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“The Internet is the first thing that humanity has built that humanity doesn’t understand, the
largest experiment in anarchy that we have ever had.”
Eric Schmidt (Chairman of Google)
OVER the last nine years a world wide debate about the future of the Internet has gainedmomentum. Many different opinions, arguments and scenarios have been subsumed
under the umbrella of the term ‘Net Neutrality (NN)’. A multitude of definitions and theories
about this vague concept exists. NN is a politically heavily debated matter in many different
countries. Over the recent years the focus of the NN debate has shifted towards a discussion
about the effect of prioritization of data in the access networks of Internet Service Providers
(ISPs).
This thesis systematically analyzes NN from an economic point of view. To this end a frame-
work is developed which helps to structure the NN debate. Furthermore, the introduction of
prioritization is studied by analyzing potential effects of Quality of Service (QoS) on Content
and Service Providers (CSPs) and Internet Users (IUs).
The structure of this thesis is composed of six chapters, as shown in Figure 1. Chapter one
gives an introduction to the history of the Internet and the concept of NN. Moreover, different
definitions of NN are presented and the relevant economic relations in the Internet ecosystem
are exemplified.
Chapter two presents a so called ‘Non Net Neutrality (NNN)’ framework. This framework
allows to structure the NN debate along two basic dimensions and to group the multitude
of scientific approaches that exist to analyze deviations from the ‘status quo’. The chapter
concludes with a policy decision guideline which was created in an effort to structure and
summarize the identified gains, threats and possible remedies of each NNN scenario according
to the dimensions of the aforementioned framework.
Chapter three deals with the CSP tiering scenario of a possible QoS tiering network regime




Chapter four deals with the IU tiering scenario of a possible QoS tiering network regime
and presents an empirical analysis based on survey data of 1035 Internet access customers to
analyze the perception of QoS and the profitability of IU tiering.
Chapter five presents an outlook on how the neutrality principle could evolve to other layers
of the Internet ecosystem.
Chapter six summarizes the findings of this thesis and exemplifies the implications for the
ongoing political process around NN and for the business of ISPs. The chapter concludes with
suggestions for future research in the field of NN.
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Introduction to the Net Neutrality
Debate
“Supply creates it’s own demand”
Say’s law by John Maynard Keynes
THIS and the following chapter are intended as an introduction and progress report onthe growing body of literature on the issue of NN. The chapters correspond in large
parts to the paper by Krämer, Wiewiorra, and Weinhardt (2012).
The so-called NN debate centers around the potential consequences of network owners exer-
cising additional control over the data traffic that is currently being transferred without further
interference and without additional fees through their networks. This chapter gives an intro-
duction to the history of the Internet, the concept of NN and the relevant economic relations
in the Internet ecosystem. The following chapter presents a framework by which the current
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literature can be classified, despite that fact that the contributions come from various academic
disciplines such as law, engineering and economics. With this approach, one is able to identify
commonalities between seemingly different standpoints and to extract the general consensus,
as well as the inherent differences between proponents and opponents of NN alike. Moreover,
examples of NN regulation are discussed and a policy decision guideline is derived.
1.1. History of the Internet
Internet is the abbreviation of the term internetwork, which describes the connection between
computer networks all around the world through routers and gateways on the basis of the same
set of communication protocols. Starting off as a closed research network between just a few
universities in 1967, the underlying network architecture still had to evolve to an open network
environment.
With the transition of the existing infrastructure to the new Transmission Control Protocol /
Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) at January 1, 1983, the Internet established as a communication
tool for a growing number of people. The design principles for the TCP/IP were guided by
two fundamental design principles: Messages are fragmented into data packets that are routed
through the network autonomously (End-to-End principle) and as fast as possible (Best Effort
(BE) principle). This means that intermediate nodes, so-called routers, do not differentiate
packets based on their content or source. Rather, routers maintain routing tables in which
they store the next node that lies on the supposedly shortest path to the packet’s destination
address. However, whereas each router acts autonomously along which path it sends a packet,
no router has control over which path the packet is send from sender to receiver. Packets are
stored in a router’s queue if they arrive at a faster rate than the rate at which the router can
send out packets. When the router’s queue is full, the package is deleted (dropped) and must
be resent by the source node. Full router queues are the main reason for congestion on the
Internet. However, no matter how ‘important’ a data packet may be, routers would always
2
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process their queue according to the first-in-first-out principle. Especially these fundamental
principles have always been a key element of the open Internet spirit and in the context of
the NN debate this has become known as the non-discrimination rule (see, e. g. , Schuett,
2010).
The first commercial ISP (‘The World’) started to offer public dial up access to the Internet in
1990 (Zakon, 1997). Together with the disruptive innovation of content visualization and link-
age via the Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML), the so called World Wide Web (WWW)
made the Internet a global success. In the dawning days of the commercial WWW in the mid
nineties the infrastructure forming the growing Internet was developed without having com-
panies in mind which have to invest heavily in bringing broadband access to every household.
Since the time when access to the Internet was predominately provided by dial up connec-
tions, the average data traffic per household has severely increased with the availability of
broadband and rich media content (Bauer et al., 2009). According to the ‘Minnesota Internet
Traffic Studies’ the overall Internet traffic in the United States (US) is growing annually by
approximately 50 percent (Odlyzko et al., 2012). The increase in network traffic is the conse-
quence of the ongoing transition of the Internet to a fundamental universal access technology.
Classic broadcasting media consumption is declining and content is instead consumed via the
Internet. On the other hand the Internet “is evolving to permit more sophisticated forms of
pricing and cost recovery, a perhaps painful requirement in this commercial world.” (Leiner
et al., 2011).
Today the commercial Internet ecosystem consists of several players. IU are connected to the
network by their local ISP, while CSPs offer a wide range of applications and content to this
mass of potential consumers. All of these actors are spread around the world and interconnect
with each other via the so called backbone of the Internet, which is operated by several big
network providers (Economides, 2005).
3
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1.2. What is Net Neutrality?
With the rapid development of the Internet as an ubiquitously available platform for informa-
tion, entertainment and communication, the role of network infrastructure owners shifted to an
essential gatekeeper position in the information society. What caused the debate is that ISPs
have signaled that they intend to use their power over the network infrastructure to generate
extra revenues. In this context, opponents of these plans envision several particular devia-
tions from the status quo which, as they say, endanger the ‘openness’ of the Internet that has
been so fruitful for content and service innovations that have advanced the daily lives of all
IUs. Consequently, the public and politicians alike are concerned about how ISPs are going
to monetize access and usage of the networks in the future. The debate was particularly stim-
ulated in 2005 after a blunt statement by Ed Whitacre, at the time the Chief Executive Officer
of ATT, who said: “Now what [content providers] would like to do is use my pipes free, but I
ain’t going to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return
on it” (O’Connell, 2005). Similar statements have been released by major European network
operators since then (Lambert, 2010; Schneibel and Farivar, 2010).
The term ‘Net Neutrality’ was coined by law professor Tim Wu (2003) a strong advocate
of NN who has still a large influence on the direction of the ongoing debate. However, the
discussion of neutrality in the Internet roots in the open access movement that was led by
Lawrence Lessig (2001, p.168–175).
From this point the term NN became the figurehead of a debate that centers around the poten-
tial consequences of network owners exercising additional control over the data traffic that is
currently being transferred without further interference (BE principle) and without additional
fees through their networks. In this context, the meaning of ‘control’ is often ambiguous and
can mean anything from blocking certain types of undesired or unaffiliated traffic (Wu, 2007),
to termination fees (Lee and Wu, 2009), to offering differentiated services and taking measures
of network management (Hahn and Wallsten, 2006).
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The term Net Neutrality has no distinct definition. Each pressure group in the debate has its
own construction of the term. In the US consumer rights groups are fighting fiercely against
the lobbying of big telecommunications and cable companies. Their definition of NN is in
particular aimed against a tiered system:
Definition 1.1 (Consumer rights group). Net Neutrality means no discrimination. Net Neu-
trality prevents Internet providers from speeding up or slowing down Web content based on its
source, ownership or destination. (Save the Internet, 2011, FAQ)
In their paper Hahn and Wallsten (2006) acknowledge that, “Net neutrality has no widely
accepted precise definition, but[...]”
Definition 1.2 (Hahn and Wallsten). “[...]usually means that broadband service providers
charge consumers only once for Internet access, do not favor one content provider over an-
other, and do not charge content providers for sending information over broadband lines to
end users.”(Hahn and Wallsten, 2006, p.1)
The so-called father of the Internet Sir Tim Berners-Lee is more concerned about the universal
access of information and the fully interconnected character of the Internet. In an interview he
made a statement, that can be interpreted as his personal ‘definition’ of the NN concept:
Definition 1.3 (Sir Berners-Lee). “While we may pay for different service levels, e.g. we pay
more for a higher bandwidth, the important thing about the Net is that if we both pay for a
certain level of service, then we can communicate at that level no matter who we are. We pay
to be able to connect to a certain bandwidth and that’s all we have to do. It’s up to our ISPs to
ensure that the interconnection is done. This is how it has always been done.”(Powell, 2006,
p.3).
Eric Schmidt, at the time of the statement CEO of Google, one of the biggest CSPs in the
world, explained the company’s definition of NN as follows:
5
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Definition 1.4 (Google and Verizon). "I want to be clear what we mean by Net neutrality:
What we mean is if you have one data type like video, you don’t discriminate against one
person’s video in favor of another, but it’s okay to discriminate across different types, so you
could prioritize voice over video, and there is general agreement with Verizon and Google on
that issue.”(Fehrenbacher, 2010)
Over the last years the question about neutrality in Internet access has grown from a mere
dispute between policy makers and network owners to an academic debate about the potential
pitfalls of ex-ante regulation and the long term effects on the Internet ecosystem in case of
an ‘laissez faire’ approach. Currently, with the exception of Chile and the Netherlands, no
explicit NN law exists that would forbid ISPs to manage, differentiate or price their networks
as they wish.
In summary, one can aggregate the matter of NN with the following short but essential
statement.
The Net Neutrality (NN) debate centers around the question whether the potential outcome of
possible NNN scenarios appears so dangerous to the freedom of the Internet ecosystem that
ex-ante NN regulation is necessary and appropriate.
1.3. Non Net Neutrality - Necessity or New Business
Model?
ISPs are confronted with the transformation of the Internet to an universal access technology.
One prominent example for this development is the company ‘Netflix’ in the US. Netflix
offers video on demand streaming of many TV shows and movies for a monthly subscription
fee. According to Sandvine (2010, p.14) already 20.6 percent of all downstream traffic on
fixed access networks in North America during peak times is Netflix. In total, approximately
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45 percent of downstream traffic on fixed and mobile access networks in North America is
attributable to real-time entertainment (Sandvine, 2010, p.12).
In 2001, Bret Swanson coined the term ‘exaflood’. In Swanson and Gilder (2008) he draws the
picture of the presumably impending flood of exabytes1 due to increasing media consumption
that would cause the congestive breakdown of the Internet.
ISPs in the fixed line business, be it former telecommunications providers or cable companies,
are concerned with this rapid development of traffic flows and the resulting infrastructure
costs. This is mainly because they invest into the last mile infrastructure bringing the Internet
to the individual households. The largest share of the cost is due to the civil engineering that
is necessary to build or upgrade the customer access network. In Europe, for example, 60-80
percent of the overall investment costs into last mile access networks are due to civil works
(Analysys Mason, 2008). In the US Verizon has to pay an estimated 4000$ per connected
customer for its fiber product FiOS. Only 650$ of these costs are for labor and the equipment
itself (Hansell, 2008). Such an investment structure causes periodical overprovisioning of
bandwidth, which, however, is soon filled up again with new content. Just like John Maynard
Keynes once said “supply creates it’s own demand”, IUs and CSPs always find and create new
ways to use the existing bandwidth. This is the dilemma that is constantly brought forward by
network operators in the NN debate.
Mobile telecommunications providers are even more in trouble. Radio waves can only deliver
a limited amount of bandwidth per cell2 and the network is therefore constrained on a regional
basis depending on the distribution of cell towers. With this additional restriction it becomes
even more challenging to guarantee a certain level of quality, because customers can move
around with their access device(s) and consequently cause congestion at highly frequented
11018bytes (If one assumes, that one megabyte of data can hold a big book of around 400 pages one exabyte of
data translates into a trillion books (cf. Swanson and Gilder, 2008, p.4).)
2Depending on the technology that is used by the network provider. Newer technologies (e.g. Long Term
Evolution (LTE)) provide higher throughput with the same limited frequency spectrum.
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spots of the covered areas.3 Another problem of mobile technologies is the unpredictable
influence of environmental conditions on the quality of the connection. Whereas fixed access
providers usually do not have to deal with the problem of interference, mobile carriers have
to take into account the topology of the terrain, general weather conditions and the speed
of customers traveling through the coverage area of a cell. This inherent uncertainty makes
it very difficult to deliver reliable service and a high level of quality compared to fixed line
access.
To cope with the increasing demand for data transportation Network Equipment Providers
(NEPs) like ‘Cisco’, ‘Alcatel Lucent’ and ‘Huawei’ are constantly improving their products.
Making use of new sophisticated multiplexing methods and additional colors in the spectrum
of light, fiber optic networks currently cope with the increasing traffic in the Internet. As a
result of this technological progress, costs per unit of bandwidth are decreasing.
One could ask why ISPs are simply not raising the prices for IUs up to a point where the
revenue is in line with the resulting infrastructure costs, or introduce a pricing scheme that
somehow corresponds to the data consumption of the customers. With respect to this argument
ISPs argue that compared to ‘flat rate pricing’, so-called ‘metered pricing’ within some kind
of two-part tariff is very unpopular and deviations from a flat rate regime back to metered
pricing schemes are often very difficult to communicate to the customer base. In 2010 the
big Canadian ISPs tried to revert to this pricing regime by imposing usage based billing on
their wholesale products. All small ISPs relying on resale and wholesale products of the
big Canadian ISPs would not be able to offer real flat rates anymore, since they themselves
would be forced to buy usage based access products. With the whole country in jeopardy to
loose unlimited Internet access, tremendous public protest arose and finally regulators decided
to stop the larger telecommunications providers (Openmedia.ca, 2011). ISPs claim that the
market for fixed Internet access is caught in some kind of ‘flat rate trap’. While the prices
3Nevertheless mobile network providers currently profit from the general trend to mobile platforms and the
increasing popularity of smart phones. In contrast to local access providers they still face an emerging market
for Internet access.
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are driven down by competition, customers would not accept a unilateral deviation back to
metered tariffs. In addition to that, the demand per customer is higher under flat rate pricing
and consequently causes higher operating costs for the ISP. In the context of Internet access
pricing this phenomenon was also confirmed in the Internet Demand Experiment (INDEX)
project4: “People were willing to pay a substantial premium to face un-metered pricing, but
they also placed much larger demands on the system than when they were metered” (Varian,
2002, p.15).
This quote shows again the dilemma brought forward by the local access ISPs. On average
consumers are willing to pay a premium for flat rate tariffs, but prices are driven down by
competition and regulation, with the result that this additional willingness to pay cannot be
internalized by the ISPs. In addition to that, flat rate customers consume more bandwidth and
data, causing higher costs due to necessary additional investments in the network infrastruc-
ture.
Another problem of ISPs, closely related to flat rate pricing, is a very small fraction of cus-
tomers (∼1%) which is causing a significant share of the overall traffic. In mobile communica-
tions for instance, these so-called ‘heavy users’ or ‘bandwidth hogs’ accounted for 35 percent
of the overall data traffic in 2010 (Cisco, 2012). It is obvious that flat rate pricing results in
some consumers paying too much compared to an alternative metered tariff, whereas heavy
users are subsidized by this group. How ISPs currently handle heavy users in their networks
will be discussed in detail in Section 2.1.1.
In summary, ISPs claim that their investments in the network are hardly counter-balanced by
new revenues from IUs. In reverse, CSPs benefit from the increased bandwidth of the ac-
cess networks, which enables them to offer even more bandwidth demanding services to their
customers. Not surprisingly ISPs argue that their current business model cannot be sustain-
able anymore in the near future and a shift towards new pricing and network management
4Within the INDEX project a large field experiment with Internet users living in university dorms was con-
ducted. Their demand for bandwidth and data was measured in reaction to different pricing schemes for
Internet access.
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regimes should not be blocked by regulation to ensure fast and reliable Internet access for all
customers.
However, the open question remains if the overall net effect on ISPs revenues will indeed
be negative and if their investments into the network infrastructure under a neutral network
regime will be sufficient or not.
1.4. Stakeholder and Revenue Streams in the Internet
1.4.1. Internet Users
Revenues in the Internet ecosystem are primarily generated by the IUs. In many countries
customers predominantly pay flat fees for their access to the Internet. Very often the access
service is differentiated solely by the maximum possible throughput of the physical connec-
tion.5 If no flat fees are offered, customers usually pay fees for being connected to the network
and additional usage fees according to the transferred amount of data or according to the time
they are being connected to the network.
In addition to that IUs generate revenues on the CSP side of the market through advertisement
impressions or direct payments. Even under the current trend to deliver content and services
via hardware tailored applications (e. g. , Apple’s AppStore), rather than standard based web
sites or formats, the biggest share of revenues in the Internet economy today is still created by
advertisements (Dou, 2004). The Internet business is subsequently often called a ‘competition
for eyeballs’.
5Customers can, for instance, decide between Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) service with six megabit per
second or service with 16 megabit per second and pay a premium for the flat rate with higher bandwidth.
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Without NN regulation it would be possible to charge IUs for preferential access to the network
or the allowance to use certain services.6 All IUs have different preferences and therefore
differing usage patterns and requirements. A business user for instance could be charged
a premium to get reliable and fast access to the network even in times of congestion. The
additional black arrows in Figure 1.1 indicate, that the respective revenue streams (IU to ISP)
could change under a NNN regime. This specific scenario will be further analyzed in Section
2.3.2.
1.4.2. Internet Service Providers
From an economic point of view ISPs are platform operators that connect the supplier of
content and services with consumers through their access networks. In the NN debate the
terms ‘core’ and ‘edge’ of the Internet are frequently used. As Figure 1.1 shows, the term core
describes all hardware and physical connections that are used to transport data from CSPs to
IUs. The core falls into three subcategories.
Access network. The physical connection to each household.
Backhaul. This network segment aggregates the traffic from all connected households of a
single ISP.
Backbone. This is the highest level of traffic aggregation. It describes the interconnection of
different network segments owned by different entities.
The local access networks are operated by so-called eyeball ISPs. Interconnection between the
backbone and eyeball ISPs is warranted by a set of mutual agreements that are either based
on bill-and-keep arrangements (peering) or volume-based tariffs (transit). In case of transit,
the eyeball ISP has to pay the backbone ISP, and not the other way around. The edge of
6T-Mobile Germany offers a ‘Voice over IP option’, that includes nothing more than the allowance of the
network operator to use services of this kind.
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the network usually describes the periphery of companies and users that can connect to the
network platform and who are able to innovate on the basis of this access technology (i. e. ,
the network platform). In the Internet economy, access to the network is never free of charge.














Figure 1.1.: Revenue streams in the Internet
1.4.3. Content and Service Providers
As mentioned before, CSPs generate revenues predominantly by advertisements. The adver-
tisement revenues increase with the number of users visiting the CSP. The level of advertise-
ment revenue depends on the click-through rate of customers (i. e. , the proportion of arriving
customers clicking on an advertising banner) and the revenue per advertisement impression
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(i. e. , the revenue per arriving consumer who potentially looks at the banner). The revenues of
CSPs are tightly interweaved with the revenues of rights owners. It is of course possible that
rights owners are also active in the role of a CSP itself, but usually they make money with the
royalties of the content they produce (e. g. , TV shows, movies, music).
CSPs are paying for access to the network, too, but usually not to the terminating ISP who de-
livers the content to the IUs visiting the respective CSP. This is very important to understand.
In the current state of the Internet ecosystem no additional fees are imposed by eyeball ISPs to
any CSP. Therefore, from the point of view of a last mile network operator CSPs are currently
‘free riding’ on their infrastructure
Without NN regulation this condition could change in the near future. It would be possible
for ISPs to charge CSP’s a positive price just for access to their networks. This is indicated by
the additional black arrows in Figure 1.1. This would be a whole new source of revenues for
eyeball ISPs, without changing anything on the underlying network architecture, but merely
requiring an additional billing system for CSPs. This termination fee scenario will be further
discussed in Section 2.2.
Obviously revenues of CSPs are somehow related to the value and the performance of the
content or the services they offer to IUs. If consumers experience a bad service quality due to
congestion in the network, they will probably not visit this CSP again, because they attribute
the bad quality directly to the CSP. For this reason CSPs are eager to improve their Quality
of Experience (QoE) for the customer. It has been already explained before that the status
quo of data transportation in the Internet follows for the most part the BE principle. This
means that all data packets are usually transported with the same priority through the network
and there is consequently only one class of service. BE implies that very demanding services
suffer more in times of congestion than other services. The current Internet has no intelligent
network mechanisms to circumvent this and to deliver higher QoE. This is the downside of the
BE principle. Without NN regulation it would be possible for eyeball ISPs to offer multiple
service classes and grant preferential access to their customer base via QoS. The additional
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black arrows in Figure 1.1 indicate that this could also be a whole new source of revenues for
ISPs (instead of charging only for bare access to the network itself without deviating from the
BE principle). This NNN scenario of CSP tiering will be further discussed in Section 2.3.1.
As Figure 1.2 shows the QoE of a CSP is influenced by three major dimensions:
• Content or service requirements w. r. t. to QoS
• End to end connection quality
• User preferences and expectations about service experience
To deliver content and services with a higher QoE, CSPs currently commission Content Dis-
tribution Networks (CDNs) and rely on their caching and route optimization services. QoS
tiering (i. e. , another shape of NNN) is one additional possible way to account for these indi-













Figure 1.2.: Quality of Experience (inspired by Kilkki, 2008)
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1.4.4. Content Distribution Networks
In the current BE Internet, where prioritization of data is not used, companies like ‘Akamai’,
‘Level3’ and ‘Limelight’ earn money by selling caching services and optimized routes through
the Internet to CSPs. Their service can be considered as a tool to deliver content and services
with higher quality to the customers, as can be seen in Figure 1.2. This business model makes
it necessary to build additional infrastructure to bypass congested routes on the public Internet
by caching frequently downloaded content closer to the requesting IUs. CDNs are an essential
and very important part of todays Internet infrastructure. Akamai for instance claims that it
delivers between 15 and 30 percent of the overall Internet traffic in the world. Figure 1.3 shows
a snap-shot of the live statistics of the Akamai CDN. At the time of the snap-shot, Akamai
delivered about two million streams to IUs worldwide and experienced about 18 million Hyper
Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) hits per second (each hit followed by delivery of non-streaming
related data). In Section 5.1 the role of CDNs in the NN debate will be discussed in more
detail.




A Non Net Neutrality Framework
“People who demand neutrality in any situation are usually not neutral but in favor of the
status quo.”
Max Forrester Eastman
THE previous Chapter explained in detail what can be subsumed under the term NNand where in the history of the Internet the NN debate is rooted. It has been analyzed
where ISPs see possible new sources of revenue in the commercial Internet ecosystem in the
future. It is obvious that access to customers is key in the Internet economy. Big eyeball ISPs
are gatekeepers of their installed base and consequently to the mass of potential customers of
CSPs. In this chapter it will be discussed how ISPs handle data transportation today and how
they could exert more control over this data. Along these lines the relevant possible NNN
scenarios are evaluated.
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In the long lasting debate many different scenarios of NNN have been studied and potential
dangers to the status quo of the Internet have been analyzed. Currently there seems to be
consensus about the most critical points that have to be addressed, but there are still many
discrepancies about the most likely scenario of NNN, which obviously crucially influences
the implications for possible NN regulation.
There are only three notable papers which structure the NN debate and the related literature.
Schuett (2010) provided the first review that focuses on the presentation of the theoretical
economic literature. In particular, Schuett distinguishes between NN as a zero pricing rule
and as a non-discrimination rule. This categorization inspired parts of the following frame-
work. Faulhaber (2011) gives a more general introduction to the debate and also discusses the
relevant literature that has emerged in the post Schuett (2010)-era. He also analyzes the new
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rules and draws the clear cut conclusion that
no evidence or academic result would justify ex-ante NN regulation. Bauer (2007) analyzes
first and foremost regulatory measures and identifies three possible governance structures that
could deal with potential NNN threats: Relying fully on anti-trust law, non-discrimination
rules and full NN regulation. His policy implications inspired parts of the structured policy
decision guideline that is presented in Section 2.4.
Figure 2.1 presents a new framework to structure the NN debate that combines and extends
previous approaches. In particular, two general dimensions are identified that form all pos-
sible NNN scenarios. In this vein, not only economic papers, but also literature from the
law and engineering domain can be categorized. Especially in the engineering domain net-
work management and prioritization mechanisms had been studied long before the NN debate
emerged.
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Figure 2.1.: Non Net Neutrality framework
2.1. Neutrality in Internet Access?
2.1.1. The Status Quo
Contrary to the believe of some proponents of NN, there are already management and prior-
itization mechanisms for data packets implemented in the network infrastructure of eyeball
ISPs today. The current generation of hardware is already able to support QoS, and new
wireless standards like LTE, the next generation of mobile data communication services, have
similar mechanisms already incorporated into the specification itself. One best practice of
eyeball ISPs nowadays is called ‘traffic management’ or ‘traffic engineering’. This procedure
describes the intelligent management of traffic flows and aims mainly at the reduction of in-
frastructure costs and to ensure service quality for the better part of the customer base. Traffic
management practices can be used to either throttle specific users or protocols1 (e. g. , Peer-to-
Peer (P2P)), or to throttle in peak load situations (Dischinger et al., 2010). The following list
from Dischinger et al., p.2 shows how differentiation can be performed “[...] by examining
one of the following:
1In technical terms this is referred to as ‘flow based differentiation’. A ‘traffic flow’ describes the whole of data
belonging to a specific type of application.
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(a) The Internet Protocol (IP) header:
The source or destination addresses can determine how an ISP treats a flow.
[...]
(b) The transport protocol header:
ISPs can use port numbers or other transport protocol identifiers to determine
a flow’s treatment. For example, P2P traffic is sometimes identified based
on its port numbers.
(c) The packet payload:2.
ISPs can use Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to identify which application
generated a packet. For example, ISPs look for P2P protocol messages
in packet payload to rate-limit the traffic of P2P applications, such as
BitTorrent.”
Based on these techniques the ISP can decide how to handle the identified data packets. With-
out going into too much technical details, one can distinguish between two possible outcomes
that can be achieved by technically handling some data packets differently: Packets of cer-
tain applications, services or content are not delivered to the requesting customer (blocking).
The experience while using or consuming certain applications, services or content is impaired
(degradation) (Dischinger et al., 2010). In an interview Georg Merdian, director of the in-
frastructure regulation devision of Kabel Deutschland, Germany’s largest cable company, said
that the cable network currently is sufficient for the data traffic generated by the customers,
but “We anticipate we will soon have to use some kind of management techniques”(O’Brien,
2010).
2A data packet consists of control information and user data. The user data of a packet is also called the
‘payload’.
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The potential dangers of mechanisms like this and the resulting fears among NN proponents
are obvious. As described in Section 1.4.1, heavy users account for a large proportion of traffic
in the networks. ISPs could use this technology to artificially degrade the traffic of such users
to save costs, even if they are paying for an unlimited flat rate plan.
Likewise ISPs could argue that these procedures are necessary to ensure a desired level of QoE
to the better part of customers, while the true reason may be anticompetitive behavior such as
foreclosure of other revenue sources, e. g. , preventing Voice over IP (VoIP) services to deliver
the same service quality as the own telephony service.
In the US two prominent examples for the abuse of traffic management are ‘Madison River
Communications’(2005) and ‘Comcast’(2008). Madison River Communications artificially
degraded other VoIP providers to make it’s own service more attractive. Comcast on the other
hand degraded P2P traffic to reduce congestion in it’s network during peak times. While the
first case ended with Madison River Communications paying a relatively low fine ($ 15,000),
Comcast challenged the authority of the FCC and won the legal dispute (Faulhaber, 2011).
This shows that consumer rights and anti-trust disputes are not the legal core competence
of network industry regulators, but that NN would extend the scope of regulation to these
grounds.
A similar argument may hold true for so-called managed services (e. g. , commercial Internet
Protocol Television (IPTV) offers). Managed services are delivered over the same IP based
connection to the customer as other Internet data. To guarantee service quality, ISPs give
IPTV packets preferential treatment in their networks, but very often also operate their own
hardware to store and distribute the content. It is not surprising that almost all of these offers
are bundled with the network access products of the respective ISPs.3 ISPs could have an
incentive to foreclose rival service providers from essential parts of their network architecture
to ensure premium service quality exclusively for their own products.
Another drawback of such preferential treatment is the negative impact on the transportation
of other Internet data. During a bottleneck situation in the backhaul, the ISP ensures firstly that
3ISPs came up with these products against the competition of cable operators, which offer TV services as their
(formerly) primary business model.
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all premium services are running smoothly, while customers requesting data from the Internet
may experience a degradation in service quality.
Another category of fears is related to free speech and freedom of information. Especially
consumer rights groups and independent journalists are afraid of ISPs being able to decide
which content and opinions are available to their customers. ISPs could block access to po-
litical controversial (but legal) information, or shut down websites of unwanted organizations
(e. g. , the websites of labor associations to prevent an assembly of workers). According to
strict definitions of NN like Definition 1.1 all forms of network management described above
cannot be considered as neutral anymore. However, the status quo of the Internet can in large
part be described as a de facto managed BE network regime.
Many law scholars focus on the potential dangers under the status-quo. Especially Wu (2003)
discusses in detail the differences between necessary network management and harmful degra-
dation, and he proposes a NN law called ‘Forbidding Broadband Discrimination’. His formu-
lation is very similar to §63 and §68 of the FCC ruling (see Section 2.4), because he empha-
sizes the right to reasonably use the Internet connection, but also accounts for the necessity to
ensure the quality of the broadband service for the better part of the customers. Christopher
Yoo (2005), also a law professor, can be seen as his dogmatic counterpart. Whereas Wu is
concerned with the gatekeeper position and anti competitive behavior of ISPs, Yoo highlights
the efficiency gains of QoS and believes in higher infrastructure competition under differenti-
ated services. In his view differentiation facilitates that more ISPs survive and therefore more
alternatives in local Internet access exist. Both authors also differ in their opinion about inno-
vation in the Internet ecosystem. While Wu believes that innovation at the edge of the network
is more important and cannot be compensated by the innovation at the core and new local ac-
cess products, Yoo thinks that the natural monopoly theory has led to the false premise that
competition in the service layer is more important than competition in the infrastructure layer
of the Internet ecosystem. In his eyes NN is a matter between the big CSPs and big ISPs.
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Whereas Wu and Yoo focus on the aspect of traffic management, QoS and price discrimina-
tion, van Schewick (2007) analyzes the incentive of ISPs to discriminate against unaffiliated
CSPs of complementary products. She concludes that NN regulation is necessary to protect
independent producers, but this comes not without costs. Van Schewick sees a direct trade-off
between innovation at the network level (core) and innovation at the application level (edge).
In her view applications are the main driver of the Internet economy and therefore innovation
at the edge of the network is more important. Consequently NN regulation is needed to foster
this innovation. She comes to this conclusion because she assumes that the reduction of in-
novation incentives of a high number of potential innovators can not be compensated by the
higher innovation of a few network providers. Additionally, she claims that centralized inno-
vators like ISPs cannot successfully replicate with their own services the innovative potential
of a large number of independent developers. Although the paper follows a convincing line of
reasoning, this appears to be more an assumption than a conclusion.
The question remains whether potential anticompetitive degradation of competing services or
nontransparent throttling of users is already a unique NN problem. Most of the actions de-
scribed above are already illegal under the status quo. Constitutional law stipulates the right
of free speech. Likewise antitrust law identifies artificial degradation of service to rivals as
illegal.
The lack of transparency and the resulting lack of assessability of the possible negative ef-
fects of such practices in reality is one of the biggest problems of the status quo. Likewise,
transparency could also be one potential remedy to this situation.
One approach in empowering users to detect whether their ISP is differentiating between types
of services of specific applications is the ‘Glasnost’ project (Dischinger et al., 2010). The re-
search project at the Max Planck Institute for Software Systems aimed at creating an online
tool that enables IUs to check whether their ISP is actually interfering with their data transmis-
sions. They found that on average at least 10% of users experienced degradation in P2P traffic
and that contrary to the arguments of the ISPs this happened throughout the whole day and
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not only at peak times. It is even more surprising, as Table 2.1 reveals, that Kabel Deutsch-
land was using traffic management procedures on a large scale even before the interview with
Georg Merdian took place.
Table 2.1.: DPI of German ISPs based on Glasnost data in Q4/2009




Kabel Deutschland 250 39%
Deutsche Telekom 205 3%
Vodafone Germany 116 4%
HanseNet Telekommunikation 112 7%
Telefonica O2 Germany 50 2%
Kabel BW 27 7%
Unitymedia 26 4%
NetCologne 18 11%
Versatel Communications 18 6%
(Mueller et al., 2009)
Beside these bottom-up tools, that do not rely on the fact that the ISP is handing out more
information about the network management practices, one could also think about forcing ISPs
to report certain quality related measures to the connected customers (top-down) directly. The
usefulness of transparency in the context of NN has already been discussed before by Faul-
haber (2010) and Sluijs, Schuett, and Henze (2010). Faulhaber claims that information has
to be easily accessible and understandable to be helpful in the NN context. He draws a com-
parison to nutrition information on groceries. Firstly, there has to be information available
on the product, otherwise consumers incur unnecessary search costs. If the information is
accessible, but complex and difficult to understand, the information does not help consumers
to make a more informed decision. In addition to that the information should be verifiable. In
contrast to this qualitative approach, Sluijs et al. (2010) use the methodology of an economic
laboratory experiment. They simulate a market with two ISPs and a potential customer base
with human participants, varying the information about the delivered service quality available
to the customers. Their most important result is, that already a fraction of informed users
can help the whole market to achieve a welfare superior outcome. This means that as long as
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enough consumers are able to obtain the correct information about the service quality, welfare
is increased.
The aspect of transparency is closely related to the aspect of competition in local access pro-
vision. In case customers indeed find out that their access provider throttles bandwidth in
peak times, or degrades certain services, they can only switch the provider in the face of com-
petition. Otherwise their option is to stay with their respective ISP, or to live without any
Internet access. This scenario perhaps sounds strange and unrealistic, but many rural areas
(especially in the US) are only served by a maximum of two ISPs. Usually one of them is the
local telecommunications provider, while the other is the local cable company. Opponents of
NN regulation argue that abuse of network management as well as other deviations from the
status-quo are unproblematic in the face of competition.
Wu (2007) analyzes the US mobile phone market with respect to NN and finds many examples
of non-neutral behavior (e. g. , crippled products and degradation) in an, as is often claimed,
highly competitive environment. He explains the interplay of competition and transparency:
“To say that competition can then be a reason not to examine industry practices and mandate
as much disclosure as possible is exactly backward. For it is such information that is necessary
to make competition work in the first place.” (Wu, 2007, p.423)
However, competition may not always be beneficial under NNN cenarios. Kocsis and Bijl
(2007) argue that termination fees and exclusive deals with CSPs can lead to more horizontal
differentiation of ISPs and consequently to higher mark-ups. This conversely relaxes compe-
tition between the ISPs in the market.
2.1.2. Strict Net Neutrality Scenario
Strict NN (as postulated by Definition 1.1) would imply a deviation from the current status quo
of the Internet towards a network regime where any network management practice would be
forbidden. This regulated technical disarming could lead to congestion problems, the cemen-
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tation of costly overprovisioning and reduced revenues, because the business with managed
services like IPTV would be in danger.
Another drawback is that strict NN prohibits to offer limited Internet access for a lower price.
This could mean anything from access to the Internet with lower priority in the backhaul of
the ISP, to unhampered access to only a subset of content or services for a lower price. This
line of argumentation is also acknowledged by the vice president of the European commission
Neelie Kroes who said that: “[...]requiring operators to provide only ‘full internet’ could kill
innovative new offers [...] Even worse, it could mean higher prices for those consumers with
more limited needs who were ready to accept a cheaper, limited package” (Meyer, 2011). For
these reasons it is more than unlikely that ex-ante regulation of strict NN can be considered
useful and welfare increasing. Nevertheless, countries like Chile walked down this road in
the year 2010. Chile was the first country in the world that intended to codify NN in law.
According to this law even network management should be forbidden and would fall into the
category of unlawful interfering with Internet traffic. The regulation of NN in general and the
example of Chile will be further discussed in Section 2.4.
The following two sections will extend the picture of NNN along two additional dimensions.
Beyond the debate whether the status quo of the Internet and the behavior of ISPs can be con-
sidered as neutral or not, two general directions of deviating from the status quo are discussed
in the literature, forming all relevant NNN scenarios.
2.2. Two-Sided Pricing
According to the two sided market literature (e. g. , Rochet and Tirole, 2006; Armstrong,
2006) each eyeball ISP can be considered as a platform provider in a two sided market. Fol-
lowing the logic of this economic concept, each ISP is some sort of match maker between two
groups of customers located on the opposite sides of the marketplace. In a two-sided market,
26
2.2. Two-Sided Pricing
it is possible to charge customers on both sides of the market for bare access to the platform
or (and) for usage of the platform’s match making process. Prominent examples of two-sided
markets are partner matching services (women/men), credit cards (cardholders/shops accept-
ing the card), gaming consoles (console owners/game publishers) and online auction services
(buyer/sellers).
One important aspect of two-sided markets are network effects. Network effects in their direct
form describe the fact that participants of a network have a positive valuation for the number of
other subscribers. By contrast, two-sided markets exhibit a general form of indirect network
effects. Hagiu (2006) coins the term ‘bilateral indirect network effects’, while Rochet and
Tirole (2006) call them ‘cross side network effects’. However one prefers to label the effect at
hand, this means that each side of the market has a positive valuation of the network size on
the other side of the market (membership externalities) and additionally also for the usage of
the platform from the other side (usage externalities).4
In terms of the Internet, one has to recall the revenue streams described in Section 1.4. IUs
value to be connected to the Internet and they also value variety of content and services as well
as their usage. The inverse holds true for CSPs and their potential advertising revenues gen-
erated by users looking at or clicking on banners. However, in addition to the ‘classical’ view
of network effects in two-sided markets, IUs may also prefer that other users are connected to
the platform, because they can communicate with them (e. g. , via a messaging service).5
4According to this definition, indirect network effects are only a special case of a two-sided market with mem-
bership externalities, but without any usage externalities (Rochet and Tirole, 2006).
5It has to be noted, that the same argument holds true for some classic examples of two-sided markets as well.
If one considers gaming consoles, one typical example of a two-sided market, one can easily comprehend
the valuation of the two sides for each other. Gamers value the variety of games and consequently the
commitment of developers and publishers for the console. Developers and publishers like a large installed
base and the presumably higher sales rate of titles for a successful console. However, with the connection to
the Internet and the rise of online multiplayer games, users of the console itself value the existence of other
players on the same console type positively. In reality two-sided markets like that exert a combination of
direct and cross side network effects.
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2.2.1. Termination Fee Scenario
According to this economic concept, one possible NNN scenario could be that eyeball ISPs
consider themselves as platform operators connecting CSPs with the IUs via their network.
From a two-sided market perspective one side of the eyeball ISP platform currently enjoys
a zero price. Under this new regime, ISPs could use their market power over the last mile
customers to charge the CSPs additional fees to connect to the installed base. However, it
is important to note that the data transportation method under this scenario does not change,
meaning that all data packets are transported following the BE rule.6 Even among the papers
assuming this scenario of NNN there is no consensus on how CSPs are charged for access to
the network of the eyeball ISP. Theoretically, any possible combination of membership and
usage fees is possible.
Besides the underlying pricing structure for network access, proponents of NN are even more
concerned about the aspect of price discrimination. In case termination fees would be allowed
on an individual CSP level, this would be first order price discrimination. With very few
exceptions, there is consensus that price discrimination techniques, which are not beneficial
to the IU side of the market, should not be allowed on the CSP side of the market either.
Therefore, even many opponents of NN vote for some kind of ‘non discriminatory surcharge’
rule in pricing.
However, there are different forms of non discriminatory access possible. For instance, ISPs
could charge all services using the same protocol (e.g. Session Internet Protocol (SIP)) or that
are in the same group of services (e.g. VoIP) the same fees for data transportation, but services
in another class (e.g. IPTV) a different price. Because services in different classes are usually
not in direct competition with each other and the quality expectations of consumers may differ
between the two types of services7, this price discrimination procedure could be considered
6Or at least to the same conditions as described in Section 2.1.1
7IU usually expect more reliability and quality with real time communication services than with streaming me-
dia, where buffering of data can already account for temporary quality reduction due to network congestion.
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as non discriminatory. Interestingly, following NN Definition 1.4 such behavior would be
considered as in line with NN by Google. This shows again that huge differences between the
views of the different stakeholders in the debate exist. However, the most undisputed pricing
scheme would be an equal fee for all CSPs that want to connect to the network of an eyeball
ISP.
First, it is important to understand that the termination fee model, as well as all other NNN
models to be discussed, will generally pose the same concerns as the current status quo. In
other words, if ISPs have an incentive to block or degrade costly traffic flows or heavy users
under a managed network regime, why should this incentive not prevail under a two-sided
pricing or QoS tiering scenario? The same logic applies to concerns about freedom of speech.
If ISPs would indeed want to block e. g. , the websites of labor associations to prevent an
assembly of workers, why should they not do so under another network regime?
If they indeed pursue such goals, the network regime is not of importance to this matter,
as long as the network technology offers the possibility to differentiate data packets. This
holds true for all scenarios except for strict NN. Another aspect mentioned before is possible
anticompetitive behavior against rival content or services. If an ISP has affiliated content
and he uses his control over the network to artificially degrade or block rival content for his
customer base, he could do so likewise in all scenarios except for strict NN.
Nevertheless, two-sided pricing brings the additional potential pitfall of reduced content inno-
vation on the table. Proponents of NN argue that already a positive price may reduce content
variety, because some CSP could not afford the money to buy access to some ISPs.
Economides and Tag (2012) were the first to present an economic model in the context of the
NN debate. They consider the termination fee model where CSPs pay a lump-sum to connect
to the IUs. The essential assumption in the model is that CSPs value an additional IU more
than IUs an additional CSP. The first version of the paper was available in 2007 and many
things changed in the process of refining the model. The main finding in the published version
of the paper is that IUs and ISPs are better off with NNN. Regulators, who are often most
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concerned with consumer welfare, should therefore be considerate before imposing mandatory
NN. This result is a direct consequence of the above assumption and fully in line with the
extant two-sided market literature: The more consumers can be attracted, the more profit can
be generated with additional fees on the CSP side of the market. Consequently, consumers
enjoy a low subscription price under NNN and ISPs are allowed to extract additional revenues
from the CSPs. Under monopoly NN is only welfare enhancing if the differentiation between
the consumers is relatively high. In other words, this would mean that IUs have a very strong
brand preference for a particular ISP compared to their valuation of access to and content
in the network. This is a very questionable case in the context of a homogeneous product
like Internet access. Therefore, in their model only CSPs would profit undoubtedly from NN
regulation. Although the results of the preliminary version of the paper supported the need
for NN regulation, the results of the published version are therefore rather tipped in favor of
NNN. The authors themselves conclude that the welfare results are ambiguous. Nevertheless,
the published version as a whole is written in a very NN orientated manner.
Njoroge, Ozdaglar, Stier-Moses, and Weintraub (2010) follow a similar approach, but they add
the platform investment decision and interconnection between two ISPs to the picture. Both
platforms charge flat access charges to CSPs and IUs. Under NN the platforms differentiate
maximally resulting in a high and low quality platform. They show that welfare in their model
is generally higher in the NNN regime, because the NNN regime leads to higher infrastructure
investments by the low quality ISP. In their model the same argument holds true for consumer
surplus and CSPs revenues. CSPs revenues increase through higher advertising revenues,
overcompensating for the higher price for access. Although the welfare results are unambigu-
ous, it is interesting that the high quality ISP prefers the NN regime. This is due to the fact
that under the NNN regime the low quality ISP can catch up through additional investments
in the network infrastructure, resulting in fiercer competition and lower revenues.
Musacchio, Schwartz, and Walrand (2009) incorporate also investment costs into their model,
but mainly add to the debate by exploring the effect of multiple ISPs charging for access.
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ISPs in their model are not in direct competition with each other, but rather forming coexist-
ing spatial monopolies. They are interested in the price charging behavior in this situation.
The authors show that two-sided pricing is preferable if the ratio of advertising rates to price
sensitivity is extreme. However, otherwise a situation similar to the tragedy of the commons
may arise in equilibrium. ISPs tend to ignore their own negative effect of overcharging on
the investments of the CSPs and consequently on the revenue of all other ISPs. This negative
effect becomes more prominent as the number of ISPs increases; resulting in NN becoming
more attractive.
Hermalin and Katz (2007), mainly interested in studying product line restrictions, apply their
model to the NN debate. They analyze a monopolistic ISP offering a menu of qualities, be-
cause he can not observe the valuation for quality of each CSP. In a special case of their model
they look into the enforcement of a zero-price rule in which the ISP would only produce one
quality. This quality would be even lower compared to a regime where only one quality would
be enforced, but positive prices to CSPs are allowed.
The first article by Wu (2003) focused exclusively on the status-quo of the Internet, whereas
Lee and Wu (2009) discuss two-sided pricing and argue in favor of a zero-price rule for CSPs.
Firstly, they highlight the important fact that all IU are potential future CSPs and that a zero-
price rule ensures cheap market entry. Also, no one has to ask for permission to reach the
installed base of ISPs. In addition to that they make the point that eyeball ISPs are actu-
ally already compensated for traffic by peering and transit agreements. Since these contracts
are negotiable and voluntary, there is no reason why higher infrastructure costs could not be
supported by more favorable agreements. A zero-price rule would also eliminate transaction
costs, because two-sided pricing makes new billing and accounting infrastructure for CSPs
necessary, and because it introduces a new form of transaction costs as well. The most strik-
ing argument in the paper deals with the potential fragmentation of the Internet ecosystem.
If two-sided pricing would result in CSPs deciding whether they want to connect with each
31
Chapter 2. A Non Net Neutrality Framework
individual ISP for a given price, than it seems inevitable that IUs will have only access to a
fraction of the CSPs they have today, depending on the ISP and his agreements with CSPs.
Yoo (2005) argues that the ‘burden of proof’ that NNN is indeed worse than NN is on the
side of those who want to regulate. He therefore calls for an ‘wait and see’ approach. Yoo
doubts that the assumption put forth by proponents of NN, that bandwidth increases faster than
demand, is correct. In his opinion overprovisioning8 is more likely to be inferior compared to
managing or diversifying the network.
Many of the papers mentioned before try to argument against or in favor of NN regulation.
The question remains what policymakers and regulators could do about the potential dangers
under a termination fee scenario, besides enforcing a NN regime and possibly risk reduced
infrastructure investments in the future (see Section 2.4).
As already discussed, one important piece of the puzzle is price discrimination. As long as
ISPs would be allowed to e. g. , auction of access (Choi and Kim, 2010), financially strong
CSPs would have an indisputable advantage. Therefore, a non discriminatory surcharge may
be one regulatory tool to ensure a level playing field for all CSPs. Remember that different
forms of non discrimination are imaginable.
However, this may not fully solve the problem, because the main argument is not invalidated
by this tool, namely the possible exclusion of young start-up companies with a constrained
budget. Nevertheless these companies have to raise money for all other aspects of their busi-
ness as well (e. g. , hardware, personnel, etc.). One viable way would be to grant promising
companies access to the network (or likewise under a QoS regime the priority lane, see also
Section 2.3.1) free of charge. Like these businesses have to pitch for money to start their busi-
ness, they could pitch their idea to get access to the network (the priority lane). This argument
is often brought forward by ISPs, however, it is exactly this kind of ex-ante selection of ideas
that proponents of NN perceive as dangerous to the open spirit of the Internet.
8‘Overprovisioning’ describes the approach of network owners to plan network resources with enough spare
capacity to guarantee the highest service quality even under peak loads.
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Another option would be some kind of non-discriminatory revenue sharing. Start-up compa-
nies could commit themselves to pay a fixed share (for a limited time) of all potential revenues
to the ISP. This would not hinder access to the network for anyone, but allow the ISP to
generate additional revenues in the case the business idea becomes successful. This construct
would allow all possible ideas to be challenged by the market and fees would only be imposed
in case the innovation becomes successful.
2.3. Quality of Service
QoS as a general concept in communications networks allows to transport telephony or data
traffic with special requirements. In contrast to traffic management policies, which usually
deal with ISP internal resource optimization, QoS tiering describes a network regime based
on the assignment of different priorities to data packets in general. Priority can be assigned on
the CSP level, but also on the IU level.
Currently the infrastructure in the Internet (e. g. , router) works on a BE basis, but the Internet
Protocol Version 4 (IPv4) already contains a Type of Service (TOS) field in its header by
which routers could prioritize packets in their queues and thereby establish QoS. However, a
general agreement on how to handle data with different TOS entries was never reached and
thus the TOS field was not used accordingly. In telecommunications engineering, research
on new protocols and mechanisms to enable QoS in the Internet has been done long before
the NN debate evolved. In context to the NN debate, the DiffServ [RFC 2474] architecture is
often discussed because it allows for a relatively simple class based differentiation of traffic.
Also the current Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6), which was standardized in 1998, contains
header information on the traffic class as well as a flow label, which facilitates QoS for real-
time applications. In addition, data packets can even be differentiated solely based on what
type of data they are carrying, without the need for an explicit marking in the protocol header.
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This is possible by means of so-called DPI. All of these features are currently deployed in the
Internet and could be used to shift the Internet access business to a new QoS tiering regime.
Such pay for priority arrangements seem less obtrusive than termination fees. If the non prior-
ity lane is still offered free of charge, all CSPs can at least connect with each ISP. However, it
should be clear that given a fixed amount of bandwidth, speeding up some CSPs will inevitably
lead to a slowing down of those CSPs that do not pay the priority fee. In a M/M/1 queuing
model this translates to introducing an additional queue which handles the request of the CSPs
in the priority class and which is processed ahead of the queue for the BE class (Kleinrock,
1976). However, in each class the queue is cleared on a first-come first-served basis. Assume
that µ denotes the available capacity in the network and λ the traffic. The average waiting
time in a neutral network is consequently denoted by wNN = 1µ−λ , which can be interpreted
as the level of congestion in the network. However, now consider a tiered system in which
the data packets of some CSPs are transported with priority, i. e. , these packets are always
enqueued ahead of the BE packets. If x denotes the share of all CSPs buying priority access,








It is easy to see that relation wP < wNN < wBE is always fulfilled, assuming an equal trans-
mission capacity in both regimes and that not all CSPs are buying priority access. Otherwise,
when all CSPs are in the priority class, the model trivially collapses to wP = wNN . This is an
important feature of this queuing model, because it shows formally that serving some CSPs or
IUs with priority will unambiguously lead to a degradation of service quality for the remain-
ing network participants in the BE class. Chapter 3 will make extensive use of this approach
to model congestion in the Internet ecosystem. For now consider only this basic trade-off,
which is driving many results in the economic literature about QoS tiering on either side of
the market.
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2.3.1. Content and Service Provider Tiering Scenario
Many opponents of NN refer to the argument that the current BE Internet cannot be consid-
ered as ‘neutral’ since different types of data and applications have different requirements for
network quality. Consider for instance an application like Skype.9 In a situation where the
network is congested, the resulting delay of data packages of the Skype service has a highly
detrimental effect on the usability of the service itself. In comparison, the detrimental effect
on an email service is negligible. According to this logic, highly congestion sensitive services
are put at a disadvantage in a neutral BE network, because the quality of experience is lower in
a bottleneck situation compared to a less demanding service. The introduction of QoS could
mitigate the experience of such inherent differences in data transportation requirements of ser-
vices. QoS allows the ISP to differentiate data packets based on different criteria and also to
charge prices accordingly. Following this logic, highly congestion sensitive services could be
better off if they were allowed to pay for priority, whereas the detrimental effect of a wors-
ening in congestion to the remaining BE class could be less severe, because only congestion
insensitive CSPs remain in this class. Again any combination of membership and usage fees
for priority transmission would be possible, but as well for access to the remaining BE class.
Also the forms of price discrimination correspond to the ones presented in Section 2.2.1.
However, QoS tiering bears one additional risk compared to the termination fee scenario.
Through the additional source of revenues (selling priority access) ISPs may have the incentive
to artificially degrade the BE quality to force more CSPs into the costly priority lane. This is
also called the ‘dirty road fallacy’ (Sidak and Teece, 2010). This problem may even be more
substantial if the ISP has to offer access to the BE class free of charge (like under the status
quo).
The economic literature on QoS tiering on the CSP side is very young, but many papers have
been published in recent years. Theoretical models rely on assumptions about the network
9Skype offers a VoIP service that allows free calls between all connected users.
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industry, that may influence many of the results. First there are differences about the nature
of Internet service quality. Some authors view data transportation quality as a complement
to quality of the delivered content, whereas others see it as substitutes. Jamison and Hauge
(2008) focus on the question whether transmission quality can substitute for content quality.
They assume that the current network capacity will increase with the introduction of QoS,
such that the transmission quality of the BE class is not affected. They find that QoS has a
beneficial effect on content and service variety. This result stems from the fact that CSPs with
a lower initial value can now compensate for that through buying priority access.
Other critical assumptions are made with respect to data delivery quality and demand for
bandwidth. Economides and Hermalin (2012) analyze the negative impact of the so-called ‘re-
congestion effect’ on overall congestion under QoS tiering. The re-congestion effect describes
the assumption that those CSPs that are prioritized under a QoS tiering regime will receive
even more consumer requests and thus generate more traffic than under NN, which in turn
re-congests the network. This assumption is in contrast to Hermalin and Katz (2007) who
argue that the overall demand for capacity is independent of priority. In Economides and
Hermalin (2012) the assumption about increase in demand (re-congestion) on the one hand
and the assumption about fixed capacity on the other hand leads obviously to a welfare loss
by construction. In addition to that much of the analysis is based on the implicit assumption
that content variety is exogenous and the same under NN and QoS tiering, resulting in NN
being superior in the short-run. This assumption neglects possible positive effects on content
and service variety through the provision of higher quality that would be not delivered under
NN. In case the re-congestion effect is not too strong QoS tiering is the more efficient regime,
because it provides higher investment incentives (i. e. , investments are not overcompensated
by increase in demand).
The paper of Hermalin and Katz (2007), which rests on the same principal modeling assump-
tions, analyzes CSP tiering by a monopolistic ISP and also in a duopoly when the ISP is free
to offer a menu of qualities (NNN) and when it is restricted to offer one quality (NN). The ISP
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offers a menu of qualities, because he can not observe the valuation for quality of each CSP.
One obvious result of NN (single quality constraint) is that all CSP with a lower valuation for
quality are driven out of the market, while CSPs with a high valuation for quality are suffering
from the underprovision of quality. However, there are some CSPs with a medium valuation
for quality, that are now receiving a better quality than under NN.
Cheng, Bandyopadhyay, and Guo (2011) and Choi and Kim (2010) were the first to employ
a queuing model to formalize the relationship between priority and BE traffic. Both papers
investigate the competition of CSPs in a duopoly and the ISP’s investment incentives under
CSP tiering. The models account for the effect of packet queuing in data transportation on
the average waiting time in a network with respect to the overall network capacity and usage
of the network. This approach allows to formalize the negative effect of prioritization on the
remaining BE class. The authors investigate the effect of CSP tiering on the competition of
CSPs that offer similar services. In both models, exactly two competing CSPs are located
at the end of a standard Hotelling line, and it is assumed that customers dislike congestion
and visit one of the two CSPs exclusively. CSPs can improve their competitive position by
purchasing priority access from a monopolistic ISP. This alleviates the effects of the network
congestion for the customers of the respective service to some extent. However, Choi and Kim
assume that the ISP sells priority access to only one of the two CSPs exclusively. Choi and
Kim make this assumption in order to exclude a possible prisoners’ dilemma situation that is
observed in Cheng et al. (2011), who allow the ISP to sell priority transmission to both con-
tent providers. They find that when the difference in profit margins between the two content
providers is rather small, both will individually buy priority access. In this situation, neither
CSP gains an advantage and the price paid for priority access is forfeited. Choi and Kim
assume discriminatory access to the priority class (only one CSP can buy priority) and even
more restrictive, they allow the ISP to auction off the priority lane (discriminatory surcharge).
In terms of the possible pricing schemes presented in this paper, this can be considered the
worst case scenario of pricing for CSP tiering. Cheng et al. (2011) as well as Choi and Kim
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(2010) show for a large range of parameters that the ISP’s incentive to invest in infrastructure
is higher under NN, whereas CSP tiering is generally welfare-enhancing in the short run.
The paper by Krämer and Wiewiorra (2012), which corresponds by and large to Chapter 3,
models the main arguments of the net neutrality debate in a two-sided market framework with
network congestion sensitive CSPs and IUs on each side, respectively. The platform is con-
trolled by a monopolistic Internet service provider, who offers CSPs prioritized access to his
customers for a non discriminatory surcharge. The CSPs are not in direct competition to each
other, but the model allows the entry of new CSPs and can therefore account for the impact of
QoS on content variety. CSP tiering functions as a means to allocate congestion away from
the congestion sensitive to the congestion insensitive CSPs. Krämer and Wiewiorra (2012)
find that CSP tiering may be the more efficient regime in the short run. In the long run, it
provides higher incentives for broadband investments, because the entry by new, congestion
sensitive CSPs creates additional demand for the priority service and consequently additional
revenues for the ISP. However, long run welfare results depend on the distribution of conges-
tion sensitivity on the CSP side of the market. If the mass of congestion sensitive CSPs is very
large, an effect similar to the re-congestion effect of Economides and Hermalin (2012) can
be observed. This shows how dependent welfare results are in relation to ad-hoc assumptions
about the development of traffic consumption.
Reggiani and Valletti (2012) extend this approach by adding a single big CSP (e. g. , Google)
to the model, which offers different services simultaneously, while a continuum of small CSPs
(‘the fringe’) offers only one service per company. Reggiani and Valletti find that NN is likely
to hinder investment at the core, but in contrast to that innovation at the fringe is stimulated.
Still they can show that the service development of the big CSP is reduced. Like in Krämer
and Wiewiorra (2012) CSP tiering leads to a better allocation of network resources and is
consequently welfare enhancing. Nevertheless CSP tiering may eventually be beneficial to the
big players on the CSPs side of the Internet ecosystem.
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The question remains what policymakers and regulators could do about the potential dangers
under a CSP tiering scenario, besides enforcing a NN regime and possibly risking reduced
infrastructure investments in the future. They could implement a Minimum Quality Standard
(MQS) to deal with this threat instead. A MQS could be introduced solely for the BE class or
for each service class individually. Very often proponents argue that ‘making someone faster’
is of no concern to them, but only if at the same time ‘no one is made worse off’. Insights from
queuing theory show that this is only possible if the network capacity is increased. Otherwise
the trade-off explained before still holds. The reason for this results is in direct relation to the
inherent property of the M/M/1 queuing model, as described before. The rationale behind
this argument will be further analyzed in a theoretical model in Section 3.6. Brennan (2011)
argues in favor of a MQS and shows that this regulatory tool may have far less negative impact
than NN. It can mitigate not only QoS related concerns, but also traffic management related
concerns that relate to the artificial degradation of rival content or costly traffic flows. He also
notes, however, that an MQS could also be misused by the industry. Incumbents could vote
for a high quality standard in order to foreclose the market for (low quality) entrants.
2.3.2. Internet User Tiering Scenario
NN Definition 1.1 does not narrow down the implication of neutrality solely to the CSP side
of the market, but applies to the transmission of data packets in general. According to this
definition it would be forbidden to slow down or speed up data, independent of the side of the
market requesting preferential treatment. Following this strict definition it would be a violation
of NN if some users would get preferential treatment in data transportation and others would
not, even if CSPs are not charged at all.
In contrast to the US, in Europe this scenario is not in the focus of the public debate. One po-
tential reason might be the highly competitive market environment in Europe, and the fact that
NN is mostly associated with discrimination of CSPs, which would only have indirect effects
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on consumers. Many business models in the Internet economy are based on advertisements.
Therefore consumers do not fear immediate price increases through priority transmission fees
that are firstly payed by the CSPs. From a business perspective differentiated service on the
IU side of the market could also be an additional revenue stream that compensates the ISP
for increasing infrastructure costs and mitigates the effect of costly overprovisioning in the
network. Some ISPs already offer Internet access tariffs to their customers that incorporate
premium options for preferential treatment. The British ISP ‘Plusnet’, for instance, offers
three service classes to its customers. The service classes discriminate among different types
of services as can be seen in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2.: Plusnet service classes (from Plusnet (2011))
To explain and justify this procedure the provider clarifies:
“As customer numbers and usage grows, we have to increase the capacity of our
network to make sure there’s enough bandwidth for everyone. When the network
is busy, it’s easy for things to get out of control. Peer-to-peer, video streaming
and large file downloads can flood the network quickly and use up the bandwidth.
If this happens, it reduces the speed of web browsing, email, gaming and other
types of web traffic. Traffic management prevents this from happening. With
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Traffic Management we can do lots of clever things to make sure everyone gets a
good, fair online experience” (Plusnet, 2011).
Before the NN debate emerged, MacKie-Mason and Varian (1995) studied congestion pric-
ing in a theoretical model as a tool to encourage users to efficiently use available network
resources. They compare the equilibrium with and without usage fees and conclude that one
key element of network costs is the social cost of congestion. They argue that pricing is the
best way to ensure efficient network operation because it has the advantage that it “[...]plays
a dual role: it provides a measure of the social cost of increased usage for a given capacity,
but it also determines the value of a change in capacity” (MacKie-Mason and Varian, 1995,
p.1142).
In an article that was also not inspired by the NN debate, Reitman (1991) looks into endoge-
nous quality differentiation in congested markets. He distinguishes between impatient and
patient consumers and finds that in an competitive equilibrium firms will always choose prices
and capacities to differentiate themselves from each other. With many firms in the market, all
of them are choosing the same level of capacity and differentiate each other solely by prices.
This result is similar to the idea of Paris Metro Pricing (Odlyzko, 1999; Chau et al., 2010).
Odlyzko states that until the mid 1980s the Paris Metro service was operated with first and
second class cars. The cars in both classes were absolutely identical, but first class tickets cost
twice as much as second class tickets. Therefore, congestion in the first class cars is lower.
With respect to eyeball ISPs, Paris Metro Pricing would mean that the available bandwidth is
split up between priority services and BE services. The consequence of splitting up capacity
and differentiating prices is that more revenue is generated compared to a single network with
the entire capacity.
In a similar model, Schwartz et al. (2008) investigate the investment and capacity division
decision of competing ISPs. They also find that two service classes are socially beneficial.
Moreover, the proportion of consumers that is worse off than with a single service class is
decreasing in the number of ISPs in the market. If there were only a few ISPs with market
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power, too much capacity would be provided for the premium service and thus a larger share
of consumers would be forced into this service class, resulting in a welfare loss. Therefore, the
authors conclude that capacity regulation (i. e. , the assignment of a predefined share of capac-
ity to the standard service) would be welfare enhancing. This regulation would be similar to a
MQS regulation (cf. Section3.6). The authors assume that users could otherwise boycott the
transition to a new QoS regime. Ex-ante MQS regulation can consequently build reputation
for a QoS regime and increases the probability that the transition to a new tiered system suc-
cessfully takes place. Under low competition ISPs anticipate NN regulation and prefer to stay
with the status quo (i. e. , the ISPs assign all capacity to one service class), because regulation
places uncertainty on QoS related network infrastructure investments.
Also Walrand (2008) shows under a similar setting that total welfare is higher if capacity is
split up and two service classes are offered. However, he finds that total revenue would be
maximized if one ISP offers the high quality (expensive) network and the other ISP the low
quality (cheap) network. The higher revenue is made by the low quality ISP and therefore
the ISPs face a dilemma which could lead to a price war. In this case both ISPs try to po-
sition themselves as the cheap network provider. At some point the price is so low, that it
becomes profitable again to deviate and position as the expensive ISP and consequently no
stable equilibrium in prices might exist.
Bandyopadhyay and Cheng (2006) study the effect of IU tiering in a theoretical model that
incorporates queuing theory. In their model, users are able to decide for preferential treatment
of their data on the fly during an Internet session. They find that this pricing scheme would
increase the revenues of ISPs without significant costs to introduce the service. Nevertheless,
the authors identify a potential problem: The monopolistic ISP might want to serve only
customers with a high valuation for this service, excluding other customer groups (separating
equilibrium). This could make regulatory intervention necessary provided that Internet access
is politically classified as an universal access technology.
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Since user side quality of service is currently not rolled out by a significant number of ISPs the
question remains, why ISPs lobby so intensely for the introduction of differentiated services
on the CSP side, but still hesitate to offer differentiated service to the IUs. A business strategy
that seems to be less risky in terms of regulation and general juridical hurdles.
Interestingly enough, regulators and politicians are less concerned with this kind of preferen-
tial treatment. This scenario would even be in line with Definition 1.3 of Sir Tim Berners-Lee.
One potential reason for this puzzle might be the perception of price discrimination (i. e. , dif-
ferentiated service). Fairness seems to be very important when dealing with pricing schemes
for end-users. In contrast to CSPs the IUs perception of pricing schemes in general is more
prone to psychological and social influence factors (Bolton et al., 2003). This effect becomes
even more prominent if the good is scarce and has to be allocated between all users. Chapter
4 evaluates the aspect of fairness in Internet access pricing w. r. t. to QoS and different pricing
schemes. To this end a web-based survey was conducted via an online panel among 1035
representative Internet access customers. The chapter identifies several key elements deter-
mining the consumer perception of pricing schemes and applies them to the Internet domain.
To understand how users would possibly react to the introduction of QoS tariffs in general
one has to find out, which of the identified factors (e. g. , fairness) influence the perception of
differentiated services. It is also unclear if the (level of) acceptance depends on the way how
data is prioritized, i. e. , capacity distributed among the customers of an ISP.
If customers feel treated unfair or perceive changes in service delivery as unfair their reactions
can reach from simple complaining to a complete boycott of the product or the delivering
company in general. The NN debate shows in an impressive way to what extent the complaint
of Internet activists can grow.
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2.4. Net Neutrality and Regulation
This section presents a policy decision guideline in form of a clustered decision process and
gives a short overview over the actual regulatory actions in the US and Europe. The guide-
line is based on results from the NN literature and will be compared to the reasoning of real
regulatory agencies.
2.4.1. Decision Support for Regulators
Any possible deviations from NN are driven by two fundamental assumptions. First, the
believe that Internet traffic will increase at a rate which cannot be handled by overprovisioning
and traffic management techniques and which will therefore result in a (future) congestion
problem. Second, the ISPs claim they cannot afford the resulting costs for the necessary
network infrastructure investments. Thus, they claim that it is inevitable to switch to a NNN
scenario in the near future. If regulators agree that both assumptions are true, a switch to a
NNN senario should not be prohibited ex-ante. The previous survey of the academic literature
has shown that under certain NNN scenarios also gains exist, that should be considered and
weighted against the inherent dangers of those NNN scenarios before deciding for any form
of intervention.
Figure 2.3 shows the potential threats that are associated with the different NNN scenarios and
clusters them into those that are specific to a tiered QoS system (CSP tiering and IU tiering
scenario), two-sided pricing (termination fee scenario) or a managed network (status quo).
For all QoS tiering scenarios the threat of the dirt road fallacy exists. Consequently, a MQS
policy could be applied to prevent artificial quality degradation or reduced capacity expansion.
Only if this measure is believed to fail, direct NN intervention is appropriate.
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Figure 2.3.: NN policy decision process
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The same logic applies to the concerns related to two-sided pricing. First, if ISPs engage in
discriminatory pricing, a non discriminatory surcharge could be demanded, based on whatever
criteria appear suitable (e. g. , Definition 1.4). Another concern under two-sided pricing is re-
duced innovation at the edge, which might result from positive termination fees that cannot be
afforded by smaller CSPs. Regulators could rely on innovation funds (venture capital) or rev-
enue sharing agreements, as described in Section 2.2.1. Lee and Wu (2009) discuss the threat
of fragmentation of the Internet, which could possibly arise if ISPs and CSPs cannot agree
on a suitable termination fee, or if ISPs make exclusive deals with certain CSPs. A possible
remedy would be to enforce mandatory interconnection similar to the telecommunications in-
dustry. Only if one of these measures cannot solve the possible NNN dangers, stricter NN
seems justified.
The final set of concerns and remedies is related to practices that can already be employed by
eyeball ISPs in the current status quo, i. e. , in a managed network. Distortion of downstream
competition (degradation of rival content, e. g. , VoIP) can readily be addressed ex post by
antitrust law. Likewise, violations of freedom of speech are subject to constitutional law.
Furthermore, if an ISP engages in degradation of certain users, content or protocols due to
cost considerations, a mix of transparency obligations and competition is currently considered
to be the right regulatory response. Again, only if these measures cannot address the concerns
adequately, stricter NN regulation should be taken into consideration.
The proposed regulatory decision support shows that (strict) NN regulation should only be
applied if the proposed remedies are believed or proven to fail. Furthermore, if a measure is
believed or proven to fail, one should try to adjust or refine the measure first, to address the
reason of failure. Recall that regulators also have to consider the possible efficiency gains of
specific NNN scenarios and the implementation costs of each remedy they intend to apply.
However, it seems that already many tools under the status quo exist that can deal with the
most acute threats.
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2.4.2. Regulation in the United States and Europe
In 2005 the FCC adopted four principles to ensure the ‘open and interconnected character of
the Internet’, a circumscription to avoid the biased term NN. In the Report & Order from 2010
the FCC proposed an updated version of this goals with a stronger focus on transparency.
“A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access service,
insofar as such person is so engaged, shall[...]”
1. Transparency
“[...]publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network manage-
ment practices, performance, and commercial terms of its broadband In-
ternet access services sufficient for consumers to make informed choices
regarding use of such services and for content, application, service, and de-
vice providers to develop, market and maintain Internet offerings.”(FCC,
2010, §54)
2. No Blocking
“[...]not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices,
subject to reasonable network management.”(FCC, 2010, §63)
3. No unreasonable degradation
‘[...]not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic
over a consumer’s broadband Internet access service.”(FCC, 2010, §68)
4. Reasonable network management
“A network management practice is reasonable if it is appropriate and tai-
lored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into
account the particular network architecture and technology of the broadband
Internet access service.”(FCC, 2010, §82) 10
10“Legitimate network management purposes include: ensuring network security and integrity, including by
addressing traffic that is harmful to the network; addressing traffic that is unwanted by end users (including
by premise operators), such as by providing services or capabilities consistent with an end user’s choices
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This shows that the FCC is more concerned with regulating the status quo. As exemplified
in Section 2.1.1, transparency regulation makes only sense in a situation with sufficient com-
petition. However, compared to the 2005 principles, which explicitly mentions the ‘right of
consumers for competition among network providers’, the current Report & Order relies pre-
dominantly on transparency. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that any deviation to a QoS regime
will be supported by the FCC since pay for priority arrangements would “raise significant
cause for concern” (FCC, 2010, §76). It is interesting to note that the ruling excludes all wire-
less network providers. The FCC argues that there is sufficient competition between wireless
operators and that compared to the fixed line business it is still an emerging market. For this
reason and in line with its own definition of NN (Definition 1.4), Verizon could introduce QoS
in its network.
In the European Union (EU) no specific NN law exists either. The EU commission adopted
a ‘wait and see’ approach and is less concerned about the introduction of a possible CSP
tiering regime (specifically, EU Directive 2009/136/EC from November 25, 2009). However,
the directive relies on similar transparency and non-blocking rules as the FCC’s order (FCC,
2010). In contrast to the US the EU allows the national regulatory agencies to set a MQS
to prevent undesired actions of ISPs under the status quo or a potential dirt road fallacy (cf.
Article 22, 3).
Besides these general regulatory approaches to NN in the US and the EU, there exist two no-
table national exceptions.
First, Chile enacted a NN law in 2010, which was finally implemented in May 2011
(Art.24Ha/Ley 20.453). At first, the law was considered to be the only implementation of
strict NN in the world (Gaitonde, 2010). However, the final amended regulation states that
ISPs cannot “arbitrarily block, interfere, discriminate, hinder or restrict” the use of the Inter-
net. This passage reveals that the law prevents just arbitrary discriminatory actions and not a
tiered system per se. In this respect the final law is more a compromise between NN propo-
regarding parental controls or security capabilities; and reducing or mitigating the effects of congestion on
the network.”(FCC, 2010, p.17952).
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nents and opponents than a codification of strict NN (Nixon, 2011).
Second, the Netherlands enacted a NN law in 2011 that forbids network operators to degrade
certain applications or charge extra fees to its customers. The law was suggested after an
announcement of mobile network operators to charge extra for certain VoIP and messaging
applications. Being the first country in the EU enacting a NN law, the Netherlands followed
the example of Chile, but in contrast to the US the law targets the emerging mobile markets
(O’Brien, 2011). In May 2012 the law is expected to be finally implemented by the Dutch
senate.
In Germany, the government commissioned a committee of inquiry (partially comprising of
politicians and experts) on different issues of the digital economy, among which was also the
issue of NN. In its final report, which is also intended to serve as a guidance to the national
regulatory authority among which NN was also discussed, the committee did not come to
a consensus w. r. t. CSP tiering. However, similar to the FCC’s order, it acknowledges that




Content and Service Provider Tiering
“Now what [content providers] would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let
them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it.”
Ed Whitacre (Chief Executive Officer of ATT) (O’Connell, 2005)
THIS chapter is intended to extend the existing theoretical literature about NN that usesqueuing theory to analyze a possible CSP tiering scenario. The chapter corresponds in
large parts to the paper by Krämer and Wiewiorra (2012).
3.1. Motivation
In the ongoing NN debate CSP tiering has been identified as the most desired regime by ISPs.
However, current models relying on queuing theory predominantly explore the aspect of com-
petition between two competing CSPs, that have been discussed in Section 2.3.1. Due to the
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Hotelling (1929) framework, these models have several drawbacks. First, they assume that
IUs use only one of the two services exclusively (single-homing). Consumers using Google’s
search engine would consequently never use Microsoft’s Bing search, too. Especially in the
context of the Internet this assumption seems to be very restrictive and unrealistic. NN pro-
ponents are particularly concerned with the variety of content and services in the Internet
ecosystem because IUs have a valuation for variety. This essential aspect of the debate can
not be addressed by this class of models. This drawback is closely related to another prob-
lematic restriction. Both models that make use of results found by queuing theory (cf. Table
3.1) assume only a fixed number of CSPs (i. e. , two). Although this captures the notion of
competition sufficiently, it does not allow to study the impact of QoS on content variety. Con-
sequently, with this class of models, one is not able to analyze whether CSPs are driven out of
the market in case they cannot afford additional access fees. Therefore it is also not possible
to make predictions about the relation between network investments and content variety. As
exemplified in Chapter 1, ISPs claim that only a shift to a new network regime ensures that
they can cope with the increasing demand for bandwidth. Second, existing models neglect the
effect of congestion sensitivity. Section 2.3 gave an introduction into the relation of neutrality
in data transportation and the demand for quality of different types of services and content.
Recall the simple fact, that e. g. , real time applications suffer more from congestion than e. g. ,
a simple mail service.
As described in Section 2.2, the Internet can be modeled as a two-sided market, with CSPs
and Internet customers on either side, each of which value an increasing number of actors on
the other side and dislike network congestion. It is assumed that the ISP has a terminating
monopoly over its customers (e.g., due to the customers’ lack of alternative ISPs or high
switching costs). Although this may sound restrictive at first, this is a reasonable assumption
for many regions in the US and Europe. For instance in the US many regions are covered only
by the local cable company. Therefore, the only way for the CSPs to reach those customers
is through the ISP’s network. Although the CSPs’ customer base is probably comprised of
customers of many different ISPs, each of which might have a terminating monopoly, it is still
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insightful to investigate the relationship between CSPs and a single ISP, particularly if that
ISP is thought to be large. For example, it would certainly have a substantial impact on CSPs’
business model if they would not have access to customers’ on AT&T’s network in the United
States of America (USA), or the customers of German Telecom.
Note that the following model deals only with one of the NNN scenarios presented in Section
2, namely CSP tiering. In contrast to e. g. , Choi and Kim (2010) the model is designed to
analyze a more realistic pricing structure. As explained in Section 2.4, one of the inherent
dangers of two-sided pricing is a discriminatory surcharge, i. e. , CSPs are charged different
prices even if they are in the same class of services (e. g. , VoIP). It is very likely that regulators
would never accept a shift to a QoS tiering regime, especially not a CSP tiering scenario, if
non-discrimination is not warranted. To study the effect of CSP tiering without the inherent
drawback of discrimination, the following model considers an ISP that charges only the same
price per transmitted data packet to all CSPs buying priority access.
Another concern mentioned in Section 2.4 is reduced innovation and fragmentation of the
Internet. To exclude this threat ex-ante the model only considers those charges to the CSPs
that are over and beyond those for access to the Internet. Consequently, the BE lane under
CSP tiering remains to be offered for zero additional costs. Analog to that, NN is considered
as a zero price rule which implies that the ISP cannot charge CSPs additionally for terminating
traffic in its network.
However, the model does not assume any restrictions on the price for priority access, nor the
quality that is offered under QoS tiering. Therefore it is not clear ex-ante if a switch to this non-
discriminatory CSP tiering regime is welfare enhancing. However, it would be highly unlikely
that CSP tiering without these restrictions would ever be allowed by regulators, following
the argumentation of e. g. , the FCC (cf. Section 2.4). Consequently, these restrictions are
restrictive in appearance only, but are in fact realistic assumptions to model a benchmark for
a possible CSP tiering scenario. Conversely it would be wrong to generalize the following
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findings to any possible forms of CSP tiering: However, the model presented in this Chapter
allows to analyze the following research questions.
Research Question 1. What is the effect of a non-discriminatory CSP tiering scenario in a
local access monopoly in the short-run?
Research Question 1.1. What is the effect of a non-discriminatory CSP tiering scenario
in a local access monopoly on content variety?
Research Question 1.2. What is the effect of a non-discriminatory CSP tiering scenario
in a local access monopoly on CSP, IU and ISP welfare?
Research Question 2. What is the effect of a non-discriminatory CSP tiering scenario in a
local access monopoly in the long-run?
Research Question 2.1. What is the effect of a non-discriminatory CSP tiering scenario
in a local access monopoly on capacity investments?
Research Question 2.2. What is the effect of a non-discriminatory CSP tiering scenario
in a local access monopoly on content variety?
Research Question 2.3. What is the effect of a non-discriminatory CSP tiering scenario
in a local access monopoly on CSP, IU and ISP welfare?
Research Question 3. What is the effect of MQS regulation under a non-discriminatory CSP
tiering regime in a local access monopoly?
Table 3.1 shows a summary of the important features of the model in comparison to the rele-
vant previous literature in the field.
Table 3.1.: Comparison of related work
Non discriminatory Infrastructure Entry Congestion
surcharge investments of CSPs Sensitivity
Choi and Kim (2010)    
Cheng et al. (2011)    




3.2.1. Content and Service Providers
The model considers a continuum of CSPs. This allows for an explicit analysis of the effect
of a CSP tiering scenario on content and service variety in the Internet ecosystem. Whatever
service the CSPs offer, they generate revenues only indirectly through online advertisements.
This rules out the possibility of CSPs charging consumers directly for access to their content.
Although this may sound restrictive at first, it has been exemplified in Section 1.4.1 that this
is the more relevant case, as empirical evidence suggest that customers are generally fairly
reluctant to pay extra for specific content or services (Dou, 2004; Sydell, 2007).
In the model, a CSP’s advertisement revenue will depend on the average received traffic, the
per-click advertisement revenue and its unique click-through rate. The click-through-rate of
each CSP is determined by its innate sensitivity towards network congestion. This allows to
explicitly account for differences in congestion sensitivity between content and services in the
Internet that have been explained in Section 1.4.3.
Before these measures are formally introduced below, one fundamental assumption has to be
made:
Assumption 1. Each CSP receives the same average traffic from each customer, denoted by
λ . This is independent of a CSP’s business model and consequently its innate sensitivity to
network congestion.
It will often be convenient to think of λ as the number of ‘clicks’ that a customer generates
on each CSP’s website. This assumption provides a neutral and unbiased reference case w. r. t.
the traffic that is generated by the specific CSPs and w. r. t. the value of the individual content
of the CSPs. This assumption does therefore not imply any ex-ante re-congestion effect. It has
already be discussed that e. g. , Economides and Hermalin (2012) assume an increasing traffic
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for CSPs that are connected with higher quality. However, this obviously would introduce an
ex-ante disadvantage of CSP tiering that has been shown to drive the results of such models
(cf. Section 2.3.1).
In general the relationship between congestion sensitivity of a CSP and the amount of traffic
that this CSP generates is far from obvious. For example, VoIP services are highly congestion
sensitive (in terms of jitter, delay, packet loss), but generate comparably little traffic. Likewise,
file hosting services are highly traffic intensive but not congestion sensitive. Assumption 1 is
aimed at avoiding this kind of relationship between the traffic that a CSP generates and its
congestion sensitivity, since it would also bias the analysis. Consequently, this setup allows
to assess CSP tiering based on its core ability, i.e., increasing transmission quality (not band-
width). Moreover, by applying Assumption 1 any judgment about the value of specific content
or services to consumers is avoided. In the model, CSPs offer heterogeneous services which
are all equally valuable to customers. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that customers dis-
tribute their clicks evenly among the available CSPs. As explained before it is not intended
to study the effect of CSP tiering on the direct competition between otherwise similar CSPs.
Therefore, Assumption 1 implies that the model abstracts from any business stealing effects.
More specifically, in what follows, it is assumed that λ is constant and thus, as the number of
active CSPs increases, consumers increase their total number of clicks accordingly. Competi-
tive pressure is introduced through diminishing ad revenues, as described below.
Nevertheless it has to be controlled for the alternate assumption, that the consumers’ total
number of clicks is fixed and thus λ diminishes as more CSPs enter the market. This would
introduce a general notion of competitive pressure among the CSPs, i.e., as more CSPs en-
ter the market, the revenue of each CSP is reduced, keeping everything else constant. This
alternative setup is analyzed in Section 3.5.1. Note that the results of either assumption are
qualitatively the same.
Congestion sensitivity on the CSP’s end has the effect that only a fraction of the arriving clicks
can be turned into advertisement revenue. This measure is known as the click-through rate. It
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is assumed that each CSP’s click-through rate diminishes as network congestion increases.
Moreover, CSPs are heterogeneous w. r. t. to their sensitivity towards network congestion.
Each CSP’s business model has an innate sensitivity as to what extent network congestion
affects the click-through rate. For example, a web-based e-mail provider is likely to be rel-
atively insensitive to network congestion. Consumers that arrive on the website are satisfied
with the service even under high network congestion, and more likely to click on advertise-
ments, because their QoE with the service is still satisfactory. In contrast, consumers of a
highly congestion sensitive web service (e.g., online gaming) may still sign up for the CSP’s
gaming service, but are less satisfied in the presence of network congestion. The QoE with the
service is worse and therefore IUs are less likely to click on advertisements. This individual
congestion sensitivity is denoted by θ and the corresponding click-through rate of a CSP is
assumed to be (1−θw), where w denotes the average waiting time in the network, the indirect
measure of the level of network congestion. The click-through rate itself follows a so-called
‘Poisson thinning process’. The probability that an arriving IU becomes advertising relevant
to the CSP depends on the average waiting time in a service class (w) and the sensitivity of
the service (θ ) itself. Therefore a CSP with a high innate sensitivity has a lower probabil-
ity of making money from the same amount of arriving traffic than a CSP with a low innate
sensitivity at any given congestion level.
In the following analysis it will be distinguished between the NN regime and the QoS tiering
regime (CSP tiering scenario) by subscript N and Q, respectively1. Assume that there exists
a continuum of CSPs with unit mass and distribution function F(θ) : [0,1]→ [0,1]. Let r be
the average revenue-per-click on advertisements depending on the mass of active CSPs in the
market. Therefore, each CSP’s profit under NN is
ΓN(θ) =
(1−θ wN)λη̄r if active0 otherwise,(3.1)
1In order to simplify the notation, the subscripts will be omitted wherever the referenced network regime is
unambiguous.
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where η̄ denotes the share of Internet customers in equilibrium. Under NN all CSPs perceive
the same level of congestion, wN .
In a CSP tiering scenario, CSPs can now opt for the priority transmission class with wQ1 < wN
at a price of p per click. The CSPs that remain in the BE class, on the other hand, experience
a higher congestion level wQ2 > wN .
ΓQ(θ) =

(1−θ wQ2)λη̄r if active in best-effort class
(1−θ wQ1)λη̄r−λη̄ p if active in priority class
0 otherwise.
(3.2)
The CSP that is indifferent between choosing the priority and the BE transmission class un-
der a QoS tiering regime, is denoted by θ̃ . Furthermore, in both regimes, the CSP that is
indifferent between becoming active and staying out of the market is characterized by a con-
gestion sensitivity of θ̄ . Thus F(θ̄) reflects the mass of all active CSPs (content variety)
and the share of CSPs choosing the priority class under a CSP tiering scenario is given by
β ≡ 1−F(θ̃)/F(θ̄).
The advertisement market is assumed to be competitive. This means that the average ad-
vertisement revenue per click depends on the mass of active CSPs, i. e. , r(F(θ̄)), and that
∂ r(·)/∂F(θ̄) ≤ 0. This introduces some kind of indirect competition between the CSPs. The
intuition behind this assumption would be a fixed budget in the advertising industry. Follow-
ing Assumption 1 the overall traffic in the Internet economy increases with the entry of new
CSPs. As a result of this traffic expansion the number of ad-relevant clicks also increases,





IU value basic connectedness to the Internet as well as the presence of many CSPs on the
other side of the market. On the one hand, basic connectedness adds a fixed utility of b > 0
whereas each additional CSP adds a marginal utility of v > 0 to a customer’s utility.2 On the
other hand, congestion reduces a customer’s utility of using the CSPs’ services.
It is assumed that consumers’ utility is diminished by the average congestion level in the net-
work wQ = βwQ1 +(1−β )wQ2, or wN , respectively. This implies that wQ = wN in the short
run (when the capacity of the network is fix and consequently equal in both regimes, i. e. ,
µQ = µN) whenever the same amount of CSPs enters the market (i. e. , θ̄N = θ̄Q).
Alternatively, one could have assumed that customers are congestion sensitivity aware
w. r. t. each individual CSP and that they instead evaluate the level of congestion as ŵN =∫
θ̄
θ=0 wNθ f (θ)dθ and ŵQ =
∫
θ̃
θ=0 wQ2θ f (θ)dθ +
∫
θ̄
θ=θ̃ wQ1θ f (θ)dθ , respectively. This alter-
native model variant will be analyzed in Section 3.5.2.
For the reminder of this chapter it will be assumed that consumer’s utility depends on the
average level of congestion. This assumption does not qualitatively change the analysis, but
makes the analytical solutions clearer. If consumers additionally evaluate congestion sensitiv-
ity based on the sensitivity parameter of the connected CSPs, CSP tiering allocates congestion
more efficiently such that ŵQ ≤ ŵN . Therefore, abandoning this assumption emphasizes the
potential advantages of the CSP tiering scenario. The analysis is consequently analytically bet-
ter traceable, but also more conservative w. r. t. QoS, and tipped in favor of the NN regime.
2This assumption is made to avoid any presumptions about the relation between congestion sensitivity and the
value of a service. Again, this is in contrast to e. g. , Economides and Hermalin (2012), but can be considered
as an unbiased reference case.
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Formally,
U =
b+ vθ̄ − ιw−a if connected0 otherwise,(3.3)
where ι > 0 denotes a consumer’s marginal disutility due to congestion, and a the Internet
access fee charged by the ISP.
As outlined before, the analysis focuses on the effect of the CSP tiering scenario under
monopoly. Thus, for expositional clarity, it is assumed that customers are homogeneous and
that therefore the ISP is able to set an access fee such that all IUs connect to the ISP in equilib-
rium. It is very important to note, that this assumption does not violate the two-sided market
property (cp. Rochet and Tirole, 2006) and is not a crucial limitation of the model per se.
With heterogeneous customers this fee is likely to be higher under NN than under CSP tiering
where the ISP can collect additional rents from CSPs through the priority fee. Under CSP
tiering the ISP may even find it profitable to subsidize the consumer side by lowering the
access fee, possibly down to zero, in order to stimulate customer subscriptions which in turn
allows the ISP to make higher profits on the CSPs’ side. Consequently, the customer access
fee and associated dead weight loss is lower under CSP tiering. Indeed, the dead weight loss
may even be zero if the access fee is zero. Under NN, the consumers’ access fee (and thus the
dead weight loss) can never be zero, because otherwise the ISP would not make any profit.
Consequently, it is likely that more consumers will subscribe under CSP tiering, and that
consumers’ welfare is higher than under NN. This result has already been discussed briefly
in Section 2.2.1 in connection with the paper of Economides and Tag (2012). In a two-sided
market the price on each side depends on the valuation for the other side of the market. As
long as CSPs indeed value an additional IU more than the IUs value an additional CSP, the
ISP has an incentive to attract additional customers to charge a higher price on the CSP side
of the market. If the logic holds the other way around, the ISP may want to increase content




Network congestion in the model is measured indirectly through Internet consumers’ average
waiting time following a content request. The model makes use of the well-known M/M/1
queuing model (Kleinrock, 1976) to capture the relationship between average waiting time,
network traffic and capacity. The basic logic behind this queuing model has been already
briefly discussed in Section 2.3. Recall that queuing models in their general notation denote
lambda as the ‘average arrival rate’ (in the context of this model interpreted as the network
traffic of a single CSP) and mu as the ‘average service rate’3 (in the context of this model
interpreted as the network capacity). Further, the M/M/1 queuing model assumes that
1. service requests arrive according to a Poisson process (i.e., arrivals happen continuously
and independently of one another),
2. service time is exponentially distributed (i.e., request coming from a Poisson process
are handled at a constant average rate) and
3. that service requests are processed by a single server.
This last assumption is equivalent to assuming that network performance is dominated by a
bottleneck component. Furthermore it is assumed that the length of the queue as well as the
number of users is potentially infinite. This model is standard and considered to be a good
proxy for actual Internet congestion (McDysan, 1999).






3The speed at which the server handles the arriving data packets.
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Λ = λ η̄ F(θ̄) denotes the average rate at which customers’ aggregate content requests arrive
at the ISP’s network, which is interpreted as the overall network traffic. For the queuing system
to be stable, it has to be assumed that µ > Λ.
Under a CSP tiering regime, CSPs are offered the choice between a priority and a BE trans-
mission class. In the M/M/1 model this translates into introducing an additional queue which
handles the request of the CSPs in the priority class and which is processed ahead of the queue
for the BE class. However, in each class the queue is cleared on a first-come first-served basis.
In this vein, the classical results of the M/M/1 queuing model represent the average waiting








Observe that the relation wQ1 < wN < wQ2 is always fulfilled, assuming a fixed transmission
capacity µ = µQ = µN and β < 1. In case all CSPs are in the first priority class (β = 1), the
model yields wQ1 = wN . This is an essential feature of the M/M/1 model, because it shows
formally that serving some CSPs with priority will (in the short run) unambiguously lead to a
degradation of service quality for the remaining CSPs in the BE class. With respect to the NN
debate and the inherent dangers of the CSP tiering scenario, recall the threat of the ‘dirt road
fallacy’ from Section 2.3. One could argue, that this is already an indication that QoS has an
detrimental effect that should be avoided. However, this argument is short-sighted. The dirt
road fallacy describes the threat of artificial quality degradation (be it sabotage under a fixed
level of capacity or intentionally reduced capacity expansion) to curb the profits from priority
sales. The M/M/1 related degradation of the BE class is solely a result of a given capacity and
the endogenous split of CSPs between the two service classes. Without sabotage the reduction
in quality of the BE class is the natural result of giving priority access to the bottleneck facility.
The case of artificial quality degradation will be discussed in the conclusion of this chapter.
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3.2.4. Internet Service Provider
The ISP is the platform operator in the local Internet access market, over which it has a termi-
nating monopoly. It maximizes his profit through a number of strategic variables. In the short
run, it charges only an access fee, a, from connected consumers. Under NN, this is the only
source of revenue for the ISP. In the long run the ISP can additionally invest into network
capacity, µ . As outlined before, customers as well as CSPs dislike network congestion. The
level of network congestion is captured by customers’ average waiting time for content, w,
which is again controlled by the ISP through its choice of network capacity.
Hence, under a NN regime, the ISP’s profit is
ΠN = η̄a− c(µ),(3.6)
where c(µ) denotes the costs of capacity expansion. To ensure the existence of an interior
solution to the ISP’s investment decision, assume a non-concave cost function, i.e. ∂c/∂ µ ≥ 0
and ∂ 2c/∂ µ2 ≥ 0.
Under a CSP tiering regime, the ISP has an additional strategic variable, p, the price which
it charges CSPs to transmit data packets with priority. The ISP will choose p in order to
maximize its additional revenues from selling priority access.
More precisely, under QoS tiering the ISP’s profit function is
ΠQ = η̄a+βΛp− c(µ).(3.7)
The ISP’s previous investments in transmission capacity are assumed to be sunk in all regimes.
Therefore, in the short run µ can be considered an exogenous variable which is irrelevant for
profit maximization.
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Figure 3.1 shows that this model setup is a simplified representation of the revenue streams in














Internet Users (IU )
r
Figure 3.1.: Model CSP tiering
3.3. Short Run Effects on Content Variety and Welfare
In order to answer Research Question 1, one has to compare NN and CSP tiering when network
capacity, µ , is exogenous and equal in both regimes.
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3.3.1. Short Run Equilibrium and Content Variety
Net Neutrality Regime
Consider the profit maximization problem of the ISP. It is easy to see that it will set an optimal
customer access charge of a= b+vθ̄−ιwN . All customers will connect to the network (η̄ = 1)
because of the homogeneity assumption. Therefore the total consumer surplus is appropriated
by the ISP.
CSPs will only enter the market if they can make a positive profit. Under NN all CSPs expect






The analysis is restricted to the case in which (at least) the most congestion sensitive CSP,
located at θ = 1, remains inactive in equilibrium. This is ensured iff the average congestion
level satisfies wN > 1. Without this assumption the market for content and services would be
already covered under NN. In this case it would be impossible to analyze a possible variety
expansion effect through the introduction of QoS.
Note that an increase in network traffic per CSP, λ , has an adverse effect on network conges-
tion (∂wN/∂λ > 0) and content variety (∂ θ̄N/∂λ < 0). This is central to the debate on NN,
because it exemplifies the network operators’ concerns with respect to the expected increase
in traffic.
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Quality of Service Tiering Regime
Under a CSP tiering regime the CSPs have the possibility to choose between priority transmis-
sion and BE transmission of their data. Congestion sensitive CSPs are now able to alleviate
the negative effect of congestion on their business by opting in the priority lane of the ISP.
Obviously, each CSP has to make this decision depending on its unique level of congestion
sensitivity.
Consequently, one can distinguish between three types of CSPs:
1. CSPs whose business model is relatively insensitive to network congestion. They will
remain in the free-of-charge BE class.
2. CSPs whose business model is sufficiently sensitive to network congestion. They will
opt for priority access at a price of p.
3. CSPs whose business model is extremely sensitive to network congestion. They will
remain inactive as entry is not profitable.
Remember that the CSP indifferent between the first two cases is denoted by θ̃ , whereas the
CSP indifferent between the last two cases is denoted by θ̄Q. Obviously, it must hold that
0≤ θ̃ ≤ θ̄Q.4













4Note that the model is not able to account for a business critical effect of (artificial) quality degradation on
congestion insensitive CSPs. In this model the business of the most insensitive CSP is completely ‘immune’
to congestion (θ = 0). Therefore one is not able to take into account the case, in which even the most
congestion insensitive CSP would need a minimum quality to establish a sustainable business.
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It follows that




Under Assumption 2, where p is determined by (3.16) and F(θ̄Q) by (3.14) this condition
becomes
√
λ +1≤ λ +1, which is always true.









































one can observe that an increase in the price for priority transmission, p, has an unambiguously
negative first order effect on content variety. This is the central concern of NN proponents,
who argue that starting from a zero price under NN, the introduction of a positive price under
CSP tiering has negative first order effects on content variety. However, this argument neglects
that there is a second order effect as well: An increase in p will induce more CSPs to choose
the free BE class and therefore alleviate congestion in the priority class. This in turn may
encourage new, congestion sensitive CSPs to enter, which drives congestion in the priority
class up again. The size and direction of the second order effect hinges on the mass of CSPs







∂ p ) and cannot be determined more
specifically for a general distribution function.
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To analyze the notion of non-uniformly distributed congestion sensitivity one has to make a
simplifying assumption about the underlying density function. For the purpose of this analysis,
therefore assume a particular density function of θ that exemplifies the effect of having a non-
uniform distribution of θ , without loosing analytical traceability.
To this end, consider the density function f : [0,1]→ [0,1], f (θ) := α + 2θ(1− α), with
α ∈ [0,2]. Let F be the distribution function to f and notice that for α = 1 one obtains a
uniform distribution with F(θ) = θ .
Otherwise, if α > 1, there is a relatively larger mass of congestion insensitive CSPs (F(θ)>
θ ) and if α < 1 there is a relatively larger mass of congestion sensitive CSPs (F(θ) < θ ).
A variation of α therefore allows one to gradually shift mass from the congestion sensitive
portion (θ > 0.5) to the congestion insensitive portion (θ < 0.5) of the CSPs and vice versa.
It is very important to note, that under the (unbiased) assumption of uniformly distributed
congestion sensitivity (i. e. , α = 1), the first order and second order effect are exactly offset.
This result holds at any price level, such that the price for priority transmission has no effect
on content variety under CSP tiering.
Thus, under a uniform distribution, NN and CSP tiering will yield exactly the same level
of content variety, i.e., θ̄Q = θ̄N = µ/(λ + 1) = 1/wN . However, if the mass of congestion
sensitive CSPs is relatively large (α < 1), an increase in price for priority will not lead to
an equally large congestion alleviation for the priority class, such that the first order effect
prevails. Consequently, under CSP tiering less CSPs will enter in equilibrium than under NN.
Conversely, if the mass of congestion sensitive CSPs is comparably small (α > 1), the second
order effect dominates, and CSP tiering leads to more content variety than NN. The following
proposition summarizes the results w. r. t. Research Question 1.1.
Proposition 1 (Content Variety). If CSPs congestion sensitivity is uniformly distributed, CSP
tiering has no effect on content variety in the short run: The number of active CSPs is the
same as under NN. In both regimes the number of active CSPs is inversely proportional to the
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average level of congestion in the network. However, if the mass of congestion sensitive CSPs
is comparably small (large), then CSP tiering is likely to lead to more (less) content variety.
Proof. It is easy to verify that for α = 1
























For α 6= 1, θ̄Q will generally depend on p. First see that p cannot exceed pmax which solves




(λα +1)2 +4µλ (1−α)
2µλ (1−α)

. The feasible values of F(θ̄Q) and F(θ̄N) in the interval p ∈ [0, pmax] are plotted in Figure
3.2. It can be readily seen that F(θ̄N) = F(θ̄Q) for α = 1, irrespective of the value of p, and
for α 6= 1 whenever p = 0 or p = pmax. In all other cases F(θ̄N) 6= F(θ̄Q) according to the
proposition.
Therefore, it is useful to assume a uniform distribution of θ as the reference case for the
subsequent analysis, from which it is then easy to draw more general conclusions.
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Figure 3.2.: Active CSPs under CSP tiering (gray) and NN (black) for different distributions
of CSPs congestion sensitivity (α).
(The figure is derived for µ = 7/4, λ = 1, r = 1, but qualitatively identical results are obtained for
other parameter values.)
Assumption 2. Content providers’ congestion sensitivity, θ , is uniformly distributed such that
F(θ) = θ .
Under the present assumptions CSP tiering will lead to neither more nor less content vari-
ety. However, under a CSP tiering scenario the ISP can additionally extract rents from CSPs
through sales of priority access. In the short run, it will do so by maximizing revenues from
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Intuitively, this shows that the ISP can extract a fraction of the CSPs’ gross advertisement
revenue r. The proportion of the extracted rent depends on the congestion alleviation to the
priority class compared to the average congestion level in the network.
Proposition 2 (ISP Preferred Regime). The ISP always prefers the CSP tiering regime because
it can make extra profits by selling a priority transmission service to CSPs.
Proof. Given the fact that F(θ̄N) = F(θ̄Q) under the given assumptions, it follows that









which is always greater than zero for µ,r,λ > 0.
3.3.2. Short Run Welfare Implications
This section deals with the short run effect of CSP tiering on welfare. Total welfare, W , is the
sum of IUs’ surplus, CSPs’ surplus and the ISP’s profit. To evaluate the transition from NN
to a CSP tiering scenario one has to look at the difference in social surplus between the two
regimes, which is given by
∆W = (UQ−UN)+(ΓQ−ΓN)+(ΠQ−ΠN) .(3.18)
Recall that UQ =UN = 0, because IUs’ surplus is always fully appropriated by the ISP. Con-
versely, this implies that any change in IUs’ surplus is reflected in a change of the ISPs’s
profit.
Furthermore, ΠQ−ΠN > 0 according to Proposition 2, because the ISP makes extra revenues
through selling priority access. What remains to be examined is the short run effect of CSP
tiering on CSPs’ surplus.
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Figure 3.3.: The short run effect of CSP tiering on CSPs’ surplus.
To this extent, consider Figure 3.3 and notice that those CSPs located at θ ∈ [0, θ̃) are evidently
worse off under a CSP tiering regime, because for them network congestion has increased from
wN to wQ2. This means a welfare loss, because this part of the surplus can not be expropriated
by the ISP. Additionally, the CSPs’ welfare loss increases with congestion sensitivity on
the interval θ ∈ [0, θ̃). The business model of the provider located at θ = 0 is not affected
at all through congestion. Conversely, the business of the CSP at θ = θ̃ is suffering from
congestion to such an extent that it is indifferent between staying in the BE class and buying
priority access. However, notice that the welfare loss decreases for the CSPs in the priority
class as θ ∈ [θ̃ , θ̄) increases. To see this, recall from Proposition 1 that the last CSP to enter
the market, θ̄ , is identical under both regimes and receives a surplus of zero. For the last CSP
that enters the market, the additional benefit through reduced congestion (compared to the NN
regime) is equal to the price that it has to pay for priority access. Consequently, for all CSPs
with less congestion sensitivity, θ ∈ [θ̃ , θ̄), the price that is paid for priority is higher than
the benefit of being in the priority class. However, for these providers the welfare loss is still
smaller in the first priority class than in the BE class. In Figure 3.3 it can easily be seen, that
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CSP θ̃ incurs the greatest welfare loss. In summary, one can conclude that in the short run all
active CSPs are (weakly) worse off under a CSP tiering regime.
However, recall that under the assumption of uniformly distributed congestion sensitivity no
CSP is driven out of the market. The price that CSPs pay for priority access represents nothing
more than a welfare shift to the ISP (hatched area in Figure 3.3). The sign of the overall welfare
effect will therefore solely depend on the difference between the gross surplus gain through
less congestion of those CSPs in the priority class and the gross surplus loss through increased
congestion of those providers remaining in the BE class.
The following proposition summarizes the results w. r. t. Research Question 1.2.
Proposition 3 (Short run Welfare). If CSPs’ congestion sensitivity is uniformly distributed,
CSP tiering unambiguously increases welfare with respect to the NN regime in the short run,
because congestion is alleviated for the most congestion sensitive CSPs in lieu of the less
congestion sensitive CSPs. However, all CSPs are worse off under a CSP tiering regime
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Thus,











⇔ 0 < β < 1 .
Equation (3.19) reveals that the overall effect of CSP tiering on welfare depends on the relative
size of the congestion alleviation effect to CSPs in the priority class (vertically hatched area
in Figure 3.4) versus the congestion aggravation effect to CSPs in the BE class (horizontally
hatched area in Figure 3.4). These effects relate directly to the main argument of proponents
and opponents of NN, respectively.
congestion aggravation
congestion alleviation
Figure 3.4.: Congestion alleviation vs. congestion aggravation effect of CSP tiering
Under a non-uniform distribution this welfare conclusion is not as clear-cut. If CSP tiering
leads to more content variety, then those CSPs who are newly active in the market will enjoy
a higher surplus under NN, and Proposition 3 is even strengthened. However, if there is a
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relatively large mass of congestion sensitive CSPs in the economy such that CSP tiering leads
to less content variety, the associated welfare loss must be counterweighted with the welfare
gain from better congestion allocation. In this case it is likely that Proposition 3 does not hold
anymore.
3.4. Long Run Effects on Infrastructure Investments,
Innovation and Welfare
In Section 1.3 it has been exemplified that ISPs are most concerned with the increasing costs
of infrastructure investments. However, ISPs would also like to attract and stimulate entry of
new (congestion sensitive) CSPs, because this is valued by customers and has a positive effect
on the revenue stream from access fees. At the same time ISPs disapprove of CSPs who free-
ride on their costly infrastructure. CSP tiering seems to be a viable way out of this dilemma,
but it is unclear whether in the long run this regime will lead to more or less incentives for
infrastructure investments compared to the NN regime.
This Section deals with long run investment incentives in network capacity (µ). Recall, that in
the model, transmission capacity is represented by the average service rate at which customer
requests can be handled by the network. An increase of µ allows the ISP to process more
service requests to CSPs at a time, and consequently the average waiting time in the network
(the proxy for congestion) will be reduced.
3.4.1. Investment Incentives
Formally, the ISP’s investment decision is a discrete decision stage even before he announces
any prices. The ISP first chooses the network capacity level, µ , and subsequently sets the
customer access charge, a, and the priority price, p (under CSP tiering). In the subgame
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perfect equilibrium, the ISP will set the optimal capacity level, which is defined by the point
where the marginal revenues of capacity expansion, MR ≡ ∂Π/∂ µ , equal marginal costs,
MC ≡ ∂c(µ)/∂ µ . Consequently, the ISP’s optimal capacity level will be higher if marginal
revenues from capacity expansion are higher. In both network regimes the following two
marginal effects of capacity expansion on ISP revenue can be distinguished:




denotes the ISP’s marginal revenue effect on the
customer access fee that results from the entry of new, congestion sensitive CSPs.
• The congestion incentive (−ι ·∂w/∂ µ) denotes the ISP’s marginal revenue effect on
the customer access fee that results from a change of the overall congestion level.
Furthermore, notice that under the assumption of a uniform distribution of CSPs’ congestion
sensitivity, these investment incentives are always positive and identical under both scenarios
(i. e. , NN and CSP tiering). Hence, potential differences in investments may only be a result
of an additional investment incentive that an ISP has under CSP tiering:
• The priority revenue incentive (∂ (βΛp)/∂ µ) denotes the ISP’s marginal revenue effect
from selling priority access.
Consequently, the sign of the priority revenue incentive determines the possible differences
between investment incentives under CSP tiering and NN. The following proposition summa-
rizes the results w. r. t. Research Question 2.1.
Proposition 4 (Investment Incentives). If the congestion sensitivity of CSPs is uniformly dis-
tributed, the ISP’s optimal capacity level is higher under CSP tiering.
Proof. Incentives to invest into network capacity are higher under CSP tiering iff marginal
revenues from priority sales are greater than zero, provided that the ISP revenues are concave,
and the costs of capacity expansion convex in µ . The latter is warranted by assumption. To
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ensure that the ISP’s revenues are concave the property ∂ 2ΠQ/∂ µ2 ≤ 0 has to be fulfilled.
The second-order condition is thus given by
∂ 2ΠQ
∂ µ2






























A≤ 0 alwaysA > 0 if ι(1+λ )2
µ3B ≥ A.
It is easy to see that A ≤ 0 is warranted if ad revenues are decreasing (which is given by
assumption) and concave (or not too convex). Otherwise we must assume, that the condition
in the second case holds. However, alternatively it can also be assumed that the second-order
condition holds locally around µ∗. Now consider ΠQ−ΠN = Λβ p. Differentiating with






















The sign of the derivative is determined by the part in square brackets. Notice from (3.13) and
(3.14) that ∂ θ̄/∂ µ = 1/(λ +1) and µ = θ̄(λ +1). Consequently,
∂ (ΠQ−ΠN)
∂ µ





Note that the gross industry advertisement revenue under NN is given by R(θ̄) =
λ r(F(θ̄))F(θ̄). It is sensible to assume that R(·) does not decrease as more content becomes






θ̄ +λ r(·)> 0,
which holds iff εr >−1, in which case QoS tiering leads to more investments.
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This finding contrasts the results of Cheng et al. (2011) and Choi and Kim (2010). The reason
is that this model explicitly accounts for the fact that more network capacity encourages the
entry of new CSPs, whose additional demand keeps the value of the priority service high. As
mentioned in Section 3.1, in Cheng et al. (2011) and Choi and Kim (2010) entry of new CSPs
is not possible, and therefore it is more profitable to exploit the current CSP base and to keep
network capacity scarce.
This picture may change under a non-uniform distribution function. In this case the mass of
active CSPs may be different in the two scenarios, and consequently variety and congestion
incentive may be not in line anymore. If the mass of congestion sensitive CSPs is very small,
the priority revenue incentive can even be negative, because the ISP can sell priority access
only to a very small number of customers. Hence, it seeks to make the priority class attractive
to less congestion sensitive CSPs by keeping network capacity scarce and the congestion level
high.
To follow this argumentation, consider Figure 3.5, which presents a numerical example of
the marginal investment incentives for varying distributions of CSPs’ congestion sensitivity.
In line with Proposition 4, the variety and congestion incentive under either regime coincide
under the uniform distribution of CSPs’ congestion sensitivity (α = 1), such that the positive
priority revenue incentive is decisive for the higher investment incentives under CSP tiering.
Nevertheless, the more congestion sensitive CSPs are in the Internet economy (α < 1,α→ 0),
the stronger is the variety incentive under NN compared to CSP tiering. On the other hand
the priority revenue incentive, which is only present under CSP tiering, increases. As the
variety incentive grows linearly in v and the priority revenue incentive grows linearly in r, NN
may only lead to more infrastructure investments for α < 1 if v is sufficiently larger than r.
The intuition behind this result follows the classic two-sided logic (cf. Section 2.2). If the
valuation from IUs for an additional CSP is high enough, it is profitable for the ISP to invest
in additional capacity and stimulate entry of congestion sensitive CSPs on the other side of the
market.
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Conversely, when there are relatively less congestion sensitive CSPs in the economy (α > 1),
the variety and congestion incentive are slightly larger under CSP tiering while the priority
incentive remains positive. In this case, CSP tiering provides unambiguously higher incentives
for infrastructure investments.
However, when the mass of congestion sensitive CSPs becomes very small (α  1), the pri-
ority revenue incentive can indeed become negative, and eventually also the variety incentive
under QoS tiering drops below the level under NN. In this case, it is likely that NN promotes
investments in network infrastructure more.
In summary, one can conjecture that Proposition 4 holds locally around α = 1 (Assumption
2), i.e., if the proportion of congestion sensitive CSPs to congestion insensitive CSPs is bal-
anced.
Figure 3.5.: ISP’s marginal investment incentives under CSP tiering (gray) and NN (black) for
different distributions of CSPs’ congestion sensitivity (α).
(The figure is derived for µ = 7/4, λ = 1, r = 1, v = 1.)
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3.4.2. Innovation at the Edge and Long Run Welfare
The ISP’s investments in network infrastructure have a direct effect on welfare. First, on the
IU side of the market, customers experience lower network congestion (congestion incentive)
and higher network effects (variety incentive). Second, on the CSP side of the market, the
click-through rate increases due to lower network congestion, and consequently the slope of
their surplus curve in both transmission classes increases, too. Nevertheless, all CSPs in the
BE class and also some CSPs in the first priority class may still be worse off compared to NN.
However, capacity expansion has an additional positive effect.
As a consequence of the overall decreased congestion level, both marginal CSPs, θ̃ and θ̄ ,
are shifted to the right. This means that new, highly congestion sensitive CSPs are able to
enter the network. Figure 3.6 shows the effect of capacity expansion for CSPs under CSP
tiering. In the context of the NN debate this has been referred to as ‘innovation at the edge’
(Jamison and Hauge, 2008). This finding illustrates the highly complementary character of
network innovation (innovation at the core) and content and service innovation (innovation at
the edge).
Obviously, the surplus of the new CSPs (crosswise hatched area), but also the surplus of some
of the previously most congestion sensitive CSPs (vertically hatched area), are thus increased
compared to a NN regime.
Accordingly, higher capacity levels will ceteris paribus lead to higher gross utility for con-
sumers and CSPs, and are thus beneficial for welfare. The following proposition summarizes
the findings w. r. t. Research Question 2.
Proposition 5 (Long Run Welfare). The regime that provides more incentives for infrastruc-
ture investments is more efficient in the long run. If the congestion sensitivity of CSPs is
uniformly distributed, CSP tiering is more efficient and provides more content variety than
NN.
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Figure 3.6.: The long run effect of CSP tiering on innovation and welfare.
Proof. To see that the overall congestion level, w, decreases with capacity expansion, one has
to show that ∂w/∂ µ = ∂ (1/(µ−Λ))/∂ µ < 0.
Notice that Λ= θ̄λ = λ µ/λ+1, so that ∂Λ/∂ µ = λ/(λ+1)< 1. Therefore, it holds that ∂ (µ−Λ)/∂ µ >
0 and consequently, ∂ (1/(µ−Λ))/∂ µ < 0. By equation (3.2) and (3.3) it is easy to see that the
gross utility of customers and CSPs increases as the congestion level decreases. The ho-
mogeneity of customers allows the ISP to fully expropriate the additional customer utility.
Capacity expansion also increases the amount of active CSPs, since ∂ θ̄/∂ µ > 0 by equation
(3.14). Before the capacity expansion occurred, these CSPs had a surplus of zero and are
therefore unambiguously better off.
If QoS tiering provides a higher capacity level (µ∗Q > µ
∗
N), the critical CSP that is just equally
well off as under NN is determined by the equation (1− θ̆wN)λ rN = (1− θ̆wQ1)λ rQ−λ p.
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Because µ∗Q > µ
∗
N , it follows directly that wN > wQ, θ̄N < θ̄Q and thus rN ≥ rQ. It is easy to
see that 0 < θ̆ < θ̄Q = 1/wQ. Therefore, all CSPs in the interval (θ̆ , θ̄Q] are better off than
under NN.
CSP tiering is consequently the more efficient regime in the long run and, by Proposition 3,
also in the short run if CSPs’ congestion sensitivity is uniformly distributed. Nevertheless, all
CSPs in the interval (0, θ̆) are still worse off compared to the NN regime.
3.5. Alternative Model Variants
3.5.1. Model with Competitive Clicks
As explained in Section 3.2 this chapter is not intended to study the effect of CSP tiering on
the direct competition between otherwise similar CSPs. Nevertheless it has to be controlled
for the alternate assumption, that the consumers’ total number of clicks is fixed and thus λ
diminishes as the variety of content and services in the Internet economy increases. This
allows to analyze a general notion of competitive pressure among the CSPs.
To analyze this scenario assume each IU spends an exogenous amount of clicks Λ on the
Internet, which he evenly distributes among the available CSPs. Therefore, the arrival rate at
each CSP is no λ = Λ/F(θ̄). Observe now that λ decreases as the number of active CSPs
increases. However, this alternative model variant is still in line with Assumption 1, because
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each active CSP receives the same number of clicks from each customer. In conjunction with
Assumption 2 this model variant yields the following results:
F(θ̄N) = θ̄N = µ−Λ(3.21)
F(θ̄Q) = θ̄Q = µ−Λ(3.22)






Obviously, it holds that θ̄N = θ̄Q = 1/wN , which is exactly in line with Proposition 1 of the
base model.













which is exactly the price structure that is described by (3.17). Consequently this model variant
must yield the same qualitative results.
3.5.2. Model with Congestion Sensitive Consumers
In the base model network congestion is incorporated in the IUs utility function in the form
of the average waiting time in the network. As explained in Section 3.2 this means that IUs
dislike congestion independently from the CSP’s innate sensitivity towards congestion. The
following extension of the base model discusses the case of congestion sensitive IUs. More
precisely, customers perceive network congestion more bothersome if the congestion sensitiv-
ity of the respective CSP is high. Note that consumers are still homogeneous w. r. t. congestion
sensitivity. Now, however, congestion does not only reduce their click-through-rate on the CSP
side but also their own valuation of each CSP.
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To capture this effect, consider the IUs’ utility function from (3.3), but now assume in contrast




θ=0 wNθ f (θ)dθ and ŵQ =
∫
θ̃
θ=0 wQ2θ f (θ)dθ +
∫
θ̄
θ=θ̃ wQ1θ f (θ)dθ , respectively.








θ=0 θ f (θ)dθ∫
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θ=θ̃ θ f (θ)dθ























From F(θ̄)(θ̄ − θ̃)≥
∫
θ̄
θ=θ̃ F(θ)dθ and from θ̄ ≥ θ̃ as well as the monotonicity of the distri-
bution function F , it follows that the inequality is always satisfied.
Consequently, if consumers are aware of the congestion sensitivity of content and services,
CSP tiering yields a higher IU utility than NN. This alternative model variant introduces an
additional short run welfare gain. Compared to the base model CSP tiering is even more
likely to be welfare superior compared to NN, because the congestion alleviation becomes
even stronger. However, recall that the ISP still extracts the whole consumer surplus due to
the assumption of IU homogeneity.
Therefore, as mentioned in Section 3.2, the base model has to be considered as the more con-
servative model variant with respect to the analysis of the potential benefits of CSP tiering.
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3.6. Minimum Quality Standards
In the context of CSP tiering with M/M/1 queuing, priority price regulation is not a suitable
policy instrument, because in the short run social and private incentives are in line. To see
this, note that the social planner seeks to set the regulated priority price such that the socially
optimal share of CSPs selects the priority transmission class. Thereby CSPs’ gross surplus is
maximized.
However, the ISP pursues the same goal and consequently already chooses the optimal price
himself, because it can extract a fraction of the CSPs’ surplus. In contrast to the optimal level
of the priority price, the social and private level of infrastructure investments are not in line.
Proposition 6 (Efficient Investments). The social planner has a higher incentive to invest in
network capacity than the ISP. This result holds for both network regimes, QoS tiering and
NN.
Proof. Each regime is considered separately, and it is exemplified that the conditions with
respect to efficient investments coincide. First, the conditions for which ∂ (WN −ΠN)/∂ µ is
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By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 4, only εr > −1 is feasible and thus the
proposition obtains.
Consequently, w. r. t. the ISP’s investments in infrastructure, there is amended concern on the
side of CSP tiering opponents. Section 2.3.1 introduced the metaphor of the dirt road fallacy
and Section 2.4 showed that the biggest concern under QoS tiering in general is related to ISPs
keeping capacity scarce (underprovisioning). As a regulatory remedy, politicians could opt for
a MQS of the BE class (Brennan, 2011). Under the new European legislative framework (cf.
Section 2.4) a MQS policy is already feasible. After all, MQSs have been found to be welfare-
enhancing in competitive settings (Ronnen, 1991).
Some politicians go even one step further and demand that new QoS technologies should
never lead to a lower quality than under NN. They argue that ISPs should be allowed to earn
additional revenues by selling a higher quality, but at the same time it should be forbidden to
reduce the BE quality below the level of the status quo (NN). Consequently, under the CSP
tiering regime no CSP would be set at a disadvantage anymore. In the model this would mean
that the MQS would be set in a way so that under CSP tiering the ISP is required to offer CSPs
a congestion level in the BE class that is at least as low as the equilibrium BE congestion level
under NN.
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At the same time, opponents of NN regulation have often objected that NN forces ISPs to
invest above the efficient level, which is known as overprovisioning. Forcing them to keep up
this high level of investments under CSP tiering can therefore not be efficient from the point
of view of the ISP.
In order to meet this MQS, the ISP is required to increase the network’s capacity, potentially
to the extent that the gap between the level of private and efficient investments is closed. More
precisely, by requiring the MQS wN(µ∗N) ≡ wQ2(µMQS) the regulator implicitly defines the
new capacity level µMQS > µ∗N .
5








Recall that µMQS > µ∗N , and thus one can differentiate between three different cases.
1. If µ∗Q ≥ µMQS, the MQS is not a binding condition for the ISP’s investment decision and
hence is simply ineffective.
2. If µ∗∗Q ≥ µMQS > µ∗Q, the MQS is effective in raising the ISP’s network capacity level,
potentially up to the efficient level.
3. If µMQS > µ∗∗Q , the MQS policy may lead to an excessive investment in network infras-
tructure.
In summary, MQSs are only effective in one out of three cases. This result shows that MQS
can also lead to an inefficient outcome. Therefore the level of the MQS has to be careful
calibrated and it is questionable whether the congestion level under the status quo (NN) is an
appropriate objective for the BE class under CSP tiering.
However, even if a regulatory agency would be able to determine the efficient level of capacity
5One asterisk denotes the equilibrium capacity level, whereas two asterisks denote the socially optimal capacity
level.
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(µ∗∗Q ), MQS are only an indirect tool to achieve the desired capacity level. The following
proposition summarizes the findings w. r. t. Research Question 3.
Proposition 7 (Minimum Quality Standard Regulation). An MQS policy which requires the
ISP to guarantee a BE congestion level under CSP tiering which is equal to the equilibrium
congestion level under NN may increase welfare, but it may also lead to excessive investments
or be ineffective.
Proof. To show that the ISP under a MQS enforcement of wQ2 = wN has a higher incentive to
















Since β < 1, it is easy to see, that µMQS > µ∗N always holds true.
3.7. Implications
This chapter contributes to the debate on NN by providing a formal framework that extends
the insights gained from the existing theoretical models in several ways. The analysis focuses
on the relationship between CSPs and a monopolistic ISP, and compares NN to a CSP tiering
regime in which CSPs may pay for the prioritized transmission of their data packets on a non-
discriminatory basis. The model adds to the field by explicitly considering the effect of CSP
tiering on content and service variety and by taking into account that CSPs are heterogeneous
w. r. t. their sensitivity towards congestion. Due to the use of basic insights from queuing
theory, the model explicitly takes into account the negative externality that prioritization has
on the remaining BE class.
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The results of the comparison between the two network regimes depends on the distribution of
CSPs’ congestion sensitivity in the Internet economy. In particular, under the neutral reference
case where CSPs’ congestion sensitivity is uniformly distributed, CSP tiering increases wel-
fare in the short run because the installed level of network capacity is used more efficiently:
Network congestion is re-allocated, such that it is alleviated for the most congestion sensi-
tive CSPs. This offsets the congestion aggravation for the CSPs in the remaining BE class.
However, CSP tiering does not immediately promote the entry of new content providers with
innovative services that are even more congestion sensitive. In fact, in the short run, all CSPs
are likely to be worse off under a CSP tiering regime because the ISP is able to expropriate
some of the CSPs’ surplus through priority pricing. Consequently, the ISP always prefers the
CSP tiering regime. It is subject to the authority of policy makers to evaluate the shift of
surplus from CSPs to ISPs, which is welfare neutral per se, but lies at the heart of the NN
debate.
On the other hand, ISPs argue that they will use the additional revenues to raise investments
in broadband infrastructure. This is true for the reference case of uniformly distributed con-
gestion sensitivities, but may not hold for more skewed distribution functions.
In sum, CSP tiering is likely to be the more efficient regime if the proportion of congestion
sensitive to congestion insensitive CSPs is balanced. In this case, the ISP invests more in
broadband infrastructure, and thereby allows for entry of new, congestion sensitive CSPs in
the short run. Therefore, the highly congestion sensitive CSPs in particular will be better off
under CSP tiering, and hence it is not surprising that Google and Verizon have privately agreed
on a tiered system (Wyatt, 2010). According to Definition 1.4, Google CEO Eric Schmidt
argues that such an agreement would be in line with NN, because it does not discriminate
against specific CSPs.
Furthermore, the analysis reveals that the level of private investments is generally not efficient.
A MQS policy that requires the ISP to guarantee a congestion level in the BE class under
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CSP tiering which is at least as low as the BE congestion level under NN is not sufficient to
guarantee efficient infrastructure investments.
In conclusion, while the model results show that some of the objections to CSP tiering are
justified, a strong case for a tiered network also exists. The potential dangers of a CSP tiering
regime can be overcome by transparency obligations or MQSs. Under competition ISPs will
try to attract customers by offering them more content variety and a lower average congestion
level than their competitor. This will boost their investment incentives. Likewise, the ISPs will
also lower the customers’ access charge, and therefore some of the ISPs’ rent is shifted towards
the consumers. However, competition between ISPs does not change the main insights of the
analysis under monopoly if one makes the reasonable assumption that CSPs multihome (i.e.,
are connected with BE to every ISP) whereas consumers singlehome (i.e., are connected to
one ISP exclusively). In this case, every CSP would again face a terminating monopoly over
the connected consumers at each ISP, leaving the previously described relationship between
the ISP and the CSPs intact. Consequently, the result that QoS tiering is the ISPs’ preferred
regime and that it will lead to more investment and content variety due to the additional priority
revenue incentive remains unchanged. Hence, there is no reason to believe that competition
between ISPs will warrant NN. In reverse, the prohibition of QoS tiering (pay-for priority),
which has been proposed by the FCC for fixed line networks, can eventually be harmful to




“The Internet is increasingly becoming the dominant medium binding us. The neutral
communications medium is essential to our society. It is the basis of a fair competitive
market economy. It is the basis of democracy, by which a community should decide what to
do. It is the basis of science, by which humankind should decide what is true.”
Sir Tim Berners Lee (Lee, 2006)
THIS chapter investigates the factors that may influence a transition to a differentiatedservice regime in the Internet in a scenario where IUs pay for preferential treatment.
4.1. Motivation
In the status quo of the Internet pricing of IUs is a simple access fee model. They pay for bare
access to the (managed) BE network, but there are no extra fees for preferential treatment.
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One possible deviation from the status quo discussed in Section 2 is called IU tiering. The
introduction of pricing schemes that are based on QoS technology are not restricted to the
CSP side of the market. Likewise, some definitions of NN (cf. Definitions 1.1 and 1.2) would
identify the introduction of QoS based Internet tariffs for consumers as a violation of the NN
principle. However, Definition 1.4 explicitly includes QoS under the umbrella of NN. Also,
regulators in Europe are less concerned about this specific scenario of NNN. This has two
reasons: First, consumers can decide whether they wish to be prioritized or not. Second,
many of the threats identified in Section 2.4 are irrelevant, because IU tiering is a one-sided
pricing scheme (i. e. , only IU pay). Therefore, regulators are less concerned about reductions
in innovation at the edge, because all CSPs face a level playing field.
Recall from Section 2.3.2 that the reason for a potential deviation from the status quo is based
on the claim of ISPs that the current pricing regime for Internet access cannot cover the costs
of future infrastructure investments. As a consequence consumers would face a congestion
problem, because ISPs will not be able anymore to ensure the current quality of Internet access
services by overprovisioning of network capacity.
4.1.1. Quality Provision Mechanism
In many countries Internet tariffs are predominantly based on flat rates. ISPs discrimi-
nate solely via the maximum bandwidth of the physical connection. There is currently no
widespread introduction of QoS based Internet access tariffs in the market. The example of
the British ISP Plusnet (cf. Section 2.3.2), however, shows that an IU tiering scenario, in con-
trast to a CSP tiering scenario, is not far fetched and has already been brought to the market.
Obviously, the general logic of queuing models also applies to a scenario in which some users
get preferential treatment in the network and others do not. A prioritization of some users
inevitably has a negative effect on the remaining BE users. Note that this effect is not nec-
essarily related to the bandwidth of an IU connection. Consider for example an IU using a
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narrow-band Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) connection and, for example, an IU
using a broadband Very High Data Rate Digital Subscriber Line (VDSL) connection. Both
users participate in an online auction for a single item. Before the auction ends they want
to send a last second bid (‘sniping’) to the online auction platform. Assume further, that the
narrow-band IU bought preferential treatment (priority access) for a premium fee from his ISP
while the broadband IU did not. In this special situation bandwidth is not the crucial factor
for the bid to arrive in time, because the transmission of a ‘single click’ is not constrained by
the ISDN connection bandwidth. However, the priority transmission of the narrow-band IU
yields that his bid arrives at the online auction platform in time, whereas the broadband IU
looses the auction because his bid arrives after the auction is finished.
With this example in mind, it becomes obvious that ‘quality’ of an Internet connection is in
the eye of the beholder. While mobile users may value a high coverage of the network and
a stable connection on the move (reliability), online brokers and online gamers may focus on
the aspect of latency, whereas file sharers may base their decision on the bandwidth of the
available Internet access alternatives.
A similar logic holds true for the availability of specific services and content. Business cus-
tomers may value the availability of high quality video telephony and Virtual Private Net-
work (VPN) connections, while private customers value access to big social networks (e. g. ,
Facebook) and real time entertainment. Consumers are undoubtedly heterogeneous w. r. t.
their preferences about Internet access in many aspects. However, in the BE Internet the net-
work technology and the available tariffs for Internet access currently cannot account for such
differences. QoS could be a viable way to account for individual preferences of IUs and to
monetize them. Some IUs may also have a constrained budget and want to buy cheaper In-
ternet access. Current Internet pricing schemes offer only ‘full access’. The cite from Nelly
Kroes in Section 2.3.2 shows that she is concerned that NN regulation may hinder new pricing
schemes that allow users to buy access to only a sub-set of available content and services, or
unprioritized access to the Internet for a lower price.
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The economic literature about QoS tiering can be divided in two distinct groups. One strand
of the literature (e. g. , Bandyopadhyay and Cheng, 2006; Cheng et al., 2011; Choi and Kim,
2010; Krämer and Wiewiorra, 2012; Reggiani and Valletti, 2012) employs a relative quality
provision mechanism (M/M/1) to fix the relationship between priority and BE transmission,
whereas the other strand (e. g. , Economides and Tag, 2012; Njoroge et al., 2010) employs a
dedicated quality provision mechanism. With dedicated quality provision, the adverse effect of
priority provision on the BE quality is constrained. One could assume that the ISP guarantees
a certain level of quality (Service Level Agreement (SLA)), or assigns a fixed share of the
overall capacity explicitly to priority and BE users respectively (Paris Metro pricing). While
the M/M/1 model relies on adding priority information to data packets, such that they can
be processed ahead of other data packets, Paris Metro pricing relies on the split of network
capacity between multiple service classes. The price for each service class implicitly regulates
how congested the respective class is. In this respect Paris Metro pricing can be thought of
multiple BE effort networks owned by the same ISP, which achieves quality differentiation
solely through price differentiation.
Besides technical differences (e. g. , costs of providing QoS with either mechanism) it is not
clear ex-ante how users perceive the two classes of quality provision mechanisms. Therefore,
it is important to explore the acceptance of both mechanisms in direct relation to NN. It is also
possible that the WTP depends on the quality provision mechanism, too. The implementation
of a quality provision mechanism that is preferred by IU could help to facilitate a successful
transition to an IU tiering scenario.
Research Question 4. Are relative and dedicated quality mechanisms perceived differently
by consumers, and if so why?




It has been exemplified that consumers can react very negatively to changes in pricing. In
Section 2.3.2 the example of big Canadian ISPs was mentioned, which tried to revert the
flat rate dominated Internet access market back to a metered pricing scheme. They faced
tremendous public protest, and the regulator finally stopped the ISPs from doing so.
The topic of NN became a politically heavily debated matter, and this example demonstrates
that changes in the network level (reduced data caps, different wholesale pricing) can result in
unforeseen reactions of consumers. IU tiering could trigger similar reactions if one does not
understand how users perceive prioritization and possible pricing schemes that come along
with such a change in network regime.
For these reasons it is not very surprising that ISPs in general are very reluctant to talk about
this scenario publicly and seem to primarily focus their lobbying efforts on the introduction
of QoS on the CSP side of the market.1 As illustrated before this may be due to different
reasons. The most striking argument, however, appears to be the perception of fairness w. r. t.
the distribution of network resources and the provision of quality.
The following overview of the most relevant fairness concepts and the perception of price
fairness is based on the papers by Xia et al. (2004) and Martín-Ruiz and Rondán-Cataluña
(2008).
In general, consumers are more likely to perceive price increases as unfair if they are justified
with scarcity of the good or are triggered by higher demand (Frey and Pommerehne, 1993).
If the price of soda cans is raised at a very hot day because the seller expects higher demand,
consumers perceive this price increase as unfair. However, Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal (2003)
find that consumers are less likely to perceive price increases as unfair, if the reason for the
increase is out of the seller’s control. (e. g. , the price peak of computer hard disk drives after
1However, mobile telecommunications providers already offer tariff options that could be considered a devia-
tion from the classic IU pricing and a violation of NN. T-mobile Germany sells a VoIP option that allows
customers to use VoIP applications (which is excluded by the general terms of service). However, this can be
considered as anti-competitive behavior and is therefore not an inherent concern under IU tiering.
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a flooding of the production facilities). Bolton et al. (2003) find that cosumers are more likely
to accept price differences that are based on differences in the quality of the products.
With respect to Internet pricing both arguments may be applicable. Due to excessive demand
the good is scarce, but on the other hand the introduction of QoS would introduce quality
differentiation to the otherwise homogeneous product.
Consumers generally use different reference points to evaluate prices of products and services.
They rely on past prices and the prices of competitors (Bolton et al., 2003). Furthermore, they
compare their present outcome with their past outcome, but they also compare their personal
present outcome with the present outcome of other consumers (Xia et al., 2004).
For a study of IU tiering it is therefore very important to provide participants with a neutral
and equal reference point.
Services (like Internet access) in contrast to durable goods are valued differently by con-
sumers. Costs of durable goods seem to be more acceptable and therefore are less likely to
be perceived as unfair. “Specifically, goods have salient material costs that serve as reference
points for selling prices and price increases and that may distract consumers from other costs”
(Bolton and Alba, 2006, p.264).
Since consumers may underestimate the ISPs’ costs for the the necessary infrastructure, Inter-
net access services would have an inherent disadvantage in that respect.
The literature on fairness, in particular price fairness, offers a rich set of different theories and
fairness concepts. Xia et al., p.1 summarize the ‘classic’ concept of fairness “as a judgment of
whether an outcome and /or process to reach an outcome are reasonable, acceptable, or just”.
Moreover, Xia et al. state that unfairness is not necessarily the other side of the coin. While
it is often clear to customers what they perceive as unfair it seems to be difficult for them to
define what is fair. They argue that the strong emotional reaction to unfair situations is the
main reason why consumers can judge such situations more easily. Obviously humans are
influenced by different aspects when they evaluate whether an outcome is perceived as fair.
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Thus, it is helpful to understand which aspects may influence their perception of differentiated
Internet access.
This thesis relies on the theoretical framework of justice theory to capture what consumers
perceive as ‘just’ or ‘fair’ in relation to Internet pricing. The concept of justice can be dif-
ferentiated into distributive justice (Adams, 1965), procedural justice (Homans, 1961) and
interactional justice.
Distributive justice is related to the outcome of allocations. The ‘Equity’ principle suggests
that “[...]a customer’s reward should equal his or her contribution to the exchange”(Martín-
Ruiz and Rondán-Cataluña, 2008, p.328), whereas the ‘Equality’ principle suggests that
“[...]different customers are entitled to receive the same outcome”(Martín-Ruiz and Rondán-
Cataluña, 2008, p.328). Procedural justice is related to the system that is used to determine
the outcome of an allocation process, whereas the concept of interactional justice is related
to “the interpersonal treatment individuals receive from service providers” (Martín-Ruiz and
Rondán-Cataluña, 2008, p.328).
A better understanding of the different aspects of fairness that influence the acceptance of a
certain quality provision mechanism and the WTP for priority access could help ISPs to adress
IUs concerns more accurately ex-ante (e. g. , via advertisements) and to plan their network
systems’ design.
Research Question 6. Which aspects of fairness influence IUs’ preference for IU tiering?
Research Question 7. Which aspects of fairness influence IUs’ WTP for priority and the
necessary monetary compensation for BE under IU tiering?
4.1.3. Combining Theories
In an effort to understand how IUs would perceive a transition from a BE Internet access to an
IU tiering scenario, and how they evaluate NN in general, ‘fairness’ is only one piece of the
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puzzle. Research on QoS perception (e. g. , Bouch and Sasse, 1999; Bouch et al., 2000) shows
that additional dimensions like ‘task importance’, ‘feedback’ and the consumers’ budget are
also important factors. Sometimes this field of research yields qualitatively similar results to
the economic theory of tariff biases. Lambrecht and Skiera (2006a) find that predictability
of the expenditure (insurance effect) and the avoidance of continued costs signals (taximeter
effect) are important in Internet tariff decisions of customers.
Moreover, any NNN scenario is currently hypothetical and thus any research project w. r. t.
user perception can only rely on data based on hypothetical scenarios. The line of research re-
lated to a similar kind of questions is called ‘technology acceptance theory’ (e. g. , Venkatesh
et al., 2003). In contrast to this study, Technology Acceptance Models (TAMs) consider the
usage intention of new Information Technology (IT) systems in an business environment.
Therefore many aspects are not applicable to a purely hypothetical service (e. g. , social in-
fluence2).
Obviously, none of these theories covers all relevant aspects of NN or IU tiering. On the
other hand, considering all factors of each theory, however, would overload the analysis by
irrelevant factors w. r. t. the NN debate.
The following sections present a modular model that was created in an effort to combine the
relevant factors from the theoretical approaches shown in Figure 4.1.
4.2. Methodology
Psychological concepts like fairness are not part of traditional economic theory. To assess the
economic impact of such latent psychological factors, this thesis employs a so-called ‘quasi
experimental’ approach (e. g. , Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006b). Quasi experiments are an
empirical methodology often used in form of a survey with hypothetical choice scenarios.
2If a technology has not been launched on the market yet, there cannot be any impression based on experience










Figure 4.1.: Combining different theories
Thereby, respondents have to indicate their own expected decision in the presented hypotheti-
cal situations. Along with the choice scenarios, additional explanatory variables are surveyed
that are assumed to have an influence on the decision at hand. This methodology is consid-
ered to be only a ‘quasi’ experiment because it lacks the control of laboratory experiments.
In contrast to a laboratory environment, the researcher neither observes the conditions under
which the respondent answers the questions, nor controls possible interaction of the respon-
dents with others, and he lacks full control over a possible treatment assignment. However,
in combination with a web-based survey design, this approach allows to gather large sample
data using a standardized interface (in contrast to personal interviews or focus group studies).
The data acquisition procedure for this thesis was conducted via a online panel among 1035
representative IUs, of which all are responsible for their own Internet access service.
The measurement model and the statistical methodology that is suitable to answer the afore-
mentioned research questions must be able to simultaneously examine the influence of unob-
servable (latent) and observable parameters on the network regime decision of IU as well as
on their WTP for a higher level of service. Latent variables, like fairness, can only be reliably
measured by multi-item scales, which cannot be sophisticatedly incorporated into standard re-
gression analysis. An item is a single verbal statement that is assumed to be an indicator of the
unobservable variable (e. g. , fairness). Respondents have to indicate their level of agreement
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to each individual item (statement) on a five point Likert scale Likert (1932). Multi-item scales
are used because single items are prone to measurement errors, because respondents may dif-
fer in their evaluation of a single aspect of an unobservable variable, but not in their evaluation
of the unobservable variable as a whole. The set of items that is assumed to measure a latent
variable is called a construct.
Structural Equation Models (SEMs) are well suited for this kind of mixed hypothesis testing.
SEMs are a multivariate methodology to represent and test a theoretical network of relations
between observed and unobserved variables (e. g. , Bollen, 1989; MacCallum and Austin,
2000). Hoyle (2011) gives an introduction into SEM that can be briefly summarized as fol-
lows: The goal of SEM is to account for as much variation (covariation) between the variables
as possible. Furthermore, in contrast to classic regression analysis, this methodology is able
to consider measurement errors of variables (e. g. , items). SEMs use the covariance matrix of
all variables as input for an iterative fitting process. The estimation is done simultaneously for
all relations that are represented in the model. To this end a statistical program (e. g. , Analysis
of Moment Structures (AMOS)) refines the estimates of the free parameters in the model in an
iterative fitting process. The process stops when the statistical software is not able to minimize
the residual matrix any further. The literature suggests a multitude of fit measures and indices
to determine how good the covariance matrix of the hypothesized model fits the sample co-
variance matrix. The more variation and covariation the model is able to explain, the better.
This thesis relies on Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) to fit the model.
An important feature of SEMs is the ability to account for interdependencies between ex-
planatory variables. Often one has to account for ‘mediating effects’. Mediating variables
are influenced by other explanatory variables in the model and have a direct effect on the ex-
plained variable. But there might not be a direct effect of the variable influencing the mediator
on the explained variable. For instance, one could assume that the number of problems with
the Internet connection directly influences the consumers’ satisfaction with the status quo.
However, there might not be a direct effect of the problems with the connection quality on
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the decision for IU tiering. Therefore, this variable would have only an indirect effect on the
decision for IU tiering through its mediator ‘satisfaction with the status quo’.
The aim of the following sections is to explain in detail the process of developing and val-
idating the underlying model and hypotheses, as well as the design of the survey to collect
the necessary data. Finally, the process of data evaluation and hypothesis testing is explained.
Figure 4.2 shows the order of steps that have been taken to systematically develop and conduct
this study.
Figure 4.2.: Study procedure
4.3. Model
First, a research model has to be specified, that allows to test specific hypothesis in relation
to the research questions. Based on this model, the survey can be designed with appropriate
measures, questions and choice scenarios to gather the necessary data.
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The model presented in this thesis relies on variables which have been deducted from existing
literature and which are assumed to have an influence on the decision of the respondents in
the hypothetical choice scenarios about an IU tiering scenario. In SEM one distinguishes
between the measurement model and the structural model. The measurement model describes
the mapping of items to the unobservable variables, whereas the structural model describes
the assumed relations (i. e. , hypotheses) between all variables in the model.
The measurement model employed in this thesis is assumed to be reflective. Reflective mea-
surement models, in contrast to formative measurement models, are based on the assumption
that the set of observable indicators (items) is influenced by the underlying unobservable la-
tent variable and not the other way around (e. g. , Zinnbauer and Eberl, 2004). These kind
of measurement models do not assume that the final set of items, constituting the construct,
covers necessarily all aspects of the latent variable. In contrast to that, a formative construct
is constituted by a set of items that is assumed to incorporate all relevant aspects of the unob-
servable variable. In this case the items would have a direct influence on the latent variable,
but are not necessarily correlated with each other (e. g. , Ronald and Raschke, 2007). The
items of a reflective construct should ideally be highly correlated, because they are to some
extend interchangeable indicators of the same unobservable variable (e. g. , Zinnbauer and
Eberl, 2004).
The structural model is visualized by a path diagram. Each arrow in the diagram symbol-
izes a hypothesis about the relationship between the respective variables. Figure 4.3 shows
a simplified representation of the structural model that is employed to study the effect of the
aforementioned dimensions on the decision about hypothetical IU tiering scenarios. Note that
the decisions of participants w. r. t. relative and dedicated quality provision are estimated si-
multaneously. The figure is simplified w. r. t. the granularity of the paths and dependencies
between variables. To this end the variables are grouped in several boxes. Note that every
arrow from one box to another box implies a single arrow from each variable in the origi-
nating box to each variable in the target box. All grey shaded variables are assumed to have
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an influence on the target variables in the model. According to the SEM notation conven-
tion, ellipses denote unobservable variables and rectangles denote observed variables. Double
headed arrows symbolize that these variables are allowed to covary with each other (i. e. , they
have a relation outside the scope of the model). Single headed arrows, on the other hand rep-
resent a unidirectional relation. Therefore, each single headed arrow in the structural model
is a hypothesis about the relationship of the two connected variables. It is obvious that not all
relations necessary to account for all possible interactions of variables are in the core interest














































Figure 4.3.: SEM structure
The aim of this model is to explain variables that are in direct relation to the research questions
motivated in this Chapter. Respondents are asked to make three choices. The first between
NN and IU tiering with relative quality provision mechanism, the second between NN and
103
Chapter 4. Internet User Tiering
IU tiering with dedicated quality provision, and the third between IU tiering with relative and
dedicated quality provision. These three choices allow to calculate a ranking of each quality
provision mechanism for each participant. Consider as an example the variable Ranking Rela-
tive Quality. The variable takes values from one to three with higher values indicating that the
respondent has a higher preference for IU tiering with a relative quality provision mechanism.
Table 4.1 shows the ranking of the regimes and the assigned values.
Furthermore, respondents are asked to indicate their WTP for priority under each quality pro-
vision mechanism and to indicate the monetary compensation that would be necessary to make
them accept Internet access service with BE quality, where they would suffer from the adverse
effect of prioritization.
Table 4.1.: Network regime ranking variable
Preference Ranking Relative Ranking Dedicated
Relative Dedicated  NN 3 2
Dedicated  Relative NN 2 3
Relative NN  Dedicated 3 1
Dedicated  NN  Relative 1 3
NN  Relative Dedicated 2 1
NN  Dedicated  Relative 1 2
4.3.1. Control and Performance
The box ‘Control and Performance’ contains all variables that are assumed to influence all
other variables in the model. They are necessary to account for heterogeneity in the sample.
IUs differ w. r. t. their consumption pattern, expenditures, demographics and technological
knowledge.
The usage pattern of an IU is captured by three variables. IUs are asked to indicate the average
Time they spend on in the Internet per month. To capture detailed usage behavior, the survey
presents six representative Internet service categories (derived from Sandvine, 2010), and re-
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spondents are asked to indicate their usage intensity on a five point Likert scale (0=services
not used, 4=services frequently used).
1. Internet telephony (e. g. , VoIP) [sensitive]
2. Online gaming [sensitive]
3. Realtime entertainment [sensitive]
4. E-mail [insensitive]
5. Social networks [insensitive]
6. File sharing (e. g. , P2P) [insensitive]
The sum of all Likert points an IU indicates for these six categories is called usage Intensity.
Sensitivity is captured by the share of an IU’s congestion sensitive usage intensity. The variable










The reason for choosing this observable measure is quite intuitive. Unified Theory of Ac-
ceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) suggest ‘usefulness’ as a measure for existing IT
systems. In contrast to that IU tiering is a purely hypothetical scenario, and therefore it is
difficult for IUs to evaluate the usefulness ex-ante, especially if they are not provided with
specific performance gains they can expect from the system. However, users with a higher
usage intensity of congestion sensitive services are very likely to expect higher gains from
IU tiering. Based on this reasoning, the decision was made to include rather the objective
demand for quality as an observable variable instead of an indirect measure. Thus Sensitivity
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is interpreted as observable economic representations of this aspect. This need is assumed to
positively influence the ranking of IU tiering, as well as the willingness to pay for priority.
To control for the expenditures of IUs, participants are asked to indicated their average
monthly bills for fixed and mobile Internet access (Bill Mobile and Bill Fixed). To account
for possible income effects a proxy variable called Profession is used. Participants are asked
to select from a list the job category they belong to. The variable Profession assigns a value
from one to six to each category with increasing average income.
Individual characteristics of Internet access decision makers are controlled by Age, Gender
and Household Size. Knowledge of computer systems and networks possessed by an IU is
incorporated as a latent variable. Note that the participants’ age is surveyed with an accuracy
of 10 years. An increase of the age variable by one indicates that the respondent belongs to
the next higher age group that is presented in the survey.
Hypothesis 1. Users with a higher congestion Sensitivity evaluate IU tiering more favorable.
Hypothesis 1.1. Users with a higher congestion Sensitivity have a higher preference for
IU tiering with relative quality provision.
Hypothesis 1.2. Users with a higher congestion Sensitivity have a higher preference for
IU tiering with dedicated quality provision.
Hypothesis 1.3. Users with a higher congestion Sensitivity have a higher WTP for pri-
ority under IU tiering with relative quality provision.
Hypothesis 1.4. Users with a higher congestion Sensitivity have a higher WTP for pri-
ority under IU tiering with dedicated quality provision.
Hypothesis 1.5. Users with a higher Internet consumption ( Time and Intensity) have a
higher WTP for priority under IU tiering with relative quality provision.
Hypothesis 1.6. Users with a higher Internet consumption (Time and Intensity) have a




The box labeled ‘fairness’ contains constructs to account for the importance of different as-
pects in the context of fairness. Each construct measures how important participants in the
survey perceive the different aspects of fairness in the context of Internet access services.
Depending on these factors one can draw conclusions about how consumers decisions and
expectations are driven by fairness. As explained before, one distinguishes between distribu-
tive, procedural and interactional justice. In the context of the NN debate, the most important
aspects w. r. t. distributive justice are Equality and Equity. In other words, is it perceived as
fair that every customer gets the same quality (equality), or that customers with a higher WTP
get a better transmission quality (equity). These competing effects are also at the heart of the
NN debate, because the transition from an BE network regime to IU tiering can be thought
of as a transition from an equality driven network regime to an equity driven network regime.
However, it is not clear ex-ante whether IUs perceive IU tiering as a violation of Equality, or
as support of Equity.
Procedural justice is captured by the aspect of Transparency. This construct captures how
important control and information about the Internet access service is to the consumer. Eq-
uity theory suggests that the perception of fairness depends on the procedure that determines
the outcome. In the context of NN, regulators seem to be convinced that transparency is a
key element to ensure that consumers can evaluate the quality provision and make informed
decisions if they feel they do not receive the expected level of service. This aspect overlaps
with the requirement of feedback mechanisms that has been identified by QoS studies (e. g. ,
Bouch and Sasse, 1999). Therefore, this construct also captures the importance of control over
the network quality and functionality.
In the context of Internet access the aspect of interactional justice is captured by the importance
of Trust in the ISP. This concept can be further subdivided into Professionalism and Care, both
of which are key elements of trust. Like Equality and Equity these two constructs capture two
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partially competing effects. While Professionalism captures the importance of the ability and
integrity of the ISP as a business partner, Care captures the importance of the impression of
‘being in good hands’ (i. e. , the benevolence) (cf. Xia et al., 2004, p.5). The interpretation of
these two aspects can be ambiguous. If an event is assumed to be perceived as positive, the
two aspects of Trust are assumed to work in the same direction. If a consumer has a positive
experience with the ISP he may think that the ISP is professional and cares about him. A
different result is expected with regard to negative events. For instance, if a consumer is
legitimately (e. g. , for contractual reasons) not granted an upgrade into a better service class,
he may still believe that the ISP is professional, but may doubt that he cares about him as
a customer. In this case Professionalism works as “[...]a buffer that helps decrease negative
attributions when price discrepancies occur”(Xia et al., 2004, p.9). In contrast to that, “[..]loyal
customers focus more on whether the sellers care about them. When customers perceive an
unfair price, they are likely to perceive it as exploitation and are more likely to punish the
seller”(Xia et al., 2004, p.9).
The effect of fairness on the perception of IU tiering is the main reason for conducting this
research project. The study of two general concepts of providing quality has been made be-
cause it is assumed that IU tiering is not evaluated based on the simple fact that quality is
differentiated, but also on how this outcome is achieved. Relative priority provision may rely
more on trust in the ISP, because it guarantees preferential treatment to paying customers,
without making any explicit guarantees or capacity reservations in the network. By contrast,
dedicated quality mechanisms may be perceived as more transparent, because they assign a
certain amount of capacity solely to priority customers. In addition to that, prioritization based
on relative priority (M/M/1) explicitly violates the equality principle, while splitting capacity
in two service classes leads to two networks in which the same set of rules apply. Therefore
the following hypotheses are made:
Hypothesis 2. Fairness has an impact on the ranking of IU tiering, on the WTP for priority
service and on the necessary monetary compensation to accept BE service.
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Hypothesis 2.1. IUs who perceive Equality as an important concept in Internet access
services have a lower preference for IU tiering with relative quality provision.
Hypothesis 2.2. IUs who perceive Equity as an important concept in Internet access
services have a higher preference for IU tiering with dedicated quality provision.
Hypothesis 2.3. IUs who perceive Professionalism as important in their relation to the
ISP have a higher preference for IU tiering with relative quality provision.
Hypothesis 2.4. IUs who perceive Care as important in their relation to the ISP have a
higher preference for IU tiering with relative quality provision.
Hypothesis 2.5. IUs who perceive Transparency as important in Internet access provi-
sion have a higher preference for IU tiering with dedicated quality provision.
Hypothesis 2.6. IUs who perceive Equity as an important concept in Internet access
services have a higher WTP for priority service under IU tiering with relative quality
provision.
Hypothesis 2.7. IUs who perceive Equity as an important concept in Internet access
services have a higher WTP for priority service under IU tiering with dedicated quality
provision.
Hypothesis 2.8. IUs who perceive Professionalism as important in their relation to the
ISP demand a lower monetary compensation for BE service under IU tiering with rela-
tive quality provision.
Hypothesis 2.9. IUs who perceive Professionalism as important in their relation to the
ISP demand a lower monetary compensation for BE service under IU tiering with dedi-
cated quality provision.
Hypothesis 2.10. IUs who perceive Care as important in their relation to the ISP de-
mand a higher monetary compensation for BE service under IU tiering with relative
quality provision.
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Hypothesis 2.11. IUs who perceive Care as important in their relation to the ISP de-
mand a higher monetary compensation for BE service under IU tiering with dedicated
quality provision.
4.3.3. Effort Expectancy
According to UTAUT, effort expectancy is an important dimension in the adoption process
of new technologies. In contrast to the performance expectancy, effort expectancy cannot be
captured by an observable proxy and is therefore incorporated by the perceived Complexity
of IU tiering. Compared to the homogeneous service under a neutral BE network regime, the
introduction of QoS and multiple classes of service could complicate the usage of the Internet
from a customer’s point of view. Furthermore, UTAUT shows that the expected Complexity
of a new IT system is influenced by a user’s general level of technical knowledge. To control
for this factor, and to be in line with the underlying theory, Knowledge has been added to the
model specification as exemplified in the control and performance section.
Effort expectancy is surveyed exclusively for the case of giving priority to some users. There-
fore, effort expectancy is intended to capture the utility offset that comes along with the, in
general, beneficial option to get preferential treatment. The construct does not capture any
expectations about the BE lane under IU tiering to prevent any mixture with the aspect of per-
formance expectancy, and because BE users do not have to make any additional effort to get
in the BE lane, if they decide against priority service.
However, the perception of fairness and Complexity of a new network regime is most likely
highly correlated with each other. The model can not explain the (unobservable) reasons
why users perceive certain aspects of fairness as more important than others in the context of




Recall that the effort expectancy is expected to measure the utility offset of prioritization.
Consequently no hypotheses about the impact on the necessary monetary compensation under
BE are made.
Hypothesis 3. IUs who perceive IU tiering as more complex evaluate IU tiering less favorable.
Hypothesis 3.1. IUs who perceive IU tiering as more complex have a lower preference
for IU tiering with relative quality provision.
Hypothesis 3.2. IUs who perceive IU tiering as more complex have a lower preference
for IU tiering with dedicated quality provision.
Hypothesis 3.3. IUs who perceive IU tiering as more complex have a lower WTP for
priority under IU tiering with relative quality provision.
Hypothesis 3.4. IUs who perceive IU tiering as more complex have a lower WTP for
priority under IU tiering with dedicated quality provision.
4.3.4. Status Quo
The box ’status quo’ incorporates the respondent’s Satisfaction with his situation in the status
quo, which is unobservable and therefore incorporated as a latent variable. The perception
of the status quo is assumed to depend on possible past experience with problems of the
Internet access service (Problem ISP) and the presumption to be artificially degraded by the
ISP (Degradation). Again, Problem ISP relies on the six aforementioned service categories.
Respondents have to indicate if they experienced at least once problems with the respective
service class and, in addition, if they attribute this problems to the ISP. The relative proportion
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Furthermore, respondents are asked to indicate for each individual service class if they assume










In section 4.1 it has been exemplified that IUs compare alternative outcomes with their current
outcome. Therefore, it is very likely that IUs infer from their past experience as well as current
satisfaction about IU tiering scenarios. For instance, users who assume to be degraded by their
ISP could fear the dirt road fallacy under IU tiering.
Hypothesis 4. IUs who are more satisfied with the status quo evaluate IU tiering less favor-
able.
Hypothesis 4.1. IUs who are more satisfied with the status quo have a lower preference
for IU tiering.
Hypothesis 4.2. IUs who presume more often to be degraded under the status quo have
a lower preference for IU tiering.
Hypothesis 4.3. IUs who presume more often to be degraded under the status quo de-
mand a higher monetary compensation for BE service under IU tiering.
In addition to these main hypotheses one can establish and test sub-hypotheses about the
status quo itself. In general ISPs seem to not be very concerned about the effect of artificial
quality degradation on their customer base. Presumably, they assume that many customers will
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attribute a negative experience with the service to other factors (e. g. , technical problems), or
that they will not realize any restrictions at all.
Hypothesis 4.4. IUs with a higher congestion Sensitivity are more likely to presume to
be artificially degraded by the ISP.
Hypothesis 4.5. IUs who attribute more problems with the Internet access service to the
ISP are more likely to presume to be artificially degraded by the ISP.
Hypothesis 4.6. IUs who presume more often to be artificially degraded by the ISP are
less satisfied with the status quo.
Hypothesis 4.7. IUs who attribute more problems with the Internet access service to the
ISP are less satisfied with the status quo.
4.3.5. Target Variables
Under the respective network regime, the preference (ranking) of a procedure to provide QoS
is assumed to have a positive impact on the WTP for prioritized Internet access and conversely,
a negative effect on the necessary monetary compensation for BE service.
Hypothesis 5. IUs who have a higher preference for IU tiering with relative quality provision
have a higher WTP for priority under IU tiering with relative quality provision.
Hypothesis 6. IUs who have a higher preference for IU tiering with relative quality provi-
sion demand a lower monetary compensation for BE under IU tiering with relative quality
provision.
Hypothesis 7. IUs who have a higher preference for IU tiering with dedicated quality provi-
sion have a higher WTP for priority under IU tiering with dedicated quality provision.
Hypothesis 8. IUs who have a higher preference for IU tiering with dedicated quality provi-
sion demand a lower monetary compensation for BE under IU tiering with dedicated quality
provision.
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All hypotheses mentioned above are in the core of this study. Recalling Figure 4.3 reveals that
the model contains also other relations between variables that are not explicitly mentioned
above. In this respect the model is exploratory in nature. In general, SEMs face a trade-off
between parsimony and explanatory power. Usually it is recommended that a model should
only incorporate parameters and relations between parameters that help to explain the variation
in the sample. However, the decision was made to refrain from ad-hoc assumptions about and
omittances of relations between variables.
4.4. Measurement Development and Pretest
In preparation of the main survey, pretesting is an indispensable prerequisite to generate a
suitable survey and suitable constructs for latent variables. First, items for each aforemen-
tioned unobservable variable were generated with an deductive approach according to aspects
mentioned in the related literature. Alternatively existing constructs from the literature were
adapted.
In total, the pretest consisted of 68 initial items that were assumed to match on 12 hypothetical
unobservable variables. In the pretest stage of this study aspects of different fairness theories
where considered (e. g. , scarcity and competition), as well as an extensive item set to measure
the satisfaction with the status quo.
To make judgment about the impact of fairness on the choice sets in the main survey one hypo-
thetical choice about IU tiering from the main survey was part of the pretest. This allowed to
check which of the constructs assumed to measure fairness have an impact on the decision.
The pretest questionnaire, conducted with 112 students of economics at the Karlsruhe Institute
of Technology (KIT), contained the following dimensions:
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Satisfaction - ISP (6 items)
The actual satisfaction of an IU with his ISP. Derived from: (Gerpott et al., 2001; Janda
et al., 2001; Wang et al., 2001).
Satisfaction - Quality (9 items)
The actual satisfaction of an IU with the perceived quality of his Internet connection.
Derived from: (Gerpott et al., 2001; Janda et al., 2001; Kim and Stoel, 2004; Shin,
2007).
Fairness - Trust (5 items)
The importance an IU attaches to Professionalsim and Care. Derived from: (Chiou,
2004).
Fairness - Transparency (6 items)
The importance an IU attaches to procedural justice. Derived from: (Faulhaber, 2010).
Fairness - Equality (8 items)
The importance an IU attaches to the equality aspect of distributive justice. Derived
from: (Bolton et al., 2003; Martín-Ruiz and Rondán-Cataluña, 2008; Wagstaff, 1994;
Xia et al., 2004).
Fairness - Equity (6 items)
The importance an IU attaches to the equity aspect of distributive justice. Derived
from: (Bolton et al., 2003; Martín-Ruiz and Rondán-Cataluña, 2008; Wagstaff, 1994;
Xia et al., 2004).
Fairness - Need (5 items)
The importance an IU attaches to the need aspect of distributive justice. Derived from:
(Bolton et al., 2003; Martín-Ruiz and Rondán-Cataluña, 2008; Wagstaff, 1994; Xia
et al., 2004).
Fairness - Scarcity (6 items)
The fairness perception of price increases due to scarcity of a physical good. Derived
from: (Frey and Pommerehne, 1993).
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Fairness - Competition (5 items)
The competitiveness of the ISP market as perceived by the IU. Derived from: (Hahn
et al., 2007).
QoS - Complexity (6 items)
The Complexity of IU tiering as perceived by the IU. Derived from: (Teo et al., 1999;
Venkatesh et al., 2003).
Control - Knowledge (6 items)
The IU’s Knowledge about computer systems and network technologies.
All constructs are assumed to be reflective and were evaluated by means of Exploratory Factor
Analysis (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), as well as checked for validity and
reliability. This procedure follows the suggested steps in the development of measures for use
in survey questionnaires by Hinkin (1998).
Based on the predictive power of the different fairness constructs on the IU tiering choice,
the decision was made to rely solely on justice theory as described before. Hence the other
aspects of fairness (i. e. , Competition, Scarcity) were excluded from the main survey. Need
is a variant of allocative justice, but it showed no impact on the IU tiering choice and did not
correspond to a relevant aspect of the potential transition from a BE network to a IU tiering
regime. The answers concerning satisfaction with the ISP in most parts mirrored the answers
concerning satisfaction with the Internet connection. Moreover, many participants indicated
that they were not able to make that fine granular judgment about different aspects of their
connection quality. Consequently, satisfaction was combined in one construct and the item set
was reduced to capture only the main aspects (satisfaction with the ISP and satisfaction with
the delivered connection quality). All trust items show the desired level of factor loadings and
the procedure associates the trust items to the sub-classes of trust mentioned before. TR1,
TR2 and TR4, as well as T3 and T5 form unique factors. Textual inspection reveals the
procedure separates the items that are related to how people are treated and appreciated by
the ISP from those items that are more related to the business related aspects of the ISP.
The former set of items (TR1,TR2,TR4) is from now on called Professionalism, while the
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latter set of items (TR3,TR5) will be called Care. The remaining constructs were refined
through item reduction w. r. t. internal consistency, reliability and validity (construct reliablity,
Average Variance Explained (AVE), Fornell Larcker criterion (Fornell and Larcker, 1981) and
Cronbachs alpha (Cronbach, 1951)). The final set of items that is incorporated in the main
survey is:
Control - Knowledge (4 items)
KN1 - “I know a lot about the technical functionality of the Internet.”
KN2 - “In my circle of friends and my family I am considered an expert for computers.”
KN3 - “I have in-depth knowledge about computer networks and data transmission
technologies.”
KN4 - “I often need help with computer problems”
Status quo - Satisfaction (2 items)
SA1 - “I am satisfied with my Internet service provider”
SA2 - “I am satisfied with my Internet connection quality”
Fairness - Professionalism (3 items)
TR1 - “It is important to me that my ISP is honest.
TR2 - “It is important to me that my ISP is reliable.
TR4 - “It is important to me that my ISP is professional.
Fairness - Care (2 Items)
TR3 - “It is important to me that my ISP understands me.
TR5 - “It is important to me that my ISP takes care of me.
Fairness - Transparency (5 items)
TP1 - “I feel only comfortable using the Internet, if I am acquainted with all details of
my Internet tariff and the respective connection quality.”
TP2 - “It is important to me to have easy access to all information related to the pro-
vided network quality.”
TP3 - “It is important to me that all information about the provided network quality are
117
Chapter 4. Internet User Tiering
unambiguous and understandable.”
TP4 - “I feel uncomfortable using the Internet, if information about my Internet access
tariff and the respective connection quality are not verifiable.”
TP5 - “I feel uncomfortable, if contractual and technical restrictions of my Internet
access service are not revealed to me.”
Fairness - Equality (5 items)
EA1 - “Only if every Internet user gets the same network quality I perceive this as fair.”
EA3 - “Only uniform transportation of data makes sure, that all Internet users have the
same prerequisites.”
EA4 - “If network capacity is split up equally between all Internet users, this is fair.”
EA7 - “Nobody should be privileged in data transportation in the Internet.”
EA8 - “Nobody should be disadvantaged in data transportation in the Internet.”
Fairness - Equity (4 items)
EI2 - “It is fair that users who are willing to pay a premium get a prioritized Internet
connection.
EI3 - “I think it is unfair, if other users get a prioritized Internet connection, because
they are willing to pay a premium.
EI4 - “If a user wants to pay less than other users, it is fair that he gets a lower connec-
tion quality.
EI6 - “Prioritization of data for a premium fee is unfair, because other users experience
a lower connection quality because of that.
QoS - Complexity (4 items)
CO1 - “I think using the Internet is easier, if all services and websites are treated
equally.”
CO3 - “The usage of the Internet becomes difficult, if I have to consider the option to
prioritize data.”




CO6 - “The option to prioritize data makes the usage of the Internet cumbersome for
me.”
Note that these measures are further analyzed with the final data set. Detailed statistical eval-
uation of the final constructs is provided in Section 4.7.
4.5. Survey Design
The final survey design has to incorporate questions that are able to obtain all data that is
necessary to run the presented research model and to test the related hypotheses. To this end
the survey consists of four parts, as shown in Figure 4.4. First, respondents are asked to
indicate their overall monthly usage time, their monthly expenditures for telecommunications
services and their satisfaction with the status quo. To capture detailed usage behavior, the
survey presents the six aforementioned representative Internet service categories (derived from
Sandvine, 2010), and respondents are asked to indicate their usage intensity on a five point
Likert scale. Along these service categories, it is additionally surveyed if the respondents
suspect to have been degraded by the ISP at least once in the respective service category. The
share of usage intensity that is suspected to have been degraded is used in the model. The
same holds true for connection problems in each service category, that are attributed to the
ISP.
In the second part, respondents have to choose between different network regimes. In total,
they have to make three network regime choices and indicate two times their willingness to
pay for priority and BE access to the network.
Research Question 4 deals with the potential difference between relative and dedicated quality.
Participants have to decide twice between NN and the respective IU tiering scenario (relative
or dedicated quality). After each decision the participants are provided with a reference price
for Internet access under NN. The survey is conducted with a representative German sample,
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Figure 4.4.: Survey structure
where the lowest price for broadband Internet access is 20 Euros per month. Participants
are asked to indicate their additional WTP for being in the priority service class under the
respective IU tiering regime and their WTP for only being in the BE service. In the last
question of this section participants have to choose between the relative and the dedicated
mechanism of quality provision under IU tiering. All choice sets are explained in text form
and visualized via an animated picture for better understanding. The pretest showed that
the analogy of a toll (free) road helps participants best to gain understanding of the concept
of IU tiering in relation to NN. Note that participants are advised to decide about Internet
access and that they should consider the animation as an intuition helping them to simplify the
complex underlying technical details. However, the survey never mentions the term NN, and
all questions are phrased in a neutral language to ensure participants are not biased in favor of
a certain network regime.
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Figure 4.5 shows one frame of the animation that is used in the final survey. The upper part of
the picture shows a representation of the NN regime, the lower part shows a representation of




Figure 4.5.: NN vs. IU tiering relative quality
Relative quality is represented by an allusion to the M/M/1 queuing model (cf. Section 2.3.2).
Each frame in the animation highlights three different cars to allow for easier comparison
between the two regimes. In the web-based survey, only colors were used to highlight the
respective car. Here they are additionally highlighted by numbers. All three highlighted cars
start at the beginning of the road in each cycle of the animation. This allows the respondent
to observe the improvement through prioritization and the degradation through the adverse
effect of prioritization on the remaining users. The car labeled ‘one’ can be considered as the
reference vehicle under a neutral network regime, whereas car ‘two’ has payed an additional
fee (Euro symbol) and now has priority. The animation shows all other cars (including car
‘three’, a BE user) waiting until car ‘two’ (with priority) has passed by. Consequently car
‘two’ arrives first, followed by car ‘one’ and finally car ‘three’.
This analogy is chosen in order to ensure that respondents with a non-technical background
121
Chapter 4. Internet User Tiering
are able to compare the differences. This graphical representation is necessary, because it is
absolutely essential that any participant understands the idea and implications of IU tiering,
even if she/he has never heard of data prioritization before.
After participants have decided for one of the two network regimes two additional sliders
appear and they have to indicate how much they are willing to pay for Internet access repre-
sented by car ‘two’ and with the second slider for Internet access represented by car ‘three’.
The price for neutral Internet access is anchored at 20 Euros. The slider for priority only al-
lows for higher prices up to 40 Euros, whereas the other slider only allows for lower prices
down to zero Euros.
Figure 4.6 shows one frame of the animation for the second network regime decision. Par-
ticipants have to decide between NN and IU tiering with dedicated quality provisioning. In
contrast to the picture of the first decision, one lane of the street is dedicated only for paying
users only. BE customers can only use the remaining and consequently more congested lane.




Figure 4.6.: NN vs. IU tiering dedicated quality
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Again, after participants have decided for one of the two network regimes two additional
sliders appear and they indicate their WTP for Internet access represented by car ‘two’ and,
with the second slider, for Internet access represented by car ‘three’. The slider behavior was
identical to the first question.
Note that the two highlighted priority cars under IU tiering arrive at the same time at the end
of the road under both quality provision mechanisms. This ensures that participants are not
biased in favor of either network regime, because they expect any performance gains. The
same holds true for the BE car under both quality provision mechanisms.
Figure 4.7 is the last network regime decision and simply compares the two kinds of quality





Figure 4.7.: IU tiering relative quality vs. IU tiering dedicated quality
In the third part of the survey, respondents are asked to indicate their level of agreement w. r. t.
all items constituting the latent variables according to the pretest procedure. To reduce order
effects, all items in the questionnaire are presented randomized to the participants.
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In the last part participants are asked for usual demographics (cf. Section 4.3) and feedback,
and finally whether they have been honest in filling out the survey.
The survey can be found in Appendix A.1.
4.6. Data Collection
The survey was conducted in June 2011 by a professional market research institute via an on-
line panel among representative Internet access customers. The survey itself was implemented
in the open source software solution ‘Limesurvey’3 and hosted by the Institute of Information
Systems and Management (IISM). The questionnaire software allows the implementation of
non-linear conditions in the online survey designs and provides access control mechanisms
to ensure interoperability with professional panel providers. All participants were payed ex-
post by the market research institute. They received a fixed participation fee and a variable
compensation, depending on the median handling time of all participants in the survey. The
market research institute did not reveal any payout information. However, the payout to each
participant had to be below 2.9 euros, the fee (after tax) payed by the IISM to the market
research institute for each participant. Participants were screened to ensure that they are the
responsible persons in their respective household for choosing the Internet access provider and
tariff. This screening also ensured that participants were familiar with the basic facts about
consumer Internet access services and representative for the following hypothetical choice
scenarios. If this requirement was not fulfilled, the questionnaire was aborted and a screen-out
message was displayed to the participant by the panel provider. A soft-start of the main survey
with 50 participants revealed that the median handling time was 8 minutes below the median
time measured at pretests conducted at the IISM. Consequently, another screening stage was
implemented to ensure participants were reading the questions carefully and not just clicking




could be correctly answered by all participants that read the companion text on the same page.
Due to the very simple nature of the screening questions it was made sure that screen-outs
happened only due to a lack of reading the instructions and not a lack of understanding, which
would have biased the sample in favor of versed participants. According to the panel provider,
the logged total screen-out ratio was 37 percent of all invited participants. It is technically
not possible to determine the share of participants who were screened out due to the lack
of responsibility for their own Internet access service and the share of screen-outs based on
improper reading of the instructions. However, the usual screen-out ratio without additional
reading control is about 20 percent according to the panel provider.
In total 1035 IUs completed the survey. Ex-post 5 observations were excluded from the study
due to self reported dishonesty of the participants, and another 50 due to intransitive order of
network regime ranking decisions. Another 5 observations were sorted out due to severe non-
normality of data (i. e. , respondents reported only 5 points on all Lickert scale items), leaving
975 valid observations for the evaluation process.
4.7. Measurement Refinement
Before one can test the hypotheses based on the collected data one has to verify and, if neces-
sary, refine the measurement model by means of EFA and CFA. The preliminary specification
of the constructs has to be tested for convergent validity, discriminant validity and reliability.
After the refinement, the final constructs are evaluated based on their measures for construct
reliability, AVE and the Fornell Larcker criterion (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). To estimate
the model, the statistical software package Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)
(Version 19) and the companion tool AMOS was used.
EFA is a statistical data dimension reduction procedure to find a smaller set of underlying
summary variables (factors). Even if one has already created groups of items with the in-
tention to measure a single latent variable, this step in the evaluation process is necessary to
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verify that the items indeed constitute a unique factor. This is possible because EFA does not
assume any relations between the items ex-ante. According to Field (2000), EFA uses the
correlation matrix of all items and groups those correlating strongly but weakly with all other
items. Ideally, items designed to measure a single latent variable load predominantly on the
same factor and relatively low on all other factors. The procedure assigns items to additional
factors as long as an additional factor explains a sufficient part of the variance in the sample.
Costello and Osborne (2005) suggest ‘Principal Axis Factoring’ as the best method to retain
factors if data is not necessarily normally distributed. In this specific study one has to fur-
ther assume that the five dimensions of fairness (Professionalism, Care, Transparency, Equity
and Equality) correlate with each other and, consequently, these factors are not orthogonal to
each other. Therefore, one has to use an oblique rotation method (e. g. , ‘Promax’) in the EFA
that allows the rotation procedure to extract factors in a non-orthogonal position to each other
(Field, 2000). This procedure yields more accurate results. Kaiser Normalization is a standard
transformation procedure in EFA with the effect, that the squared factor loadings in each row
sum up to one. The squared factor loading of an item shows the proportion of the variance
of the item that is explained by the factor. Table 4.2 shows the resulting pattern matrix. The
pattern matrix presents the ‘pattern loadings’, which can be interpreted as the regression coef-
ficients of each item on each of the extracted factors (DeCoster, 1998). Values lower than 0.2
are suppressed for clarification. First, note that all items load predominantly on the intended
factors, which is an indicator for convergent validity. Item 6 from the Equity construct (EI6),
as well as items CO1 and CO5 show relatively high cross-loading with the factor equality
(EA). This is problematic and has to be further analyzed by CFA.
In contrast to EFA, CFA assumes a fixed relation of items to latent variables. Constructs that
correlate with each other have to be tested for discriminant validity (i. e. , how selective they
are w. r. t. the correlated variables). This test gives statistical indication whether the constructs
at hand really measure two distinct unobservable variables. Several goodness of fit indices
and modification indices for CFA are available to detect problematic items that distort the ac-
curate measurement of the latent variables. However, it is also very important to keep in mind
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Table 4.2.: EFA - Initial pattern matrix
Factor






























Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
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the verbal representation of each item and to inspect the statements again before items are
removed from the study (content validity). Only if one can find evidence for contextual mis-
interpretation of items that supports the statistical analysis one should refine the constructs by
omitting them. Otherwise this iterative process can easily divert to simple model tweaking.
Inspection of the confirmatory results shows that the regression weights for all items are signif-
icant. However, the overall model fit is insufficient (CMIN/DF = 4.5 and RMSEA = 0.09).
Inspection of the modification indices and cross checking with the item texts reveal several
problems that have to be resolved.
First, the constructs Equality and Equity are not sufficiently selective to each other. Conse-
quently the items causing this had to be detected and removed. EA7 and EA8 show a high
association with the Equity construct which can be explained by the explicit mentioning of
the words ‘privileged’ and ‘disadvantaged’. EI2 has a kurtosis of above ten, which violates
the boundaries to legitimately assume a normal distribution (e. g. , Kline, 2005). Removing
these three items delivers discriminant valid constructs.
Second, item TP5 shows a very small regression weight (<0.5). Textual inspection of the item
leads to the conclusion that this is the only item not mentioning ‘network quality’, but instead
‘contractual and technical restriction’. The item is therefore removed.
Third, item KN4 also has a borderline regression weight in the CFA. Textual inspection leads
to the conclusion that this item suffers presumably from the well known ‘social desirability’
bias (Fisher, 1993). The item is therefore removed.
CO1 and CO5 show a very high association with the equality construct. Textual inspection
reveals that the verbal negation of these two items lead to the use of equality related phrases.
This most likely caused the lack of discriminant validity. The two items are therefore removed.
For the final set of items an additional EFA is conducted. Note that after the refinement all
items in Table 4.3 load predominantly on the intended factors (convergent validity) and show
a sufficient level of factor loadings. Even though this result is desirable, one has to verify its
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Table 4.3.: EFA - Final pattern matrix
Factor
























Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
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validity to retain the obtained number of factors from the data. The following explanation of
determining this number of factors is based on the article of Brown (2001). In factor analysis,
eigenvalues are used to inspect for how much of the overall variance a factor accounts in a
correlation matrix. For a given factor, the sum of the squared factor loadings is the eigenvalue.
The scree test is used to find the ‘kink’ where the level of eigenvalues appears to level off.
To the right of this point one can assume to find only ‘scree’. Scree is the geological term
referring to the accumulation of fragments at the base of mountains. It means that one should
not extract too many factors, and that all factors to the right of the kink should thus be omitted.
Note, that no other formal criterion exists to interpret the scree plot. The scree plot in Figure
4.8 suggests that the number of factors that have been extracted is valid.
Table 4.4 shows that the eight retained factors account in total for 76,54% of the variance.
Before the refinement procedure the factors were only able to account for 71.8% of the vari-
ance.
Figure 4.8.: Scree plot
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Table 4.4.: EFA - Total variance explained
Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadingsa
Factor Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total
1 6.013 26.142 26.142 4.287
2 2.992 13.010 39.151 3.940
3 2.329 10.126 49.277 2.118
4 1.647 7.163 56.440 3.579
5 1.609 6.996 63.436 3.287
6 1.153 5.013 68.449 2.708
7 0.994 4.324 72.773 2.751
8 0.867 3.770 76.543 1.272
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot
be added to obtain a total variance.
To check the final constructs for discriminant validity and reliability, a second CFA is con-
ducted. Assessment of normality reveals that it is valid to use Maximum Likelihood (ML)
estimation because all items show a skewness below three and a kurtosis below ten (e. g. ,
Kline, 2005).
All items load significantly on their latent variable. The overall measurement model shows
a good model fit (CMIN/DF = 2.1, RMSEA = 0.034). Table 4.5 reports the standard mea-
sures for all latent constructs. Cronbachs alpha (Cronbach, 1951) is a measure for the internal
consistency of a construct. If the correlations between the items of a construct are high, the
measure delivers higher values. Cronbachs alpha attains values between zero and one. The
literature suggests different thresholds for acceptable values. The most strict threshold (0.7) is
postulated by Nunnally (1967, p.245), and all retained constructs fulfill this requirement.
The measure for factor reliability and the AVE (Fornell and Larcker, 1981) indicate how good
the items of a construct are able to measure the latent variable. These measures are very
sensitive to high measurement errors of the items. They are indicators for reliability and
convergent validity of constructs (Zinnbauer and Eberl, 2004).
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Discriminant validity can be checked by a simple χ2 difference test. However, this thesis
relies on the more sophisticated Fornell Larcker criterion (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). The
criterion requires every factor to account for more variance than the squared highest correlation
(maxρ2) with other factors. This ensures that only those constructs are included in the analysis
that are able to explain enough variance on their own, even if they are allowed to correlate with
each other.
Based on the results from Table 4.5, it is valid to proceed with hypotheses testing based on the
proposed structural model using the final constructs as measures for the unobservable latent
variables.
Table 4.5.: CFA - Construct reliability
Construct Items Chronbachs α Reliability AVE Fornell Larcker
(≥ 0,7) (≥ 0,7) (≥ 0,5) (AVE > maxρ2)
Equality 3 0,89 0.89 0.73 0.73 > 0.50
Equity 3 0.78 0.79 0.56 0.56 > 0.50
Care 2 0.79 0.79 0.66 0.66 > 0.40
Professionalism 3 0.84 0.80 0.58 0.58 > 0.40
Transparency 4 0.83 0.83 0.56 0.56 > 0.24
Complexity 2 0.84 0.84 0.72 0.72 > 0.24
Knowledge 3 0.86 0.86 0.68 0.68 > 0.01
Satisfaction 2 0,76 0.73 0.58 0.58 > 0.01
4.8. Evaluation
The model is estimated with the statistical software package AMOS. AMOS is especially
designed for modeling and estimating SEMs. This section provides stepwise estimation output




Before one can start with the inspection of the results, the model fit has to be determined and
evaluated. To this end AMOS reports a multitude of fit indices. The SEM literature is not
always conclusive about the most suitable thresholds. To better understand the measures and
their implication for this model, several fit indices are reported and discussed. First χ2 tests
the null hypothesis that the proposed (overidentified) model fits the data as good as a saturated
(just-identified) model. A saturated model contains as many parameter relations as possible,
only constrained by the degrees of freedom, whereas the the independence model constrains
all relations between the parameters to zero. Table 4.6 reports the CMIN which represents
the χ2 statistics according to the number of estimated parameters in the model (NPAR). The
CMIN alone is not suitable to evaluate the model fit, because it is very sensitive to sample size
(p-value indicates that the null hypothesis of good model fit should be rejected). Therefore,
CMIN/DF has been developed as a suitable alternative. Smaller values of the χ2 statistics
divided by the degrees of freedom indicate a better model fit. The most conservative threshold
CMIN/DF≤2 is suggested by Byrne (1989, p.55).
Table 4.6.: Fit - CMIN
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF
Default model 395 743.238 424 0.000 1.753
Saturated model 819 0.000 0
Independence model 78 15185.003 741 0.000 20.493
One of the most important fit measures in SEM studies ist the Root Mean Square Residual
(RMSEA). The RMSEA is an indicator of how well the estimated model fits the population
covariance matrix. It estimates the lack of fit to the saturated model. Consequently lower
values are more desirable. The RMSEA favors more parsimonious models, because it is very
sensitive to the number of estimated parameters. In addition, AMOS provides a confidence
interval. The literature discusses many different cut-off values that indicate an acceptable fit.
Browne and Cudeck (1993) suggest values below 0.08 and Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest
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values below 0.06. Table 4.7 reveals that the proposed model also fulfills this requirement and
that the confidence interval also includes only desirable values.
Table 4.7.: Fit - RMSEA
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE
Default model 0.028 0.024 0.031 1.000
Independence model 0.141 0.140 0.143 0.000
So-called baseline comparisons are a group of measures that compare the proposed model
with the independent model instead of the saturated model. Consider for instance the Normed
Fit Index (NFI). The NFI is calculated as the difference between the χ2s of the indepentent
and proposed model divided by the χ2 for the independence model. Table 4.8 reports also
the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Incremental fit Index (IFI) and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI).
However, these measures are relatively similar to each other and all of them demand values
above 0.90 to indicate acceptable fit and values above 0.95 to indicate good fit (Bentler and
Bonett, 1989; Baumgartner and Homburg, 1996).
Table 4.8.: Fit - Baseline Comparisons
Model NFI IFI TLI CFI
Default model 0.951 0.978 0.961 0.978
Saturated model 1.000 1.000 1.000
Independence model 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Appendix A.3 reports also the parsimony adjusted measures and the Akaike information crite-
rion. Parsimony adjusted measures are variants of the NFI and CFI, that additionally penalize
for model complexity. However, no general accepted cut-off values for these measures exist,
which makes them difficult to interpret (Zinnbauer and Eberl, 2004). The Akaike information




Due to its exploratory nature, the model might not be the most parsimonious one, but ex-ante
it would be unjustified to remove paths from the model and make ad-hoc assumptions. In this
respect the model is very conservative and controls for many variables that could influence
the ranking of network regimes and the willingness to pay. Nevertheless, pretesting as well
as solid model and survey design are rewarded by overall good fit values. One can there-
fore continue to inspect the estimations of the model and interpret the results. The following
subsections focus predominantly on the presented Hypotheses and the interpretation of di-
rect effects. However, the estimates of the remaining dependent variables, as well as indirect
effects and covariances are reported in Appendix A.4.
4.8.2. Network Regime Preference
Table 4.9 shows side-by-side the effects of all variables on the network regime ranking under
relative and dedicated quality provision mechanisms. IUs with a higher congestion Sensitivity
are not more likely to prefer IU tiering or have a higher WTP for priority under either quality
provision mechanism. This result can be interpreted in two different ways. Participants in the
survey may not be fully aware of their consumption sensitivity, and therefore do not know that
they would have additional gains from a better quality provision in Internet access services.
One could also argue that they might be aware of their congestion sensitivity, but have a low
valuation for additional quality, and therefore make decisions based on other criteria. Based
on these results Hypotheses 1.1-1.2 have to be rejected. However, the effect on the dedicated
quality provision mechanism is at least significant on the 7.5 percent level. Therefore, one
could argue that dedicated quality provision is at least more likely to find acceptance among
users that are aware of their congestion sensitivity, even if the potential effect is very small.
Fairness has indeed an impact on the network regime ranking of participants. In this respect
participants perceive the two quality provision mechanisms fundamentally different from each
other. Participants who perceive Equity as a fair concept in Internet access services are more
likely to prefer the dedicated quality provision mechanism. In contrast to that, Equity does not
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significantly affect the preference for relative quality provision. Furthermore Equality has only
a significant effect on the preference for the relative quality provision mechanism. However,
the effect is only significant on the 7.5 percent level, but it is comparably high. This supports
the non significant effect of Equity and indicates that relative quality provision mechanisms
might be perceived as a violation of the equality principle. Therefore this mechanism might
be more likely to be rejected by customers. Based on these findings Hypothesis 2.1 has to be
rejected and Hypothesis 2.2 can be accepted. Professionalism has no measurable effect on the
ranking of IU tiering with relative quality provision. Conversely, Care has an highly signif-
icant positive effect on the ranking of IU tiering with relative quality provision. The overall
hypothesis was that relative quality provision is more appealing to IUs who perceive trust as
an important aspect in the relation to the ISP. The fact that only Care has an effect may lead to
the conclusion that IUs feel appreciated by the ISP through the possible assignment of prior-
ity. IUs that perceive it as important to feel treated special and with care are presumably more
likely to rank a network regime higher that allows for such preferential and special treatment.
Explicit prioritization taps this preference in contrast to simply splitting up capacity. Dedi-
cated quality provision mechanisms, however, tap the preference for Transparency instead. In
contrast to relative quality provision this mechanism relies less on trust and therefore IUs with
a higher preference for procedural justice rank it higher. Based on these results Hypothesis
2.3 has to be rejected and Hypotheses 2.4 and 2.5 can be accepted.
A similar divergence can be found w. r. t. the Complexity of IU tiering. Perceived Complexity
has only a significant negative effect on IU tiering under relative quality provision. This leads
to the conclusion that participants in the survey perceive relative quality provision mechanisms
as more complex and cumbersome, and therefore have a lower preference for this quality pro-
vision variant. This findings confirm Hypothesis 3.1 and leads to the rejection of Hypothesis
3.2.
The Satisfaction with the status quo has no significant effect on the ranking of both variants
of IU tiering. One could interpret this finding as follows: The participants in this survey did
not consider IU tiering as less useful even if they were already satisfied with the quality of
the Internet access service and the ISP under the status quo. Therefore, one could conclude
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Table 4.9.: Estimates - Ranking quality provision mechanism
Relative QoS Dedicated QoS
Estimate St. Estimate P Estimate St. Estimate P
Complexity -0.104 -0.150 *** 0.035 0.043 0.323
Transparency -0.053 -0.056 0.241 0.148 0.133 **
Care 0.134 0.147 ** -0.101 -0.096 #
Professionalism -0.050 -0.034 0.520 0.086 0.050 0.358
Equity 0.064 0.069 0.225 0.239 0.222 ***
Equality -0.075 -0.102 # -0.012 -0.014 0.797
Knowledge 0.003 0.004 0.912 0.019 0.020 0.612
Age 0.006 0.077 * 0.002 0.018 0.641
Gender 0.052 0.038 0.268 -0.16 -0.100 **
Sensitivity -0.107 -0.029 0.410 0.296 0.068 #
Satisfaction -0.007 -0.011 0.749 0.023 0.030 0.390
Degradation 0.064 0.032 0.334 0.027 0.011 0.735
Problem -0.014 -0.006 0.852 0.063 0.023 0.481
Intensity 0.019 0.095 * 0.009 0.040 0.314
Bill Fixed 0.001 0.015 0.640 0.001 0.024 0.474
Bill Mobile 0.001 0.022 0.497 0.003 0.064 #
Time -0.001 -0.003 0.918 -0.006 -0.025 0.463
Household 0.025 0.043 0.172 0.003 0.004 0.897
Profession 0.013 0.027 0.442 -0.002 -0.003 0.927
# p<0.075, * p<0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
that consumers are at least open to additional quality gains that could be achieved by QoS
mechanisms, even if they are satisfied with the status quo. Therefore Hypothesis 4.1 has to be
rejected. Furthermore, it was assumed that users would project the negative experience they
may had with artificial quality degradation in the status quo to an IU tiering scenario. They
could assume that the ISP would try to artificially degrade the BE lane to lurk them into the
costly priority lane. However, the results show that participants who assume more often to be
degraded by their ISP are not significantly more likely to reject IU tiering. Therefore Hypoth-
esis 4.2 has to be rejected.
Besides the explicitly mentioned hypotheses some control variables also show a significant
effect on the preference for IU tiering. Inspection of demographics reveals that older partici-
pants are more likely to favor the relative quality provision mechanism, while males are less
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likely to favor dedicated quality provision. One can also observe that higher usage intensity
has a positive effect on the ranking of the relative quality provision mechanism. Standardized
estimates reveal that the main drivers for the ranking of the relative quality provision mecha-
nism are Complexity and Care, while the main drivers for the ranking of the dedicated quality
provision mechanism are Transparency and Equity.
4.8.3. Willingness To Pay for Priority
Table 4.10 shows the estimates for the variables that are assumed to have an influence on the
willingness to pay for priority access under both quality provision mechanisms. First, note
that consumption is a strong predictor of the WTP for priority under IU tiering under both
quality provision mechanisms. This finding holds true for all variables that can be attributed
to a high level of Internet usage, i. e. , usage Time, usage Intensity, Household size and the
expenditures for fixed and mobile access (Bill Fixed, Bill Mobile). Based on these findings
Hypotheses 1.5 and 1.6 can be accepted.
Sensitivity does not have any effect on the WTP for priority under both quality provision
mechanisms. The possible explanations for the non existing effect are identical to the ones
for the non existing effect on the preference for IU tiering. Therefore Hypotheses 1.4 and 1.5
have to be rejected.
Fairness also has an impact on the WTP for priority. Equity has a highly significant effect
under both QoS mechanisms which leads to Hypotheses 2.6 and 2.7 being confirmed. This
finding may sound counterintuitive in the light of the diverging effects of fairness in the rank-
ing. However, in fact payment decisions almost deterministically trigger the concept of equity
fairness in humans. If people are confronted with a certain network regime, the WTP for ad-
ditional benefits obviously does not depend on fairness concepts that may have influenced the
preference for the regime itself. However, the ranking still has a significant effect on the WTP.
The higher the ranking of a certain quality provision mechanism, the higher is the WTP for
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Table 4.10.: Estimates - WTP Priority
Relative QoS Dedicated QoS
Estimate St. Estimate P Estimate St. Estimate P
Ranking 0.533 0.079 *** 0.465 0.071 ***
Complexity -0.205 -0.043 0.291 -0.346 -0.065 0.11
Transparency 0.416 0.064 0.167 0.578 0.079 0.086
Care -0.173 -0.028 0.582 -0.214 -0.031 0.542
Professionalism 0.738 0.073 0.153 0.530 0.047 0.357
Equity 1.374 0.220 *** 1.882 0.266 ***
Equality 0.272 0.055 0.305 0.328 0.058 0.268
Knowledge -0.216 -0.040 0.288 -0.236 -0.039 0.298
Age -0.018 -0.033 0.365 -0.056 -0.089 *
Gender -0.779 -0.083 * -0.483 -0.046 0.165
Sensitivity 0.756 0.030 0.378 0.671 0.023 0.483
Satisfaction 0.047 0.010 0.752 0.207 0.040 0.217
Degradation 0.115 0.008 0.792 0.147 0.009 0.763
Problem 0.669 0.042 0.178 0.520 0.029 0.348
Intensity 0.231 0.173 *** 0.257 0.170 ***
Bill Fixed 0.018 0.068 * 0.026 0.090 **
Bill Mobile 0.019 0.081 * 0.026 0.100 **
Time 0.140 0.109 *** 0.107 0.074 *
Household 0.313 0.080 ** 0.246 0.056 #
Profession -0.054 -0.016 0.633 -0.091 -0.024 0.471
# p<0.075, * p<0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
priority under the respective quality provision mechanism. Standardized estimates reveal that
the effect is relatively low compared to the direct effect of Equity and the aggregated effect of
heavy consumption. Nevertheless, Hypotheses 5 and 7 are thereby confirmed. Some of the
aforementioned fairness concepts that influence the ranking consequently still have an implicit
effect on the WTP. These indirect effects are reported in Table A.7 in the appendix.
Effort expectancy shows no significant impact on the WTP and thus Hypotheses 3.3 and 3.4
have to be rejected.
Besides the explicitly hypothesized effects control for demographics reveal that older partic-
ipants are willing to pay less for additional quality under relative quality provision and that
males are less likely to pay more under dedicated quality provision.
In summary, one can conclude that heavy users are willing to pay more for additional qual-
139
Chapter 4. Internet User Tiering
ity of service, compared to the status quo. Fairness seems to play an important role, too. If
users perceive Equity as a suitable concept in Internet access services, they have a significantly
higher WTP.
4.8.4. Monetary Compensation for Best Effort
Table 4.11 shows the estimates for the variables that are assumed to influence the monetary
compensation that would be necessary for consumers to accept BE Internet access under the
respective quality provision mechanism.
It was assumed that users would project the negative experience they may had with artificial
quality degradation to the BE service under IU tiering. IUs could assume that the ISP would
try to artificially degrade the BE lane to lurk them into the costly priority lane. However, the
results do not support Hypothesis 4.3 and therefore it has to be rejected.
The effect of fairness on the necessary monetary compensation is supported by the results.
Participants who perceive Care as an important factor in their relation with the ISP are more
likely to demand a higher monetary compensation for BE service. In contrast to that, Pro-
fessionalism has a negative effect, which is only significant under relative quality provision,
but at least significant on the 7.5 percent level under dedicated quality provision. However,
the general intuition exemplified before seems to be confirmed by the data. In contrast to pri-
ority, BE triggers the feeling that the ISP might not care about BE customers, but this effect
is partially counterweighted by the believe in its Professionalism. Even if consumers have to
be compensated, because they are afraid that the ISP might not care about the BE class (or
even feel betrayed), Professionalism makes it more likely that they demand less compensation
under BE. The intuition behind this result can be compared to first and second class service
in an airplane. Customers appreciate the better service in the first class, because they like to
be taken care of personally and they can rely on the professional handling with a good airline
anyway. In the second class, customers, who like to be taken care of might be afraid that the
airline is not interested in their individual well being, and consequently they have also a lower
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WTP for the economy class. But at the same time they know that they can rely on a certain
quality of service, because the airline also handles the economy class with professionalism.
Based on these results, Hypotheses 2.8, 2.10 and 2.11 are accepted and Hypothesis 2.9 has to
be rejected.
The network regime ranking was expected to show a negative effect on the monetary compen-
sation. This can only be confirmed for dedicated quality provision. Hypothesis 6 therefore has
to be rejected and Hypothesis 8 can be accepted, but the effect size is comparably small. In
addition to that, Table A.7 reveals that there are no significant indirect effects on the necessary
monetary compensation under either quality provision mechanism. Therefore, in contrast to
the WTP, the preference for IU tiering plays no decisive role w. r. t. the necessary monetary
compensation under either quality provision mechanism. Besides the explicitly formulated
hypotheses, one can observe four additional effects. First, Knowledge has a negative effect
on the monetary compensation. IUs with a higher knowledge about computers and networks
are more likely to demand a lower monetary compensation. Versed participants most likely
assume the adverse effect of priority on other IUs to be comparably low, and consequently
they are likely to accept BE for a higher price. Other IUs are most likely over-estimating the
adverse effect and assume a higher disutility from BE service.
In contrast to that, higher usage Time makes it more likely to demand a higher compensation.
Obviously users, that spend a lot of time on the Internet have to be compensated more under
BE, because they expect a higher disutility due to the prevailing adverse effect of prioritization
of other users.
Inspection of the demographic control variables reveals a highly significant and comparably
big effect of age. Obviously older participants have to be compensated significantly more to
accept BE service. This finding could indicate a lower price sensitivity of younger customers.
The Internet might be more important to them in general and consequently they are willing to
accept a higher price even for BE Internet.
Participants with a job that is more likely to result in a higher monthly income also demand
a higher monetary compensation for BE. This effect is significant on the 5 percent level for
relative quality provision, but only on the 7.5 percent level for dedicated quality provision.
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Participants with such jobs are more likely to have higher opportunity costs and are presum-
ably more likely to fear restrictions than other participants. Somewhat puzzling is the negative
effect of usage intensity on monetary compensation that can be observed under relative qual-
ity provision. The only reason for this result could be a proportion of participants that would
perhaps use only a handful of services in the Internet, but those very frequently (e. g. , e-mail).
Sensitivity has no significant effect and therefore it is even more likely that the effect is caused
by usage intensity of insensitive services. These users would perhaps decide for BE on their
own and are happy to pay less compared to NN. With this intention in mind, it would not be
surprising to find that these users are willing to pay comparably more for BE service.
Table 4.11.: Estimates - Compensation BE
Relative QoS Dedicated QoS
Estimate St. Estimate P Estimate St. Estimate P
Ranking -0.121 -0.013 0.506 -0.513 -0.066 ***
Complexity -0.107 -0.017 0.696 -0.262 -0.042 0.329
Transparency -0.394 -0.045 0.353 -0.712 -0.082 0.088
Care 1.129 0.134 * 1.230 0.149 **
Professionalism -1.516 -0.111 * -1.256 -0.094 #
Equity -0.731 -0.086 0.137 -0.458 -0.055 0.343
Equality 0.134 0.020 0.721 0.556 0.084 0.129
Knowledge -0.787 -0.108 ** -0.592 -0.083 *
Age 0.102 0.135 *** 0.107 0.144 ***
Gender -0.190 -0.015 0.666 -0.157 -0.013 0.717
Sensitivity 1.168 0.034 0.335 0.879 0.026 0.459
Satisfaction -0.148 -0.024 0.485 -0.159 -0.026 0.443
Degradation -0.468 -0.025 0.449 0.288 0.016 0.634
Problem 0.415 0.019 0.555 0.058 0.003 0.932
Intensity -0.160 -0.088 * -0.111 -0.062 0.119
Bill Fixed 0.009 0.027 0.423 0 0.001 0.983
Bill Mobile 0.015 0.047 0.154 0.018 0.058 0.078
Time 0.170 0.097 ** 0.117 0.068 *
Household 0.137 0.026 0.413 0.044 0.008 0.788
Profession 0.341 0.075 * 0.281 0.063 #




Table 4.12 shows the estimated regression weights of all variables that are assumed to influ-
ence the presumption to be artificially degraded by the ISP. Sensitivity makes it indeed more
Table 4.12.: Estimates - Degradation
Degradation
Estimate St. Estimate P
Problem 0.252 0.217 ***
Sensitivity 0.162 0.088 *
Gender -0.015 -0.023 0.507
Age 0.003 0.066 0.078
Knowledge 0.011 0.029 0.457
Equality -0.038 -0.104 #
Equity -0.023 -0.050 0.350
Care 0.063 0.141 **
Transparency -0.023 -0.049 0.283
Intensity -0.001 -0.01 0.796
Bill Fixed -0.002 -0.086 **
Bill Mobile 0.002 0.140 ***
Professionalism -0.049 -0.067 0.201
Time 0.004 0.042 0.207
Household 0.000 0.001 0.976
Profession 0.008 0.031 0.365
# p<0.075, * p<0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
likely to assume to be artificially degraded by the ISP. The same holds true if a participant
is more likely to attribute technical problems to the ISP. Based on these results one can ver-
ify Hypothesis 4.4 and 4.5. Furthermore, one can observe a positive effect of Care on the
presumption to be artificially degraded by the ISP. Participants who perceive Care as an im-
portant aspect in the relation to the ISP are more likely to be suspicious about the delivered
service quality under the status quo. The highly significant effect of Bill Mobile is positive,
whereas the significant effect of Bill Fixed is negative. This finding supports for purported dif-
ference between the behavior of ISPs in mobile and fixed networks. Heavy mobile users are
significantly more likely to presume to be artificially degraded, because they are already more
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likely to have experienced a form of degradation. Mobile network operators today enforce nu-
merous restrictions (e. g. , VoIP throttling, data caps and speed limits) and IUs obviously adapt
their expectations accordingly. These effects have an indirect implication on the satisfaction
with the status quo. Table 4.13 shows the estimated regression weights of all variables that are
assumed to influence the perception of the status quo. Both, the attribution of problems to the
Table 4.13.: Estimates - Satisfaction
Satisfaction
Estimate St. Estimate P
Degradation -0.330 -0.109 **
Problem -0.495 -0.141 ***
Usage sensitivity -0.238 -0.043 0.270
Gender -0.004 -0.002 0.955
Age 0.002 0.016 0.699
Knowledge 0.020 0.017 0.696
Equality -0.013 -0.011 0.850
Equity -0.039 -0.029 0.635
Appreciation 0.038 0.028 0.624
Transparency 0.067 0.047 0.355
Usage 0.005 0.017 0.700
Bill Fixed -0.001 -0.026 0.476
Bill Mobile -0.001 -0.028 0.437
Professionalism -0.039 -0.018 0.766
Time 0.018 0.063 0.089
Household -0.020 -0.024 0.496
Profession -0.001 -0.002 0.968
# p<0.075, * p<0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
ISP as well as the presumption to be artificially degraded by the ISP have a significant nega-
tive effect on the satisfaction with the status quo. This findings confirm Hypotheses 4.6 and
4.7. ISPs therefore indeed reduce their consumers satisfaction with non-neutral network man-
agement procedures. They also face drawbacks from nontransparent management of network
congestion. IUs are more likely to presume to be degraded if they attribute technical problems
to the ISP. Moreover, Table A.6 in the appendix reveals that the attribution of technical prob-
lems to the ISP has an additional significant indirect effect on the satisfaction with the status
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quo (partial mediation). Therefore, ISPs would do better if they communicate their network
status more detailed to customers and prevent the attribution of problems to their business.
4.8.6. Profitability of Internet User tiering
The question remains if it is profitable for ISPs to introduce IU tiering to their customer base.
Recall that the preference for IU tiering has a positive significant effect on the WTP for IU
tiering. Even if the effect is not huge, it makes sense to take into consideration implementing
the most preferred quality provision mechanism to maximize the positive effect on the WTP
for priority. Figure 4.9 shows the distribution of the ranking of each quality provision mecha-
nism. The bars indicate how often a network regime has been ranked according to the values
presented in Table 4.1. The figure reveals that dedicated quality provision is preferred over
the relative quality provision mechanism. The figure reveals that more than one third of all
respondents would favor IU tiering with dedicated quality provision over all other alternatives.
This means 72.26 percent of all respondents deciding for IU tiering as their most favored net-
work regime would prefer the dedicated quality provision mechanism. This result is strongly
in favor of a dedicated quality provision mechanism if the transition to an IU tiering system is
planned.
To further analyze the WTP of participants in the survey the difference between the premium
for priority and the necessary compensation for BE has been calculated for each respondent in
both network regimes. For the reminder of this thesis this difference will be called the delta.
This new variable is useful to classify participants. A positive delta indicates that a participant
has a higher valuation for the anticipated additional quality in the priority lane in relation to
the expected disutility of beeing in the BE lane. Conversely, a negative delta indicates that a
participant expects a higher disutility from being in the BE lane compared to the expected gain
from additional quality in the priority lane. The group of participants with a negative delta can
be further divided into users who boycott IU tiering and those who don’t. Boycott means that
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Figure 4.9.: Preference quality provision mechanism
users indicate zero additional WTP for priority and maximum necessary compensation for
BE. This means those IUs would accept BE Internet access only for a price of zero and would
pay for priority Internet access only the same price as under NN. Otherwise, they implicitly
claim to stay out of the market and to buy no Internet access at all. Figure 4.10 shows the
distribution of these three distinct groups. The figure reveals, that the share of the boycott
group is comparably high with 17-18 percent.
This effect can also be seen in Figure 4.11, which shows the aggregated demand curves for
priority and BE under IU tiering. To understand this figure, recall that any customer provides
two times a tuple of prices (priority and BE).
It is obvious, that even a monopolistic ISP has no incentive to deviate from the status quo,
because any price change from the anchored price under NN (20 Euros) would inevitably
drive so many customers out of the market that additional revenues from priority can not
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Figure 4.10.: Delta WTP
compensate for the losses.4 Any deviation from NN would drive the whole boycott group out
of the market.
To better understand this effect consider an example. Imagine a monopolistic ISP would cal-
culate its priority price based on the premium that participants report to be willing to pay for
priority and not based on the total price for priority access. Based on this assumption and
the aggregated demand shown in Figure 4.11, the ISP could calculate the revenue maximizing
premium for priority access. Therefore he would charge 9.9 euros extra for priority access
under dedicated quality provision and 4.9 euros for priority access under relative quality pro-
vision. This would maximize his revenues from priority premiums. As a result of this priority
access prices he could expect in the best case that 29.95 percent of the participants would
be willing to buy priority access under dedicated quality provision and 49.33 percent of the
participants under relative quality provision. Based on the residual demand for BE (each cus-
tomer can only buy once) the revenue maximizing price for BE service would be 9.9 euros
4Under the assumption, that 20 euros is the optimal monopoly price under NN.
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Figure 4.11.: Aggregated demand
in both network regimes. As a result 27.38 percent of the participants would buy BE access
under dedicated quality provision and 18.67 percent under relative quality provision. The total
revenue under dedicated quality provision would be 58.33 percent of the revenue under NN
and under relative quality provision 70.66 percent of the revenue under NN.
Now consider another ISP that decides based on the data, but prices priority and BE services
according to the average WTP of its customers. To this end consider the following formula, in
which α denotes the share of consumers under IU tiering buying prioriy and WT P represents
the average willingness to pay for priority and BE, respectively, assessed independently for
















In order to establish an IU tiering regime with higher revenues compared to NN the ISP has to
earn more money with the average customer compared to NN (i. e. , more than 20 euros). The
average willingness to pay under IU tiering with relative quality provision for priority access
is 24.34 euros and for BE access 7.96 euros. Conversely, under IU tiering with dedicated
quality provision the average willingness to pay for priority access is 25.47 euros and for BE
access 7.80 Euro. In order to increase the revenues compared to NN the ISP would have to
convince at least 73.5 percent of the existing customer base to buy priority under an IU tiering
regime with relative quality provision and 69 percent under IU tiering with dedicated quality
provision. However, given these prices and the data at hand, the necessary share of priority
buyers could not be achieved and IU tiering would not be profitable.
Limitations
A limitation w. r. t. Research Question 5 is the sample of users that already pays for Internet
access services. BE access for a lower price compared to NN could activate new users to buy
Internet access and encourage them to enter the market. With the data at hand, one cannot
make any predictions about how many additional users the introduction of a cheaper BE class
could attract (if any). This fact relativizes the findings above. With the introduction of ser-
vice classes in Internet access, the ISP wants to create a separating equilibrium in the market
between users with a high valuation for quality and users with a low valuation of quality. How-
ever, the surveyed data does not provide information about the participants’ decision between
priority and BE access if they are in an IU tiering scenario. Therefore, one cannot directly
infer what a user would choose if he or she faces a tuple of priority and BE prices that are
below his or her WTP for the respective service class. This information is important, because
otherwise one cannot make any prediction about how many users would opt for the cheaper
service and therefore cannibalize the priority service.
Another important aspect that cannot be further evaluated by the data of this survey are the
costs of QoS provisioning. It has been argued in Chapter 4 that many network components
149
Chapter 4. Internet User Tiering
today are already capable of QoS, and therefore hardware costs are presumably low. However
ISPs have to install new billing systems and have to make the provision of priority transparent
to the consumer. On this end investments into the accounting and billing infrastructure might
be necessary, but those costs are likely to be fixed and not variable.
In sum it is very doubtful that IU tiering with two classes of services could be a profitable
strategy for ISPs. The most likely scenario of successful IU tiering might by the activation of
people who currently do not use the Internet because they perceive it as too costly. With the
data at hand only such a demand expansion effect could lead to higher profits.
4.9. Implications
Fairness plays an important role in the perception of IU tiering. By contrast, the status quo has
no direct influence on the acceptance of new network regimes and the WTP. The presumption
about artificial quality degradation has no negative effect on those decisions. However, this
factor has an direct effect on the satisfaction with the status quo. Violations of NN (e. g. , to
reduce costs) have already a negative impact on customer satisfaction today and consequently
on the business of ISPs too. The model suggests further that more technical problems that
are attributed to the ISP have an impact on the presumption to be degraded by the ISP. Un-
intentional restrictions with the Internet access service could be misinterpreted as intentional
degradation, or increase the awareness of customers for quality issues.
Consumers who that think Care is an important aspect of the relation to the ISP are more
likely to assume to be degraded intentionally. One could assume that those customers are
more suspicious.
Relative and dedicated quality provision mechanisms are perceived completely different. Rel-
ative quality provision mechanisms are less likely preferred if users are afraid of the effort
and the complexity that may come along with the introduction of differentiated services. In
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addition, it is likely that users perceive relative prioritization as a violation of the Equality
principle. However, relative priority also suggests the impression of personal and individual
treatment. This could explain why Care has a positive effect on the preference for relative
quality.
In reverse, dedicated quality mechanisms appeal to consumers who have a preference for
Transparency, and are therefore more likely to be preferred. Moreover, dedicated quality
mechanisms are not likely to be less preferred if Equality is important to consumers. Quite the
contrary is true. Equity fairness is associated with this network regime and therefore it appeals
to consumers that perceive this concept as suitable for Internet access services.
The WTP for priority under IU tiering shows a quite homogeneous picture. As expected, Eq-
uity is a main driver for the WTP, but also heavy users are willing to pay more. By contrast,
the monetary compensation is mostly influenced by trust in the relation to the ISP. If BE is
perceived as a negative event from the customer’s point of view, customers with a high per-
sonal attachment to the ISP (Care) have to be compensated more, while users that rely on the
business aspects of the relation to the ISP (Professionalism) have to be compensated less.
Furthermore, older people have to be compensated more under BE, which might be due to
the fact that younger participants have a higher valuation of the Internet, even with BE ser-
vice. Users with a better understanding of technical matters are more likely to demand a lower
monetary compensation. Perhaps these users do not tend to overestimate the negative adverse
effects of prioritization on the BE class.
The profitability of the introduction of IU tiering is highly doubtful (at least in the form pre-
sented in this study). A large proportion of the participants decide for NN as their most
preferred network regime (52.31 percent) and many users boycott through their indication of
a non-existent additional WTP for priority and the rejection of BE service for a positive price.
Note that these results were found despite the fact that the emotionally charged term NN was
avoided throughout the whole survey.
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This could be overcome by clever marketing efforts. Imagine the ISP offers three classes
of service (instead of two) and presents the medium priority class as the ‘neutral’ standard
access product for e. g. , 20 euros. Priority access would be priced as a premium option on top.
BE access could be marketed as a monthly price discount. This presentation would reduce
the impression of a ‘two-class’ world and still deliver a neutral reference point for existing
customers.
Nevertheless, dedicated quality provision shows many favorable characteristics. It triggers
the desired aspect of distributive justice and avoids the impression to treat users unequally.
The network regime ranking of dedicated quality provision seems not to be influenced by
interpersonal justice, which could reduce negative brand effects (i. e. , the preference may not
crucially hinge on the reputation of the ISP). Therefore this variant is recommended for an
introduction of IU tiering and should be explicitly mentioned in the communication with the
potential customers.
Further research is needed to make predictions about potential cannibalization of the priority
services classes through BE and what demand expansion effects can be expected from cheaper
BE products. It would be also interesting to include the level of provided quality (compared
to NN) as a variable. The estimates for the WTP under priority and BE in this study do not
advertise any guarantees w. r. t. the delivered quality. To the respondent it is not fully clear how
much quality gain or loss he has to expect, even if the animations in the survey were explicitly
designed to show an equal gain-loss ratio compared to NN. Conversely, the expectation about
the delivered quality is at least partially included in the indicated WTP for priority and BE.
Providing respondents with real life examples (e. g. , a live video embedded in the survey,




Neutrality in the Internet Ecosystem
“[...] you can’t regulate technology. What you have to do is regulate an industry.”
Ivan Seidenberg (CEO of Verizon Communications) (Murray, 2010)
THE notion of neutrality in Internet access services has already flashed over to otherparts of the Internet ecosystem. This outlook presents directions of how the topic might
evolve in the future. The chapter is based on the paper by Krämer, Wiewiorra, and Weinhardt
(2012). Each section provides the main arguments for a neutrality principle in the respective
domain and discusses if the principle of neutrality could be legitimately applied in other layers
of the Internet Ecosystem as well. Figure 5.1 shows in what ways the principle of neutrality
could be applied up and down the Internet value chain.
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Network Neutrality
(e.g., QoS tiering, CDNs)
Content & Service Neutrality
(e.g., search neutrality)
Device Neutrality
(e.g., application store neutrality)
upstream
downstream
Figure 5.1.: Neutrality in other layers of the Internet ecosystem
5.1. Net Neutrality and Content Distribution Networks
Section 1.4.4 already gave a brief introduction into the business model and the technology
of CDN. Figure 1.2 illustrates the possible substitution between the service of an CDN and
QoS tiering w. r. t. data transmission quality in the Internet. Both technologies are capable to
deliver content or services with a desired level of Quality of Experience to the customers.
Proponents of NN argue that CDNs are no violation of NN, since they deliver data without vi-
olating the BE principle, although they do not use the same routes as other traffic. In addition,
proponents argue that there is sufficient competition between traditional CDNs. Consequently
they can not be seen as gatekeepers to data transmission quality in the Internet.
Opponents (e. g. , Yoo, 2005) argue, that the mere existence of CDNs already introduces an
entry barrier for new and financially weak CSPs. Many of the existing NNN concerns are
therefore not inherent to neutrality, but inherent to market power. This leads to the question
if the market for CDNs is indeed sufficiently competitive. Akamai, the biggest and oldest
CDN, currently has more than 60 percent market share (Rice, 2010). Clearly, this would be
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considered a dominant position by any regulatory authority. Therefore, large CDNs should be
considered as gatekeepers in the Internet economy.
In the recent years telecommunications providers and other eyeball ISPs have begun to in-
vest heavily in CDN technology and offer content distribution products in their own networks.
Local access providers often cooperate with bigger CDN providers and they market these
products as upgrades to the basic operational features of their distribution networks (e. g. ,











End to end Quality of Experience (QoE)
End to end connection Quality of Service (QoS)
End to end 
network QoS
End to end 
network QoS
Figure 5.2.: End-to-end service quality (inspired by Statovci-Halimi and Franzl, 2011)
ditional CDNs are only able to deliver data to the ‘front door’ of an eyball ISP network because
they have no direct control over the internal network infrastructure of ISPs. They can provide
end-to-end network quality only in the backbone of the Internet, whereas eyeball ISPs offer
only end-to-end network quality in their own local access networks. Both parties are, con-
sequently, unable to offer end-to-end connection quality (see Figure 5.2). One could rather
argue, that the services of both sides are complements to each other.
Nevertheless, also under this scenario ISPs use their market power to provide a costly product,
giving only paying CSPs a competitive advantage in their own network. It is obvious that even
if the technology is different from QoS, the possible negative implications could be similar to
the ones discussed in Section 2.2.1. One could argue, that the introduction of CDN technology
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in eyeball ISP networks is only a technological circumvention of possible NN ruling. Even
if data is transported based on the BE principle, market power over the infrastructure allows
ISPs to grant quality improvements in their networks to financially strong CSPs exclusively.
5.2. Device Neutrality
Renda (2010) points out that the Internet ecosystem in all it’s parts is affected by vertical
competition. Players up and down the Internet value chain exert pressure on the network layer
by taking over revenue sources previously exploited by ISPs.
In recent years, with the tremendous success of smart phones and tablet computers, mobile
device manufacturers (e. g. , Apple) and owners of mobile operating systems (e. g. , Google)
are exerting more and more control over the content and services that are consumed on this
class of devices. In the days when predominantly feature phones were sold, (mobile) network
operators were in control of what software and services were preinstalled one the subsidized
devices. On these devices there was no customizable operating system installed, and cus-
tomers were stuck with whatever software or services were supported by their providers. This
power structure has changed dramatically. Nowadays mobile ISP have almost lost complete
control over the software on mobile devices. Their own affiliated services (Short Message
Service (SMS), Multi Media Message (MMS), video telephony etc.) are becoming obsolete,
because their functionality is replaced by applications that rely only on Internet connectivity
and not on special network embedded service protocols. Additionally, device manufacturers
are opposing wishes from network owners to control the technological capabilities of their
handsets. Hahn et al. (2007, p.424) names the following restrictions that network operators
try to impose on subsidized devices, sold together with mobile phone contracts.
• “Require handset be sold by operator (or agent of operator)
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• Prevent use of handset on rival’s network
• Require manufacturers to remove or limit call timers
• Disable certain Bluetooth functionality
• Disable Wi-Fi
• Must use additional service to transfer photos”
In this respect Apple changed the mobile industry fundamentally. The company entered the
market with a highly desired product, the iPhone, and offered to the mobile operators a trade-
off in the aforementioned dimensions. They agreed to multi year exclusive deals for the iPhone
with one single operator per country, giving this certain provider the possibility to extract a
(local) monopoly rent on the contracts sold with the phone. Apple also agreed to limit the
usage of the handset to this single network. In exchange they claimed full control over the end
user experience and software, including all wireless functionalities. After having successfully
established a significant market presence they let all exclusive deals expire.
This paradigm shift resulted in a gradual decline of value added services by mobile operators.
The elimination of these traditional revenue sources is often viewed as the main driver for the
desire to introduce QoS in mobile networks (Wu, 2007; Wallsten, 2007; Hahn et al., 2007).
After coining the term Net Neutrality in 2003, Wu extended the concept to the mobile industry
by subsuming the related problems with the term ‘Wireless Net Neutrality’. In the respective
paper Wu (2007) surveys the practices of mobile network operators to exert as much control
over their networks as possible (see list above). He calls for regulation that would impose the
right to connect any non-harmful device to the network. He also calls for regulation of sub-
sidization of devices and strict rules to prevent ‘crippled products’, like phones with disabled
Bluetooth functionality.
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Wallsten (2007) responds to the paper of Wu in a short note. He thinks that many of Wu’s
arguments are flawed because there is enough competition in the wireless industry, and he
lists many counterexamples.
Hahn, Litan, and Singer (2007) call for an moderate approach w. r. t. to wireless NN. They
conclude that regulatory intervention is only necessary if there is a definite market failure and
if the proposed interventions lead to a better outcome as the status quo. This recommendation,
however, seems tautological.
5.3. Content and Service Neutrality
A similar line of argumentation may hold true upstream of the Internet value chain as well.
Also on the content and service layer of the Internet ecosystem one can observe a concentration
of market power and the emergance of new gatekeepers. One prominent example is Google.
Google’s search engine is the entry point to the Internet for many IU around the world. The
search engine is the first place to go, when looking for information in the WWW. However,
no one really knows or can control how the Google search algorithm decides which results are
displayed on top. Google only publishes the set of measures that are taken into account, but
there is no information on how a single measure is weighted in the final ‘page rank’.
Odlyzko (2009) argues that even Sergey Brin and Larry Page, the founders of Google, once
thought, that advertisement funded search engines have an incentive to bias search results in
favor of their paying advertisers. The problem becomes even more evident if one considers
other well known gatekeepers in the modern Internet ecosystem. Social network providers
(e. g. , Facebook, Google+) own the information on the so-called ‘social graph’ (the aggregate
information about all links between members of the social network, as well as the related per-
sonal information on each member). With this information search engines can even more per-
sonalize search results based on personal preferences, social affiliation and the user’s browsing
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history. Grimmelmann (2010, p.438) presents the following eight “[...]search-neutrality prin-
ciples:
1. Equality: Search engines shouldn’t differentiate at all among websites.
2. Objectivity: There are correct search results and incorrect ones, so search
engines should return only the correct ones.
3. Bias: Search engines should not distort the information landscape.
4. Traffic: Websites that depend on a flow of visitors shouldn’t be cut off by
search engines.
5. Relevance: Search engines should maximize users’ satisfaction with search
results.
6. Self-interest: Search engines shouldn’t trade on their own account.
7. Transparency: Search engines should disclose the algorithms they use to
rank web pages.
8. Manipulation: Search engines should rank sites only according to general
rules, rather than promoting and demoting sites on an individual basis.”
Grimmelmann states that a search engine, that treats all websites equally can not distinguish
between relevant and irrelevant information. A search engine should not decide what is
correct information because this is in the eye of the user. Each search term may lead to
ambiguous results, because the understanding of the term may differ between users. This
is also the reason why personalization of search (i. e. , unequal treatment) may be the best
solution to narrow down the potential meaning of search terms.
In his view the argument of search engines being biased because they favor big traffic
intensive websites over small ones is flawed, too. For an algorithm ‘relevance’ usually means
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‘information that matters’ and information that already matters to a lot of people is likely to
be also more important to another user (and not a small website that no one visits).
Furthermore, he states that there is no reason to establish a right for constant traffic. In his
view, the exact opposite should be done, because users should not be directed to a site, if it is
irrelevant to them. This is the natural free market competition of new content and services,
that finally may lead to further innovations. This is one of the underlying arguments of NN
and would even be perverted under this principle.
Transparency, in contrast to regulation of Internet access, is no viable option in the search
business. The search algorithm itself and the exact composition of relevant parameters
used to generate search results are the core business secret of the search engine company.
Enforcing transparency would make the service easily duplicable and consequently could kill
the business of search engines.
In summary Grimmelmann comes to the conclusion that all of these principles are unusable
for any possible form of regulation in the market for Internet search. However, he also comes
to a conclusion that is similar to the decision support guideline for NN regulation proposed in
Section 2.4: “Just because search neutrality is incoherent, it doesn’t follow that search engines
deserve a free pass under antitrust, intellectual property, privacy, or other well-established
bodies of law. Nor is search-specific legal oversight out of the question. Search engines are
capable of doing dastardly things[...]” (from Grimmelmann, 2010, p.438)
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"The Internet needs a makeover. Unfortunately, congressional initiatives aimed at preserving
the best of the old Internet threaten to stifle the emergence of the new one."
David Farber and Michael Katz (Farber and Katz, 2007)
THIS work on the economics of NN and the effect of priority pricing in access networksextends the existing NN literature in several ways.
To structure the different approaches, arguments and assumptions about NN and the potential
threats of deviations from the status quo a NNN framework has been proposed. The frame-
work is structured along two important dimensions: The network regime, which describes the
degree of network management, and the pricing regime, which can be either one- or two-sided.
This categorization allows to evaluate NNN on the basis of unique scenarios, each of which is
based on an individual set of assumptions. In the political debate about NN different scenarios
often get mixed up and consequently illegitimate conclusions are drawn.
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Furthermore, all threats and possible regulatory remedies of the proposed NNN scenarios have
been consolidated in a policy decision guideline. The guideline recommends regulators to
first check two fundamental assumptions: First, ISPs face (or will face) a congestion problem
in the access and backhaul networks and second, ISPs are not able to cope with the increasing
costs for additional capacity, and therefore have to generate additional revenues. Only if these
assumptions are found to be valid a deviation from the status quo would be necessary. The
proposed decision guideline embeds a NN law as the last resort. Each possible threat of
the different NNN scenarios can be counteracted by less severe measures. This is important
because the mere identification of potential problems does not necessarily imply that ISPs
would exploit their technological power under NNN, especially if they are in competition with
each other. Only if those measures are assumed (or proven) to fail, a NN law would be suitable.
The policy decision guideline complements the NNN framework and allows politicians and
regulators to evaluate their available measures to protect the Internet ecosystem from possible
negative effects of network management and network pricing.
The reminder of this work analyzed QoS tiering. The two relevant scenarios which have been
identified in the NNN framework are CSP tiering and IU tiering.
Chapter 3 analyzed the scenario in which CSP can pay an additional fee to get preferential
access to the customer base of individual ISPs. To this end a theoretical model has been
presented that extends the existing literature by incorporating the aspect of entry (innovation),
endogenous quality differentiation and congestion sensitivity. This approach allows to analyze
an important aspect of the CSP tiering scenario in a setting with a monopolistic ISP: The
interplay between innovation at the edge of the network and innovation at the core.
It has been found that under the assumption of uniform congestion sensitivity CSP tiering is
most likely the welfare superior network regime. This has two main reasons: First, in the long-
run CSP tiering fosters the entry of new congestion sensitive services that could not establish a
sustainable business under NN, and second, the introduction of QoS distributes the congestion
more efficiently between the heterogeneous CSPs.
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These results stem from the fact that QoS pricing provides the ISP with additional revenues,
which in turn allows for higher network investments. Conversely, this means that compared
to NN CSPs are worse off, because the ISP is now able to extract some of their revenues
through priority pricing. The remaining CSPs are worse off because they are now suffering
from higher congestion. However, under uniform congestion sensitivity, no CSP is driven out
of the market.
These results obviously depend on the distribution function of congestion sensitivity. It has
been shown with a special non-uniform distribution function, that a higher mass of congestion
sensitive CSPs could lead to situations in which NN is the superior network regime. MQSs in
the context of CSP tiering have to be used with caution. Especially political goals like quality
parity between BE and NN could lead to an excessive investment in capacity.
Chapter 4 analyzed the scenario in which ISPs introduce preferential treatment of data to the
IU side of the market. Regulators are less concerned about IU tiering because it represents a
one-sided pricing scheme (i. e. , only IU pay) and, therefore, many NNN threats are irrelevant.
IU tiering is consequently more likely to be accepted by regulators. Therefore, ISPs are inter-
ested in a successful transition to and a sustainable business case under IU tiering.
Real world examples in the context of NN show that consumers can outrage about perceived
unfair treatment and can, as a consequence, boycott new business practices. This work ex-
tends the existing literature by providing an empirical model to analyze the effect of fairness
on the acceptance of IU tiering and the WTP to pay for preferential access, as well as the nec-
essary monetary compensation to accept BE service. To collect data an online survey among
1035 representative Internet access customers has been conducted. The data has been used to
confirm and evaluate a SEM. The results reveal that fairness indeed plays an important role
in the perception of IU tiering, and that relative and dedicated quality provision mechanisms
are preferred for fundamentally different reasons. Dedicated quality provision is favored by
customers who perceive Equity as the suitable allocative fairness concept and indicate that
Transparency about their Internet access is important to them.
In contrast to that, relative quality provision mechanisms rely on the concept of Trust, and
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customers who prefer personal and individual treatment are more likely to choose this net-
work regime. However, customers who are afraid of the complexity that comes along with
IU tiering are less likely to opt for the relative quality regime. In addition, it is at least very
probable that customers who perceive Equality as the suitable concept of allocative fairness in
the context of Internet access service are less likely to opt for IU tiering with a relative quality
provision mechanism.
The WTP for priority depends to some extend on the preference for the respective quality
provision mechanism. Furthermore, customers who perceive Equity as the suitable allocative
fairness concept have a higher WTP for priority.
The necessary monetary compensation for BE depends on both aspects of Trust. While Pro-
fessionalism makes it less likely that customers demand a higher compensation under BE,
customers who prefer individual and personal treatment (Care) from their ISP are more likely
to demand a higher compensation.
All these findings have several important implications for regulators and ISPs alike.
Implications for ISPs ISPs need to consider that customers do not only care about the
mere outcome of preferential treatment, but also take into account the mechanism of how
this outcome is achieved. Dedicated quality provision is highly preferred by customers, and
this preference is less facilitated by customers’ trust in the ISP than by the mechanism itself
appearing more transparent. The analysis of the profitability of IU tiering (as presented in the
survey) revealed that the additional WTP for priority is most likely not sufficient to establish
a sustainable business case, neither under dedicated nor relative quality provision. This leads
to the conclusion that the introduction of two service classes may not be suitable to facilitate
a successful transition to an IU tiering regime. To this end, at least three service classes might
be necessary to provide existing users with a ‘neutral’ reference case.
A business case for this kind of quality differentiation should consider that ISPs with a stronger
brand are more likely to be able to charge higher prices for BE, compared to their competitors.
If the brand effect leads to higher trust in the ISP, the necessary compensation for BE could be
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lower. The WTP for priority does not depend on trust in the ISP, but customers unambiguously
have a higher WTP for priority delivered by a dedicated quality provision mechanism. This
result is despite the fact that customers receive the same level of quality under relative and
dedicated quality provision. Furthermore, customers have a measurable WTP for priority and
three classes of service could help ISPs to absorb this premiums from equity driven customers
without intimidating the remaining customers.
Since regulators are very concerned about two-sided pricing, ISPs should be aware that IU
tiering could be the only option to generate additional revenues in the future.
Degradation in the status quo does not influence the decision about IU tiering. However, it
has been shown that the current level of Satisfaction is negatively influenced by potential cost
reducing measures of network management. ISPs who use such methods are more likely to
face an unsatisfied customer base, who may be more likely to switch to a competitor. Further-
more, it has been shown that the attribution of problems with the Internet connection to the ISP
has a positive effect on the presumption to be artificially degraded by the ISP. This calls for
more transparency under the status quo. ISPs should adequately inform their customers about
technical difficulties and other technical restrictions to prevent unfavorable conclusions about
their network management practices, which in turn could negatively affect their customers
satisfaction.
Implications for Regulators Regulators face the difficult challenge to correctly evaluate
existing and necessary network capacities as well as the resulting level of congestion in the
networks. Based on these evaluations they have to decide if the claims of ISPs are legitimate
and NNN is necessary. Furthermore, they have to evaluate the distribution of congestion sensi-
tivity among CSPs, because CSP tiering might only be superior to NN if not too many (future)
services are congestion sensitive. They further have to weight the possible gains and threats
of certain NNN scenarios against each other and, if necessary, implement remedies to resolve
potential issues. However, ex-ante NN regulation should only be the last resort if regulators
expect or find all other measures to fail. Otherwise NN obligations could hinder investments in
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the network infrastructure. Faulhaber and Farber (2010) look into the 2008 spectrum auction
(700 Mhz) in the US which can be considered a natural experiment in NN regulation, because
one spectrum block was attached to NN obligations. The authors find that the attached NN
obligations “[...]decreased the value of the spectrum asset by 60%” (Faulhaber and Farber,
2010, p.331).
The implications about CSP tiering are especially relevant for quasi monopolistic Internet ac-
cess markets like in the US. Further research is needed to make predictions about the possible
effect of QoS tiering in competitive market environments. However, it is very likely that the
findings of the monopolistic setting carry over to a duopolistic setting, in which CSPs multi-
home (i. e. , are connected to each ISP individually). Even if regulators come to the conclusion
that a deviation from the status quo would not be necessary per se, the question remains why
ISPs should be forbidden to manage their networks to generate additional revenues, if QoS
tiering is found to be welfare superior to NN. However, in the current debate, ISPs focus
predominantly on arguments about impending congestion and the resulting investment prob-
lems.
Future Research The research presented in this work could be extended in several ways.
Consider first the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3. Section 2.3.1 summarized the
paper of Reggiani and Valletti (2012) that already considers an extension of the model to a
setting with CSPs with different market power. The question remains how QoS tiering per-
forms in a competitive environment. The discussion exemplified the most likely result under
multi-homing. In reality, however, the Internet is an interconnected network of networks, and
quality provision depends on the agreements between different ISPs. Therefore, it would be
interesting to further analyze the interplay between and the forming of coalitions of different
ISPs offering QoS products. Furthermore, the degree of competition between ISPs might de-
pend on the number of service classes. Classic economic literature (e. g. , Shaked and Sutton,
1982) suggests that two competitors are able to abate competition through quality differentia-
tion. However, this result may depend on the number of service classes (i. e. , qualities).
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The research project about IU tiering could be further extended to analyze possible profitable
IU tiering business cases. To this end, it is fruitful to find out how users perceive a deviation
to more than two service classes. Future studies have to survey explicitly the preference for
a certain service class to allow for more sophisticated profitability analysis. Furthermore,
future studies should consider a representative sample of the whole society instead of focusing
on Internet access customers exclusively. This would allow to estimate a possible demand
expansion effect through the introduction of cheaper BE tariffs. As a consequence, a pen and
paper questionnaire would have to be used because otherwise the sample would be biased in
favor of participants with Internet access. The study presented in this work focused on the
prioritization of individual users. However, ISPs could also decide to grant preferential access
based on single services or service categories that have to be specified by the customers. The
question remains if a segregated approach to priority pricing could lead to higher revenues.
This approach to IU tiering could also help to reduce the number of participants implicitly






1) Please indicate your agreement to the following statements (1=disagree/5=agree).
© I am satisfied with my Internet service provider.
© I am satisfied with my Internet connection quality.
© I am responsible for the contract of my Internet access.
2) Please indicate your average Internet usage time per day
© in fixed access networks:
© in mobile networks:
3) How much do you pay on average per month for telecommunications services (Inter-
net, telephony, TV)?
© in fixed access networks:
© in mobile access networks:
I
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Please answer the following questions with respect to your Internet consumption in fixed line
access networks. The following section presents different concepts to handle data traffic in
Internet access networks. To visualize the different concepts please imagine the Internet as
a highway and the data packets as cars driving on this highway. As on reals roads, a high
volume of traffic can cause congestion.
4) Please compare concept A and B with each other. (cf. Figure A.1)
Highlighted (colored) cars represent data packets that arrive simultaneously at a congested
area. The blue data packet is treated like all other data packets on the road. The golden euro
symbol represents the eligibility to bypass a congested area. The green car has this eligibility,
whereas the red car has not.
© Concept A: All data packets are treated equally in the congested area.
© Concept B: For an additional fee data packets can bypass a congested area. Other data





Figure A.1.: NN vs. IU tiering relative quality
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5) What is the characteristic of the blue data packet?
© The data packet is treated like all other data packets.
© The data packet is eligible to bypass a congested area.
© The data packet has to wait in a congestion situation until other data packets passed by.
6) What is the characteristic of the gree data packet?
© The data packet is treated like all other data packets.
© The data packet is eligible to bypass a congested area.
© The data packet has to wait in a congestion situation until other data packets passed by.
7) What is the characteristic of the red data packet?
© The data packet is treated like all other data packets.
© The data packet is eligible to bypass a congested area.
© The data packet has to wait in a congestion situation until other data packets passed by.
8) Pleas imagine Internet access according to concept A (blue data packet) costs 20 eu-
ros per month. Ho much would you be willing to pay for Internet access with priority
according to concept B (green data packet)?
© Slider: 20-40 euros.
9) Pleas image Internet access according to concept A (blue data packet) costs 20 euros
per month. Ho much would you be willing to pay for Internet access without priority
according to concept B (red data packet)?
© Slider: 0-20 euros.
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10) Please compare concept A and C with each other. (cf. Figure A.2)
Highlighted (colored) cars represent data packets that arrive simultaneously at a congested
area. The blue data packet is treated like all other data packets on the road. The golden euro
symbol represents the eligibility to bypass a congested area. The green car has this eligibility,
whereas the red car has not.
© Concept A: All data packets are treated equally in the congested area.
© Concept C: One lane of the road can only be used for an additional fee. As a result the




Figure A.2.: NN vs. IU tiering dedicated quality
11) Pleas imagine Internet access according to concept A (blue data packet) costs 20
euros per month. Ho much would you be willing to pay for Internet access with priority
according to concept B (green data packet)?
© Slider: 20-40 euros.
12) Pleas imagine Internet access according to concept A (blue data packet) costs 20
euros per month. Ho much would you be willing to pay for Internet access without
priority according to concept B (red data packet)?
© Slider: 0-20 euros.
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13) Please compare concept B and C with each other. (cf. Figure A.3)
Highlighted (colored) cars represent data packets that arrive simultaneously at a congested
area. The golden euro symbol represents the eligibility to bypass a congested area. The green
car has this eligibility, while the red car has not.
© Concept B: For an additional fee data packets can bypass a congested area. Other data
packets that have not bought this eligibility have to wait in such a situation until those packets
passed by.
© Concept C: One lane of the road can only be used for an additional fee. As a result the





Figure A.3.: IU tiering relative quality vs. IU tiering dedicated quality
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15) If you have problems accessing services or websites from this category. What is in
your opinion the most likely reason?
© My Internet Service Provider.
© The provider of the service or website.
© Other users, trying to use this service or website at the same time.
© My technical equipment. (e. g. , Wireless Fidelity (WiFi), computer etc.)
16) Do you think that your Internet Service Provider at least once blocked or degraded












18) If you have problems accessing services or websites from this category. What is in
your opinion the most likely reason?
© My Internet Service Provider.
© The provider of the service or website.
© Other users, trying to use this service or website at the same time.
© My technical equipment. (e. g. , WiFi, computer etc.)
19) Do you think that your Internet Service Provider at least once blocked or degraded
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21) If you have problems accessing services or websites from this category. What is in
your opinion the most likely reason?
© My Internet Service Provider.
© The provider of the service or website.
© Other users, trying to use this service or website at the same time.
© My technical equipment. (e. g. , WiFi, computer etc.)
22) Do you think that your Internet Service Provider at least once blocked or degraded












24) If you have problems accessing services or websites from this category. What is in
your opinion the most likely reason?
© My Internet Service Provider.
© The provider of the service or website.
© Other users, trying to use this service or website at the same time.
© My technical equipment. (e. g. , WiFi, computer etc.)
25) Do you think that your Internet Service Provider at least once blocked or degraded
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27) If you have problems accessing services or websites from this category. What is in
your opinion the most likely reason?
© My Internet Service Provider.
© The provider of the service or website.
© Other users, trying to use this service or website at the same time.
© My technical equipment. (e. g. , WiFi, computer etc.)
28) Do you think that your Internet Service Provider at least once blocked or degraded












30) If you have problems accessing services or websites from this category. What is in
your opinion the most likely reason?
© My Internet Service Provider.
© The provider of the service or website.
© Other users, trying to use this service or website at the same time.
© My technical equipment. (e. g. , WiFi, computer etc.)
31) Do you think that your Internet Service Provider at least once blocked or degraded
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32) Please indicate your agreement to the following statements (1=disagree/5=agree).
© I know a lot about the technical functionality of the Internet.
© In my circle of friends and my family I am considered an expert for computers.
© I have in-depth knowledge about computer networks and data transmission technologies.
© I often need help with computer problems.
33) Please indicate your agreement to the following statements (1=disagree/5=agree).
© I think using the Internet is easier, if all services and websites are treated equally.
© The usage of the Internet becomes difficult, if I have to consider the option to prioritize
data.
© I perceive it as clearer, if all services and websites are receive the same network quality.
© The option to prioritize data makes the usage of the Internet cumbersome for me.
34) Please indicate your agreement to the following statements (1=disagree/5=agree).
© I feel only comfortable using the Internet, if I am acquainted with all details of my Internet
tariff and the respective connection quality..
© It is important to me to have easy access to all information related to the provided network
quality.
© It is important to me that all information about the provided network quality are unambigu-
ous and understandable..
© I feel uncomfortable using the Internet, if information about my Internet access tariff and
the respective connection quality are not verifiable.
© I feel uncomfortable, if contractual and technical restrictions of my Internet access service
are not revealed to me.
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35) Please indicate your agreement to the following statements (1=disagree/5=agree).
© Only if every Internet user gets the same network quality I perceive this as fair.
© Only uniform transportation of data makes sure, that all Internet users have the same
prerequisites.
© If network capacity is split up equally between all Internet users, this is fair.
© Nobody should be privileged in data transportation in the Internet.
© Nobody should be disadvantaged in data transportation in the Internet.
36) Please indicate your agreement to the following statements (1=disagree/5=agree).
© It is important to me that my Internet Service Provider is honest.
© It is important to me that my Internet Service Provider is reliable.
© It is important to me that my Internet Service Provider understands me.
© It is important to me that my Internet Service Provider is professional.
© It is important to me that my Internet Service Provider takes care of me.
37) Please indicate your agreement to the following statements (1=disagree/5=agree).
© It is fair that users who are willing to pay a premium get a prioritized Internet connection.
© I think it is unfair, if other users get a prioritized Internet connection, because they are
willing to pay a premium.
© If a user wants to pay less than other users, it is fair that he gets a lower connection quality.
© Prioritization of data for a premium fee is unfair, because other users experience a lower
connection quality because of that.
XIII
Appendix A. Internet User Tiering
38) Please indicate your gender.
© female
© male
39) Please indicate your age.
© under 18 years
© 18 - 29 years
© 30 - 39 years
© 40 - 49 years
© 50 - 59 years
© 60 years and older





© 5 persons or more
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A.2. Extensive Model Specification
Note that all fairness and control variables are allowed to covary with each other (indicated by
double arrows at the grouping boxes). Furthermore, the error terms of the ranking variables,
as well as the error terms of the WTP and compensation variables are allowed to covary with
each other. These relations are necessary because the decisions are not independent from each
other. For instance, any influence which is not explicitly considered by the model but may
cause a higher WTP for priority under relative quality provision, will also partially influence
the WTP for priority under dedicated quality provision. The covariances and correlations are
reported in Table A.8 and A.9.
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A.3. Model Fit
Table A.1.: Fit - Parsimony
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI
Default model ,572 ,544 ,560
Saturated model ,000 ,000 ,000
Independence model 1,000 ,000 ,000
Table A.2.: Fit - AIC
Model AIC BCC
Default model 1533.238 1567.071
Saturated model 1638.000 1708.150




Table A.3.: Estimates - Problem ISP
Problem ISP
Estimate St. Estimate P
Usage sensitivity -0.051 -0.032 0.375
Gender 0.001 0.002 0.954
Age 0.003 0.076 #
Knowledge -0.004 -0.013 0.749
Equality -0.011 -0.036 0.528
Equity -0.041 -0.105 0.063
Appreciation 0.024 0.061 0.254
Transparency -0.008 -0.021 0.663
Usage -0.001 -0.007 0.874
Bill Fixed 0.000 0.017 0.622
Bill Mobile 0.001 0.063 #
Professionalism -0.043 -0.068 0.216
Time -0.001 -0.014 0.688
Household 0.004 0.017 0.599
Profession -0.006 -0.030 0.402
# p<0.075, * p<0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table A.4.: Estimates - Complexity
Complexity
Estimate St. Estimate P
Knowledge -0.134 -0.119 **
Equality 0.131 0.124 *
Appreciation -0.178 -0.136 **
Transparency 0.364 0.266 ***
Equity -0.474 -0.358 ***
Age -0.007 -0.063 0.091
Gender 0.165 0.084 *
Usage sensitivity -0.063 -0.012 0.735
Satisfaction -0.024 -0.025 0.466
Usage 0.009 0.031 0.437
Bill Fixed 0.001 0.025 0.439
Bill Mobile -0.001 -0.016 0.618
Degradation 0.005 0.002 0.957
Problem -0.159 -0.047 0.142
Professionalism 0.039 0.018 0.729
Time -0.004 -0.013 0.700
Household 0.031 0.044 0.208
Profession 0.005 0.006 0.855
# p<0.075, * p<0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table A.5.: Estimates - Intercepts
Relative QoS Dedicated QoS
Estimate P Estimate P
Ranking 1.129 *** 1.792 ***
Priority -0.194 0.856 2.100 0.081
Best Effort 5.997 *** 7.352 ***
# p<0.075, * p<0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Variables that have no significant indirect effect on at least one of the dependent variables in
the model are omitted for clarification.
Table A.6.: Indirect Effects (Part 1)
Degradation Satisfaction Complexity Ranking Ranking
Relative Dedicated
Equity -0.010 0.031 (*) 0.007 0.047 (**) -0.020
Knowledge -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.015 (*) -0.004
Transparency -0.002 0.012 -0.001 -0.040 (**) 0.013
Care 0.006 -0.034 (**) -0.003 0.023 (*) -0.003
Equality -0.003 0.019 0.001 -0.016 (*) 0.003
Bill Mobile 0.000 -0.001 (**) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Age 0.001 (*) -0.002 (**) 0.000 0.001 0.000
Gender 0.000 0.004 0.000 -0.018 (*) 0.005
Problem ISP 0.000 -0.083 (***) 0.015 0.035 -0.012
Complexity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p<0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table A.7.: Indirect Effects (Part 2)
Compensation WTP Priority Compensation WTP Priority
BE Relative Relative BE Dedicated Dedicated
Equity 0.036 0.123 0.000 0.235 (*)
Knowledge 0.003 0.036 0.027 0.056
Transparency -0.031 -0.129 -0.198 -0.042
Care -0.023 0.145 (*) 0.122 0.038
Equality 0.010 -0.088 -0.043 -0.061
Bill Mobile 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002
Age 0.000 0.008 (*) 0.002 0.005
Gender -0.014 -0.017 0.032 -0.131
Problem ISP -0.019 0.042 0.176 -0.009
Complexity 0.013 -0.056 (***) -0.018 0.016
* p<0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Variables that do not significantly covary with each other are omitted for clarification.
Table A.8.: Covariances and Correlations (Part 1)
Parameter Covariance P Correlation
Age <–> Transparency 0.692 *** 0.115
Age <–> Intensity -10.792 *** -0.370
Age <–> PANPANF 39.703 *** 0.261
Age <–> Profession 4.709 *** 0.326
Age <–> Professionalism 0.366 ** 0.094
Age <–> Time -2.842 ** -0.094
Age <–> Household Size 0.861 * 0.086
Age <–> Equality 0.630 * 0.080
Age <–> Care 0.496 * 0.078
Age <–> Knowledge -0.512 * -0.070
Care <–> Equity -0.092 *** -0.163
Care <–> Transparency 0.268 *** 0.491
Error RD <–> Error RR -0.207 *** -0.415
Error PD <–> Error BD -8.039 *** -0.285
Error PD <–> Error PR 16.508 *** 0.813
Error PD <–> Error BR -8.289 *** -0.288
Error BD <–> Error BR 29.430 *** 0.821
Error BD <–> Error PR -6.307 *** -0.247
Error PR <–> Error BR -6.638 *** -0.255
Equality <–> Care 0.165 *** 0.233
Equality <–> Transparency 0.240 *** 0.356
Equality <–> Equity -0.495 *** -.709
Gender <–> Knowledge 0.161 *** 0.368
Gender <–> Intensity 0.227 *** 0.130
Gender <–> Equity 0.031 * 0.082
Household Size <–> Knowledge 0.077 * 0.073
Time <–> Knowledge 0.709 *** 0.224
Time <–> Profession -0.750 *** 0.126
Time <–> Care 0.233 * 0.085
* p<0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table A.9.: Covariances and Correlations (Part 2)
Parameter Covariance P Correlation
Bill Fixed <–> Bill Mobile 54.041 *** 0.149
Bill Fixed <–> Household Size 3.444 *** 0.158
Bill Fixed <–> Profession 4.369 *** 0.076
Bill Fixed <–> Time 4.424 * 0.067
Bill Mobile <–> Profession 2.971 *** 0.022
Bill Mobile <–> Time 7.807 ** 0.108
Bill Mobile <–> Care 1.550 ** 0.103
Bill Mobile <–> Professionalism 0.704 * 0.076
Professionalism <–> Equality 0.141 *** 0.324
Professionalism <–> Care 0.222 *** 0.632
Professionalism <–> Transparency 0.183 *** 0.546
Professionalism <–> Equity -0.075 *** -0.216
Sensitivity <–> Time 0.107 *** 0.160
Sensitivity <–> Knowledge 0.037 *** 0.228
Sensitivity <–> Gender 0.020 *** 0.216
Sensitivity <–> Age -0.176 *** -0.114
Sensitivity <–> Intensity 0.272 *** 0.424
Sensitivity <–> Profession -0.025 ** -0.054
Sensitivity <–> Transparency 0.015 ** 0.116
Sensitivity <–> Professionalism 0.008 * 0.092
Sensitivity <–> Household Size 0.016 * 0.072
Sensitivity <–> Care 0.011 * 0.076
Transparency <–> Equity -0.134 *** -0.249
Transparency <–> Knowledge 0.072 *** 0.114
Intensity <–> Transparency 0.368 *** 0.147
Intensity <–> Knowledge 0.876 *** 0.287
Intensity <–> Bill Mobile 10.440 *** 0.150
Intensity <–> Professionalism .197 *** 0.122
Intensity <–> Time 3.516 *** 0.279
Intensity <–> Profession -0.794 *** -0.111
Intensity <–> Equity 0.243 ** 0.094
Intensity <–> Care 0.194 * 0.074
Intensity <–> Bill Fixed -4.451 * -0.070
* p<0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Legend: Covariances and Correlations
• Error RR: Error term Ranking Relative Quality
• Error RD: Error term Ranking Dedicated Quality
• Error PR: Error term Willingness to pay - Priority Relative
• Error PD: Error term Willingness to pay - Priority Dedicated
• Error BR: Error term Compensation - Best Effort Relative




AMOS Analysis of Moment Structures
AVE Average Variance Explained
BE Best Effort
CDN Content Distribution Network
CFA Confirmatory Factor Analysis
CFI Comparative Fit Index
CSP Content and Service Provider
DPI Deep Packet Inspection
DSL Digital Subscriber Line
EFA Exploratory Factor Analysis
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EU European Union
FCC Federal Communications Commission
HTML Hyper Text Markup Language
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
IFI Incremental fit Index
IISM Institute of Information Systems and Management
INDEX Internet Demand Experiment
IP Internet Protocol
IPTV Internet Protocol Television
ISP Internet Service Provider
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network
IT Information Technology
IU Internet User
KIT Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
LTE Long Term Evolution
ML Maximum Likelihood
MLE Maximum Likelihood Estimation
XXVI
MMS Multi Media Message
MQS Minimum Quality Standard
NEP Network Equipment Provider
NFI Normed Fit Index
NN Net Neutrality
NNN Non Net Neutrality
P2P Peer-to-Peer
QoE Quality of Experience
QoS Quality of Service
RMSEA Root Mean Square Residual
SEM Structural Equation Model
SIP Session Internet Protocol
SLA Service Level Agreement
SMS Short Message Service
SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
TAM Technology Acceptance Model
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol
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TLI Tucker Lewis Index
TOS Type of Service
US United States
USA United States of America
UTAUT Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology
VDSL Very High Data Rate Digital Subscriber Line
VoIP Voice over IP
VPN Virtual Private Network
WiFi Wireless Fidelity
WTP Willingness To Pay
WWW World Wide Web
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